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I. INTRODUCTION

An employer discharges an anesthesiologist with sleep apnea for falling
asleep during surgical procedures.' Another employer discharges a
manager with post-traumatic stress disorder for an angry confrontation
with a female co-worker during which he slapped her hand.2 A third
employer discharges a grocery store clerk with Tourette's Syndrome for
outbursts of profanity and racial slurs in the workplace.3 A fourth employer
discharges a long-standing administrative employee with major depression,
who left work in an emotional crisis and was admitted to a psychiatric
hospital, for leaving the workplace without notifying her direct supervisor.4
The Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) prohibits employment
discrimination against qualified individuals with disabilities because of
their disabilities.' Assuming that the conditions of these employees
constitute disabilities within the meaning of the Act, do any of their
1. Brohm v. JH Props., Inc., 947 F. Supp. 299,300-01 (W.D. Ky. 1996), af'd,149 F.3d 517
(6th Cir. 1998).
2. Hamilton v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 136 F.3d 1047, 1049, 1052 (5th Cir. 1998).
3. Ray v. Kroger Co., 264 F. Supp. 2d 1221, 1224 (S.D. Ga. 2003), afj'd,90 Fed. Appx. 384
(11 th Cir. 2003).
4. Simpkins v. Specialty Envelope, Inc., No. 95-3370, 1996 WL 452858, at *1-2 (6th Cir.
Aug. 9, 1996).
5. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a) (2000).
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discharges implicate the protections of the ADA? A few courts have held
that discharge due to conduct causally connected to a disability constitutes
discrimination because of disability and violates the ADA unless the
plaintiff is not qualified for his or her job.' Some other courts have held
that employers can discharge employees for conduct causally connected to
their disabilities only if the violated conduct rules are job-related and
consistent with business necessity.7 Most courts, however, have held that
disabled employees who engage in misconduct are unprotected by the
ADA,8 asserting that "if a disabled employee engages in misconduct, an
employer may terminate or discipline that employee without incurring
liability." 9 Under the majority view, a finding that an employee engaged in
misconduct, even misconduct related to his or her disability, is generally
fatal to the employee's ADA claim.'0 Moreover, although the ADA
requires employers to make reasonable accommodation to the limitations
of disabled individuals, courts have held that the duty of reasonable
accommodation never compels an employer to excuse past misconduct."
The proper analysis of disability-related misconduct is an important
issue under the ADA because many disabilities, particularly mental ones,
manifest themselves in the form of conduct. If employers are able to avoid
ADA scrutiny when discharging a disabled employee simply by pointing
to the employee's conduct, the ADA's promise of equal employment
opportunity to individuals with disabilities will be thwarted. On the other
hand, providing too much protection to disability-related misconduct
would interfere greatly with the ability of employers to operate their
businesses safely and efficiently. The specter of a physician falling asleep
during surgery with impunity, provided that he could later claim that his
behavior was caused by a disability, is a frightening one. But is the
majority view the only interpretation of the ADA that would avoid this
consequence? In order for the anesthesiologist to lose his claim, is it
necessary for the manager, the grocery store clerk, and the administrative
employee to have no recourse under the ADA as well?
In the recent case of Raytheon Co. v. Hernandez, the Supreme Court
indicated that the proper analysis of disability-related misconduct turns on
the distinct forms of disability discrimination prohibited by the ADA:
disparate treatment, failure to provide reasonable accommodations, and
disparate impact.' 2 This Article analyzes the existing jurisprudence on

6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.

See infra Part I1I.B.2.
See infra Part III.B.2.
See infra Part III.B. 1.
Maes v. Henderson, 33 F. Supp. 2d 1281, 1288 (D. Nev. 1999).
Id.
See infra Part II.B.2.
540 U.S. 44, 52-53 (2003).
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disability-related misconduct through the lens of these forms of
discrimination, demonstrating that courts have failed to apply them
properly in cases involving misconduct.
Part II outlines the forms of discrimination prohibited by the ADA, as
well as the ADA's limited protected class. Part HI describes the existing
jurisprudence ofthe ADA and misconduct, discussing disabilities that may
manifest themselves in the form of conduct and exploring current
approaches to cases involving disability-related misconduct. Part IV
critiques the current approaches first by exploring the meaning of
"misconduct" and then by examining the lessons of Raytheon-and its
emphasis on the distinct forms of discrimination-for disability-related
misconduct cases. Part V applies the lessons of Raytheon to the cases of
the anesthesiologist, the manager, the grocery store clerk, and the
administrative employee, exploring the ability of these workers to
challenge their discharges as disparate treatment, disparate impact, and
failure to provide reasonable accommodation. As part of this analysis, this
Article contends that a second chance should be a possible reasonable
accommodation in cases (1) where there is little evidence of employee fault
with respect to both the misconduct and the failure to request an
accommodation prospectively, (2) where the misconduct is of low severity,
and (3) where the employee is unlikely to repeat the misconduct. In Part
VI, the Article concludes that, despite potential problems with
accommodating misconduct, a finding that a discharged employee engaged
in disability-related misconduct should not be fatal to the employee's ADA
claim. Rather, courts should scrutinize carefully whether such employees
have experienced discrimination because of their disabilities, examining
all of the forms of discrimination prohibited by the ADA.
II. PROHIBITED DISCRIMiNATION UNDER THE ADA

Title I of the Americans with Disabilities Act prohibits employers from
"discriminat[ing] against a qualified individual with a disability because
of the disability of such individual in regard to" hiring, discharge, and
other terms and conditions of employment. 13 To understand the scope of
the ADA's protections, it is necessary to understand the meaning of both
"qualified individual with a disability" and "discriminate."
A. QualifiedIndividualwith a Disability
The ADA protects only qualified individuals with disabilities from
discriminatory acts by employers.' 4 A qualified individual with a disability

13. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a) (2000).
14. Id. An exception to this rule involves the ADA's restrictions on medical examinations and
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is "an individual with a disability who, with or without reasonable
accommodation, can perform the essential functions of the employment
position that such individual holds or desires." 5 The statute defines
disability as "a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one
or more of the major life activities of' the individual in question; "a record
of such an impairment;" or, "being regarded as having such an
impairment." 6 Although the statute does not define the term "impairment,"
regulations issued by the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
(EEOC) 7 provide that a physical or mental impairment includes "[a]ny
physiological disorder, or condition, cosmetic disfigurement, or anatomical
loss affecting one or more" of specified body systems,18 and "[a]ny mental
or psychological disorder, such as mental retardation, organic brain
syndrome, emotional or mental illness, and specific learning disabilities."' 9
The scope of the ADA's coverage depends largely on the meaning of
two words: "major" and "substantially. 20 The Supreme Court has stated
that a life activity is major if it is significant and of "comparative
importance," and that the activity in question need not have a "public,

inquiries. Id. § 12112(d). Courts have held that persons who have been subjected to medical
examinations and inquiries prohibited by the statute have standing to sue under the ADA, even if
they are not disabled. See, e.g., Roev. Cheyenne Mountain Conference Resort, Inc., 124 F.3d 1221,
1229 (10th Cir. 1997) (stating that "[i]t makes little sense to require an employee to demonstrate
that he has a disability to prevent his employer from inquiring as to whether or not he has a
disability").
The ADA differs greatly from the seminal antidiscrimination statute, Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-1 to 2000e-17, which does not limit its protection to
members of certain classes. See Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471, 504 (1999)
dissenting) (noting that "every single individual in the work force" is protected by Title
(Stevens, J.,
VII); McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transp. Co., 427 U.S. 273, 279-80 (1976) (holding that Title
VII's prohibition of race discrimination is enforceable by whites as well as blacks); Brill v. Lante
Corp., 119 F.3d 1266, 1270 (7th Cir. 1997) (stating that all men and women are members of a
protected group in sex discrimination cases).
15. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8).
16. Id. § 12102(2). The coverage of the "record of" and "regarded as" definitions of di sability
are outside the scope of this Article.
17. The Supreme Court has questioned the persuasive authority of the EEOC regulations
interpreting the term "disability" because Congress delegated to no agency the authority to issue
such regulations. See Toyota Motor Mfg., Ky., Inc. v. Williams, 534 U.S. 184, 194 (2002); Sutton,
527 U.S. at 479.
18. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(h)(1) (2004). The body systems listed are "neurological,
musculoskeletal, special sense organs, respiratory (including speech organs), cardiovascular,
reproductive, digestive, genito-urinary, hemic and lymphatic, skin, and endocrine." Id.
19. Id. § 1630.2(h)(2). Because the definition of impairment is so broad, few cases have
turned on the issue of whether the plaintiff has an impairment.
20. According to the Supreme Court, "these terms need to be interpreted strictly to create a
demanding standard for qualifying as disabled." Toyota Motor Mfg., Ky., Inc., 534 U.S. at 196-97.
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economic, or daily dimension."'" In a later case, the Court stated that major
life activities are "those activities that are of central importance to daily
life."22 Courts generally agree that the activities listed by the EEOC in its
regulations--"caring for oneself, performing manual tasks, walking,
seeing, hearing, speaking, breathing, learning, and working"23-are major
life activities.24 Other activities that many courts have found to be major
include thinking, eating, and sleeping. Moreover, some courts have found
concentrating and interacting with others to be major life activities."
Regarding the meaning of the phrase "substantially limits," the
Supreme Court has stated that "substantially" means .'considerable' or
"'to a large degree."' 2 7 Accordingly, an impairment that interferes in a

21. Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624, 638 (1998). In Bragdon, the Court held that the
plaintiff's asymptomatic HIV infection was a disability because it substantially limited the major
life activity of reproduction. Id.at 639-41.
22. Toyota Motor Mfg., Ky., Inc., 534 U.S. at 197. The Court thus reasoned that in order for
the performance of manual tasks-the activity at issue in Toyota-to be a major life activity, "the
manual tasks in question must be central to daily life," when viewed either individually or together.
Id.Because the plaintiff's carpal tunnel syndrome and related impairments only limited her ability
to perform certain job-related manual tasks, the Court held that the plaintiff was not entitled to
summary judgment on the issue of whether she had a disability. Id.at 200-02.
23. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(i) (2004).
24. See, e.g., EEOC v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 306 F.3d 794, 801 (9th Cir. 2002) (finding
that seeing is a major life activity); Emerson v. N. States Power Co., 256 F.3d 506, 511 (7th Cir.
2001) (stating that learning and working are "established major life activities"); Mullerv. Costello,
187 F.3d 298, 312 (2d Cir. 1999) (finding that breathing is a major life activity); Benette v.
Cinemark U.S., Inc., 295 F. Supp. 2d 243, 255 (W.D.N.Y. 2003) (finding that hearing is a major
life activity).
25. See, e.g., Brown v. Cox Med. Ctrs., 286 F.3d 1040, 1044-45 (8th Cir. 2002) (finding that
thinking--"[t]he ability to perform cognitive functions"--is a major life activity); Humphrey v.
Mem'l Hosps. Ass'n, 239 F.3d 1128, 1134 (9th Cir. 2001) (finding that "caring for oneself' is a
major life activity) (quoting 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(i) (2000)); Lawson v. CSX Transp., Inc., 245 F.3d
916, 923 (7th Cir. 2001) (finding that eating is a major life activity); Pack v. Kmart Corp., 166 F.3d
1300, 1305 (10th Cir. 1999) (finding that sleeping is a major life activity).
26. See, e.g., Gagliardo v. Connaught Labs., Inc., 311 F.3d 565,569 (3d Cir. 2002) (finding
that concentrating is a major life activity); McAlindin v. County of San Diego, 192 F.3d 1226, 1234
(9th Cir. 1999) (reasoning that "[b]ecause interacting with others is an essential, regular function,
like walking and breathing, it easily falls within the definition of 'major life activity'). But see
Pack,166 F.3d at 1305 (finding that concentrating is not a major life activity); Soileau v. Guilford
of Me., Inc., 105 F.3d 12, 15 (1st Cir. 1997) (suggesting that getting along with others is not a
major life activity because "[t]he concept.., is remarkably elastic, perhaps so much so as to make
it unworkable as a definition"). In its Compliance Manual, the EEOC lists "fm]ental and emotional
processes such as thinking, concentrating, and interacting with others" as "other examples of major
life activities." EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMM'N, EEOC COMPLIANCE MANUAL
§ 902.3(b) (Mar. 1995). As noted by the Soileau court, however, "the manual is hardly binding."
105 F.3d at 15 n.2.
27. Toyota Motor Mfg., Ky., Inc., 534 U.S. at 196 (quoting WEBSTER's NEWINTERNATIONAL
DICTIONARY 2280 (3d ed. 1976)).
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minor way with a major life activity is not a disability. 28 Rather, the
impairment must prevent or severely restrict the individual from engaging
in the major life activity, and the impact of the impairment must be
permanent or long-term.29 Courts generally agree that if an impairment
lasts "at least several months," its impact is long-term.3 ° Moreover, an
individual is substantially limited in the major life activity of working only
if the individual's impairment prevents him or her from working in a broad
class of jobs.31 It is insufficient for the impairment to preclude the
individual from performing "one type of job, a specialized job, or a
particular job of choice."32 Finally, courts must consider an individual's
impairment in its corrected state in determining whether the impairment
substantially limits a major life activity. 33 If medication corrects an
individual's impairment, the impairment is not a disability, and an
employer is free to discriminate against the individual based on that
impairment.34
B. DiscriminationBecause of Disability
To challenge an employer's action under the ADA, a plaintiff must
prove that he or she is a qualified individual with a disability, which-as

28. Id. at 197 (stating that "[tihe word 'substantial' thus clearly precludes impairments that
interfere in only a minor way with the performance of manual tasks from qualifying as disabilities").
29. Id. at 198. In Bragdon, however, the Court emphasized that the ADA "addresses
substantial limitations on major life activities, not utter inabilities." Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S.
624, 641 (1998). Accordingly, the Court reasoned that even though "[c]onception and childbirth
are not impossible for an HIV victim," such an individual is nonetheless substantially limited in the
reproduction because such activities "are dangerous to the public health." Id.
30. Aldrich v. Boeing Co., 146 F.3d 1265, 1270 (10th Cir. 1998) (finding that a reasonable
jury could find the plaintiff's impairment substantially limiting because its anticipated duration was
"at least several months"); see also Reg'l Econ. Cmty. Action Program, Inc. v. City of Middletown,
294 F.3d 35, 48 (2d Cir. 2002) (reasoning that the plaintiffs' impairment of alcoholism was long
term because they would be discharged from a halfway house "'between three and nine months after
admission"' (quoting N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 14 § 375.8(g) [sic])). Similarly, the EEOC
Compliance Manual provides that an impairment "may be long-term, or potentially long-term," if
its duration "is indefinite or unknowable or is expected to be at least several months." EQUAL
EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMM'N, supra note 26, § 902.4(d) (example 2).
31. Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471,491 (1999).
32. Id.at 492. The Court stated further that "[i]fjobs utilizing an individual's skills (but
perhaps not his or her unique talents) are available, one is not precluded from a substantial class
ofjobs. Similarly, ifa host ofdifferent types ofjobs are available, one is not precluded from a broad
range ofjobs." Id.
33. Id.at 482.
at 488-91 (holding that plaintiffs with severe myopia who had 20-20 vision with
34. See id.
the aid of glasses or contacts were not disabled, such that United Air Lines was free to reject their
employment applications because of their myopia).
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discussed above-may not be easy to do. In addition,35 the plaintiff must
prove that the challenged action constituted discrimination because of
disability.3 6 The ADA prohibits discrimination because of disability and
defines discrimination in three main ways: disparate treatment, failure to
provide reasonable accommodations, and disparate impact.37
1. Disparate Treatment
Disparate treatment, "the most easily understood type of
discrimination,"38 is intentional discrimination.39 Disparate treatment
occurs whenever an employer treats a disabled person differently from
others because of a protected trait such as a disability.' In a disparate
treatment case, the plaintiff must prove that a prohibited factor actually
motivated the employer's decision,41 or in other words, that a prohibited
factor caused the employer to make the decision.42
Under Title VII, unless the very narrow bona fide occupational
qualification defense is satisfied, employment decisions based on a
protected trait such as race or sex are prohibited.43 In contrast, the ADA
permits employment decisions motivated by an individual's disability ifthe
individual is not qualified." To be qualified, and thus protected from
disparate treatment on the basis of one's disability, an individual must be

35. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a) (2000).
36. See id. (providing, as the "[g]eneral rule" regarding discrimination, that "[n]o covered
entity shall discriminate against a qualified individual with a disability because of the disability of
such individual").
37. Davidson v. Am. Online, Inc., 337 F.3d 1179, 1188-89 (10th Cir. 2003). The statute also
restricts certain medical examinations and inquiries of employees or applicants for employment as
part of its prohibition against discrimination. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(d) (2000).
38. Int'l Brotherhood of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 335 n.15 (1977).
39. Peebles v. Potter, 354 F.3d 761, 765 (8th Cir. 2004).
40. Raytheon Co. v. Hemandez, 540 U.S. 44, 52 (2003); Peebles, 354 F.3d at 766; see also
Pamela S. Karlan & George Rutherglen, Disabilities, Discrimination, and Reasonable
Accommodation, 46 DUKE L.J. 1, 8 (1996) ("A disabled individual who could perform the job in
its present form, but whom the employer refuses to hire because of a mistaken belief that she cannot
perform the requisite tasks or out of revulsion against the worker's disability (such as a disfiguring
cosmetic condition), is simply a victim of traditional discrimination.").
41. Raytheon Co., 540 U.S. at 52.
42. See Gonzalez v. City of Minneapolis, 267 F. Supp. 2d 1004, 1014 (D. Minn. 2003)
(finding that the plaintiff's ADA disparate treatment claim failed because of the lack of evidence
indicating that "his disability in any way motivated or caused his termination or other adverse
action").
43. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (2000); id.§ 2000e-2(e) (providing that employment decisions
based on "religion, sex, or national origin" are permissible "in those certain instances where
religion, sex, or national origin is a bona fide occupational qualification reasonably necessary to
the normal operation of that particular business or enterprise").
44. Id. § 12112(a).
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able to perform the essential functions of the employment position that he
or she holds or desires, with or without reasonable accommodation.45
Because of the difficulty in finding direct evidence of discriminatory
intent, plaintiffs often attempt to demonstrate disparate treatment using the
burden-shifting approach first developed in the Title VII context in
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green.' Under this approach, a plaintiff first
must establish a prima facie case of discrimination-enough evidence that
will raise an inference of discrimination.47 The burden then shifts to the
employer to articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its
adverse employment action.4" Finally, the plaintiff must prove that the
employer's articulated reason is pretext and that its actual reason was
prohibited discrimination.49 Where the adverse employment action at issue
is termination, courts generally have stated the elements of a prima facie
case of discrimination under Title VII as follows: (1) plaintiff belongs to
a class protected by Title VII; (2) plaintiff was qualified for the job he or
she held; (3) plaintiff was discharged; and (4) the job was not eliminated
after the discharge.5"
45. Id.§ 12111(8).
46. 411 U.S. 792, 802-04 (1973).
47. Id. at 802.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 804. To rule in favor of the plaintiff on a disparate treatment claim, the trier of fact
must find that the employer's motivation for the adverse employment action was discrimination
based on a protected trait. St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 519 (1993). However, "a
plaintiff's prima facie case, combined with sufficient evidence to find that the employer's asserted
justification is false, may permit the trier of fact to conclude that the employer unlawfully
discriminated." Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 148 (2000).
50. See, e.g., Williams v. Ford Motor Co., 14 F.3d 1305, 1308 (8th Cir. 1994). Some courts
have stated that the fourth element of a prima facie case of discriminatory discharge under Title VII
is that the employer replaced the plaintiff with someone outside the plaintiff's protected group. See,
e.g., Brown v. McLean, 159 F.3d 898, 905 (4th Cir. 1998) ("In order to make out a prima facie case
ofdiscriminatory termination, a plaintiff must ordinarily show that the position ultimately was filled
by someone not a member of the protected class."). However, most courts agree that the plaintiff
need not make such a showing. See, e.g., Pivirotto v. Innovative Sys., Inc., 191 F.3d 344, 353 (3d
Cir. 1999) (holding that "a plaintiff need not prove, as part of her prima facie case, that she was
replaced by someone outside of the relevant class"); Williams, 14 F.3d at 1308. In their treatise on
employment discrimination, Harold S. Lewis Jr. and Elizabeth J. Norman state that "the termination
plaintiff usually satisfies element (4) simply by producing evidence that the employer had a
continuing need for someone to perform the plaintiff's work, or, even more clearly, that the
employer in fact filled plaintiff's former position, but not necessarily with someone from another
protected class." HAROLD S. LEWIS JR. & ELIZABETH J. NORMAN, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION
LAW AND PRACTICE § 3.10 (2001).
With regard to the second element of the prima facie case, the plaintiff need only prove that he
or she met the minimum or absolute qualifications of the position. See Walker v. Mortham, 158
F.3d 1177, 1185 (11 th Cir. 1998). Moreover, ifthe employer asserts that it terminated the plaintiff
because of poor work performance or misconduct, courts typically consider such an argument as
the employer's asserted legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for the plaintiff's termination, rather
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As under Title VII, courts in ADA cases frequently use the burdenshifting approach to proving disparate treatment. 1 They vary, however, in
how they describe the elements of a prima facie case of disability
discrimination. Many courts state the elements in discharge cases as (1)
plaintiff has a disability; (2) plaintiff is a qualified individual;5 2 and (3) in
discharging the plaintiff, the employer discriminated against him or her
because of the disability.53 This delineation of the elements of the prima
facie case is problematic, however, because it simply reiterates the statute's
prohibition of discrimination. The ADA prohibits employers from
"discriminat[ing] against a qualified individual with a disability because
of the disability of such individual."54 As discussed above, courts
developed the burden-shifting approach to proving discrimination in order
to allow those plaintiffs lacking direct evidence of discrimination to create
an inference of discrimination using circumstantial evidence.55 Thus,

than finding the plaintiff unable to satisfy the "qualified" element of a prima facie case. See, e.g.,
Aragom v. Republic Silver State Disposal, Inc., 292 F.3d 654,659-60 (9th Cir. 2002) (finding that
plaintiff satisfied his "minimal prima facie burden of establishing that he was qualified for [his]
position," despite employer's argument that he was laid off for inadequate job performance); Cline
v. Catholic Diocese of Toledo, 206 F.3d 651, 660-64 (6th Cir. 2000) ("[W]hen assessing whether
a plaintiff has met her employer's legitimate expectations at the prima facie stage of a termination
case, a court must examine plaintiffs evidence independent of the nondiscriminatory reason
'produced' by the defense as its reason for terminating plaintiff.").
51. See, e.g., Raytheon, Co. v. Hemandez, 540 U.S. 44,49 (2003).
52. Unlike Title VII, which does not require an individual to be "qualified" to receive
protection from employment decisions motivated by a protected trait, ADA plaintiffs must be
"qualified" to receive protection from disparate treatment on the basis of disability. 42 U.S.C.
§ 12112(a) (2000). To be "qualified" under the ADA, a plaintiff must be able to perform the
essential functions of the job with or without reasonable accommodation. Id. § 12111(8).
53. See, e.g., Shaner v. Synthes (USA), 204 F.3d 494, 500 (3d Cir. 2000) ("In order to
establish a prima facie case of disparate treatment under the ADA, a plaintiff must show '(1) he is
a disabled person within the meaning of the ADA; (2) he is otherwise qualified to perform the
essential functions of the job, with or without reasonable accommodations by the employer; and
(3) he has suffered an otherwise [sic] adverse employment decision as a result of discrimination."')
(quoting Gaul v. Lucent Techs., Inc., 134 F. 3d 576,580 (3d Cir. 1998)); Hamilton v. Southwestern
Bell Tel. Co., 136 F.3d 1047, 1050 (5th Cir. 1998) (stating that to make out a prima facie case
under the ADA, plaintiff "must show that (a) he has a disability; (b) he is a qualified individual for
the job in question; and (c) an adverse employment decision was made because of his disability");
Martinson v. Kinney Shoe Corp., 104 F.3d 683, 686 (4th Cir. 1997) (stating that a plaintiff
establishes a prima facie case of discriminatory discharge by proving that "he has a 'disability;'
"that he is a 'qualified individual;"' and that "in 'discharg[ing]' him, his employer 'discriminate[d]
against [him] because of [his] disability"') (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a) (1994)).
54. Id. § 12112(a).
55. In McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, for example, the Court listed the elements of a
prima facie case of a racially discriminatory failure to hire as "(i) that [the plaintiff] belongs to a
racial minority; (ii) that he applied and was qualified for a job for which the employer was seeking
applicants; (iii) that, despite his qualifications, he was rejected; and (iv) that, after his rejection, the
position remained open and the employer continued to seek applicants from persons of [the
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requiring a plaintiff to prove discrimination because of disability-the
ultimate question under the ADA-as part of a prima facie case makes
little sense. 6
Some courts, however, have described the elements of a prima facie
case of discriminatory discharge under the ADA in a manner more
consistent with the purposes of the burden-shifting approach.17 One court
stated the third element as requiring a showing that the plaintiff "suffered
an adverse employment action under circumstances from which an
inference of unlawful discrimination arises. 58 Another court stated that a
plaintiff must show that "he or she was subject to an adverse employment
action" and that "he or she was replaced by a nondisabled person or was
treated less favorably than non-disabled employees."59 As under Title VII,
once a plaintiff establishes a prima facie case of disability discrimination,
the burden shifts to the employer to articulate a legitimate,
nondiscriminatory reason for terminating the plaintiff.6° The plaintiff must

plaintiff's] qualifications." 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973). The Court did not include as one of the
elements "that in not hiring the plaintiff, the employer discriminated against him because of his
race" or "the employer failed to hire the plaintiff because of his race."
56. If a plaintiff must prove discrimination because of disability as part of her prima facie
case, an employer could not prove that it was motivated by a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason
rather than the plaintiff's disability. The plaintiff would have established the ultimate question of
discrimination as part of her prima facie case, and there would be no point in proceeding through
the remaining steps of the burden-shifting approach.
57. In Hutchinson v. United ParcelService, Inc., the court expressly rejected the version of
the prima facie case that includes the "because of disability" element. 883 F. Supp. 379, 395 (N.D.
Iowa 1995). The court reasoned as follows:
This court agrees with those decisions holding that the properprimafaciecase
under the ADA is that most closely resembling the primafacie showing required
for other forms of employment discrimination: the plaintiff need not show at the
primafaciecase phase that he or she was terminated "because of" a disability.
Rather, the plaintiff need only make a showing that gives rise to an inference of
discrimination on the basis of disability.
Id.
58. Young v. Warner-Jenkinson Co., 152 F.3d 1018, 1021-22 (8th Cir. 1998); see alsoButler
v. City of Prairie Vill., 172 F.3d 736, 748 (10th Cir. 1999) (stating that "to establish the third
element of a prima facie case of disability discrimination, the plaintiff must show that she was
terminated because of her disability, or that the employer terminated the plaintiff 'under
circumstances which give rise to an inference that the termination was based on her disability')
(quoting Morgan v. Hilti, Inc., 108 F.3d 1319, 1323 (10th Cir. 1997)).
59. Burch v. Coca-Cola Co., 119 F.3d 305, 320 (5th Cir. 1997) (quoting Daigle v. Liberty
Life Ins. Co., 70 F.3d 394, 396 (5th Cir. 1995)). According to yet another court, a plaintiff must
demonstrate an adverse employment action, that "the employer knew or had reason to know of his
or her disability," and that "after ... termination the position remained open, or the disabled
individual was replaced." Monette v. Elect. Data Sys. Corp., 90 F.3d 1173, 1185 (6th Cir. 1996).
60. See Butler, 172 F.3d at 750 ("Because we have concluded that Plaintiff set forth a prima
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then demonstrate that the asserted reason is a pretext for disability
discrimination, and the plaintiff may do so by showing that the reason is
not credible.6"
The disparate treatment theory of discrimination furthers the goal of
equal treatment of employees. Under the disparate treatment theory, the
plaintiff contends that the employer failed to provide equal treatment and
instead treated the plaintiff differently because of a protected trait.
Different treatment on the basis of disability is prohibited unless the
plaintiff is not a qualified individual able to perform the essential functions
of his or her job with or without reasonable accommodation.62
In contrast, the two other forms of discrimination prohibited by the
ADA-failure to provide reasonable accommodations and disparate
impact-further the goal of equal opportunity. Under both the
accommodations theory and the disparate impact theory, the plaintiff
contends that the employer's equal treatment of its employees operated to
deny the plaintiff equal opportunity, such that the employer must alter that
treatment because of its effect on the plaintiff or on persons in the
plaintiffs protected class.
2. Failure to Provide Reasonable Accommodations
The ADA includes in its definition of discrimination "not making
reasonable accommodations to the known physical or mental limitations
of an otherwise qualified individual with a disability who is an applicant
or employee" unless the employer "can demonstrate that the
accommodation would impose an undue hardship on the operation of the
[employer's] business. 63 The statute provides that reasonable
accommodation may include physical changes to the workplace, such as
"making existing facilities used by employees readily accessible to and
usable by individuals with disabilities." Reasonable accommodation also
may include nonphysical changes, such as "job restructuring" or
"appropriate adjustment or modifications of... policies."65

facie case of discrimination under the ADA, we must examine whether the [employer] proffered a
legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its decision to terminate Plaintiff's employment.").
61. Cleveland v. Home Shopping Network, Inc., 369 F.3d 1189, 1193 (11th Cir. 2004).
62. 42 U.S.C. § 12111 (2000).
63. Id. § 12112(b)(5)(A). The Act also prohibits "denying employment opportunities to ajob
applicant or employee who is an otherwise qualified individual with a disability, if such denial is
based on the need of such covered entity to make reasonable accommodation to the physical or
mental impairments of the employee or applicant." Id. § 12112(b)(5)(B).
64. Id. § 12111(9)(A).
65. Id. § 12111(9)(B). For example, courts have held that modifying the plaintiff's work
schedule may be a reasonable accommodation. See, e.g., Breen v. Dep't of Transp., 282 F.3d 839,
842-43 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (holding, under the Rehabilitation Act, that a modified work schedule-in
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In order to trigger the duty to accommodate, a plaintiff generally must
inform the employer of his or her disability and request an
accommodation.66 Moreover, courts have reasoned that, because an
employer must accommodate only "the 'known' physical or mental
limitations" of an otherwise qualified disabled individual, the duty of
reasonable accommodation is prospective in nature.6" Accordingly, a
"second chance" is not a reasonable accommodation contemplated by the
ADA.68
Commentators frequently have emphasized the distinction between the
traditional equal treatment model of discrimination represented by Title
VII and the equal opportunity model represented by the ADA's duty of
reasonable accommodation. For example, Pamela S. Karlan and George
Rutherglen have stated that "under the civil rights statutes that protect
women, blacks, or older workers, plaintiffs can complain of discrimination
against them, but they cannot insist upon discrimination in their favor;
' As noted by Christine Jolls, however,
disabled individuals often can."69
which plaintiff would work one extra hour at the end of each day without disruptions and then take
one compensatory day off every other week-may be a reasonable accommodation for a plaintiff
whose obsessive compulsive disorder made it difficult for her to complete her tasks with normal
workplace interruptions).
66. Brown v. Lucky Stores, Inc., 246 F.3d 1182, 1188 (9th Cir. 2001) (referring to "the
general rule that an employee must make an initial request" for an accommodation); Robin v. Espo
Eng'g Corp., 200 F.3d 1081, 1092 (7th Cir. 2000) (stating that because plaintiff "did not make a
request for an accommodation under the ADA," his employer "was not required to accommodate
his disability").
67. See, e.g., Office of the Senate Sergeant at Arms v. Office of Senate Fair Employment
Practices, 95 F.3d 1102, 1107 (Fed. Cir. 1996). The EEOC's Enforcement Guidance on the
Americans with Disabilities Act and Psychiatric Disabilities takes the same position, stating that
"reasonable accommodation is always prospective." EQUALEMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMM'N,
EEOC ENFORCEMENT GUIDANCE ON THE AMERICANS wrrH DISABILTIES ACT AND PSYCHIATRIC
DISAmBjTIES 31 (Mar. 25, 1997), availableat http://www.eeoc.gov/policy/docs/psych.html.

68. Burch v. Coca-Cola Co., 119 F.3d 305, 320 (5th Cir. 1997); Corr v. MTA Long Island
Bus, 27 F. Supp. 2d 359, 368 (E.D.N.Y. 1998).
69. Karlan & Rutherglen, supranote 40, at 3. Karlan and Rutherglen further explain that the
ADA contains:
[A] far different definition of "discrimination" than the definition embraced in
other areas of employment discrimination law. Title VII, for instance, essentially
takes jobs as it finds them. It defines discrimination in a negative sense:
employment practices are unlawful only ifthey prevent individuals from doing the
job as the employer defines it. The failure to undertake positive steps to revamp
the job or the environment does not constitute discrimination.
Id.at 9 (footnote call number omitted). Similarly, Samuel Issacharoff and Justin Nelson describe
ADA cases as differing from early discrimination case law in that the redistributive impact of those
early cases "flowed directly from the prohibition on discrimination simpliciter," while most ADA
cases "concern not discrimination simpliciter, but a claimed failure to redistribute in the form of
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these commentators have overlooked the fact that Title VII also
incorporates an equal opportunity model of discrimination through its
disparate impact theory of liability.7" Similarly, in addition to the duty of
reasonable accommodation, the ADA also prohibits employment practices
that have a disparate impact on individuals with disabilities. 1
3. Disparate Impact
As developed in the Title VII context, the disparate impact theory of
discrimination prohibits employers from engaging in facially-neutral
employment practices that have a disproportionately harsh effect on
members of a protected class, unless such practices are job-related and
consistent with business necessity. 72 The Supreme Court first recognized
this theory of discrimination in the case of Griggs v. Duke Power Co., in
which the Court found that an employer violated Title VII by requiring that
employees pass two standardized tests and have a high school diploma in
order to obtain a job in one of the company's more desirable departments,
where such requirements had the effect of disproportionately excluding
black employees and could not be shown to be related to successful job
performance. 73 The Court held that Title VII prohibits "not only overt
discrimination but also practices that are fair in form, but discriminatory
in operation," unless the challenged practice is related to job

accommodation." Samuel Issacharoff & Justin Nelson, Discrimination with a Difference: Can
Employment DiscriminationLaw Accommodate the Americans with DisabilitiesAct?, 79 N.C. L.
REV. 307, 310-11 (2001) (footnote call number omitted); see also Stewart J. Schwab & Steven L.
Willbom, ReasonableAccommodation of Workplace Disabilities,44 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1197,
1200 (2003) (contrasting the '"sameness' model" of Title VII-"requiring employers to treat
African Americans and women exactly the same as others"--with the "'difference' model" of the
ADA--"requiring employers to treat individuals with disabilities differently and more favorably
than others").
70. Christine Jolls, Antidiscriminationand Accommodation, 115 HARV. L. REV. 642, 645
(2001).
71. See Davidson v. Am. Online, Inc., 337 F.3d 1179, 1188-89 (10th Cir. 2003) (explaining
that the ADA prohibits "three distinct types of discrimination"--disparate treatment, not making
reasonable accommodations, and disparate impact); Gonzales v. City of New Braunfels, 176 F.3d
834, 839 n.26 (5th Cir. 1999) (noting that "the disparate impact theory has been adopted entirely
by the ADA").
72. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A) (2000); see also Int'l Brotherhood of Teamsters v. United
States, 431 U.S. 324, 335 n.15 (1977) (explaining that claims of disparate impact discrimination
"involve employment practices that are facially neutral in their treatment of different groups but that
in fact fall more harshly on one group than another and cannot be justified by business necessity").
73. 401 U.S. 424, 431-32 (1971). The Court noted that census statistics revealed that black
males were much less likely to have a high school diploma than white males, and that the EEOC
had found in another case that the use of a group of tests-including the two tests at issue in
Griggs-resulted in only six percent of blacks passing the tests, compared with fifty-eight percent
of whites. Id.at 430 n.6.

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol57/iss2/2

14

2005]

Timmons:
Acommodating
Misconduct
Under
the Americans
with Disabilities
Act
ACT
201
AMERICANS
WITH DISABILITIES
MISCONDUCT
UNDER THE
ACCOMMODATING

performance.74 Even though the challenged requirements may have been
"neutral on their face, and even neutral in terms of intent," the Court
reasoned that they violated Title VII because "Congress directed the thrust
of the Act to the consequences of employment practices, not simply the
motivation."75
Consistent with the disparate impact theory as recognized under Title
VH, the ADA prohibits employers from "utilizing standards, criteria, or
methods of administration" "that have the effect of discrimination on the
basis of disability."76 The ADA also prohibits employers from "using
qualification standards, employment tests or other selection criteria that
screen out or tend to screen out an individual with a disability or a class of
individuals with disabilities unless the standard, test or other selection
criteria, as used by [the employer], is shown to be jobrelated.., and.., consistent with business necessity."" This language is
similar to that used in the Civil Rights Act of 199 1, which amended Title
VH to expressly codify the disparate impact theory of discrimination.78
The method of proving a disparate impact under the ADA differs from
the method under Title VII, however, making it easier for an ADA plaintiff
to utilize this theory of discrimination. Under Title VII, a plaintiff must
prove that an employer "uses a particular employment practice that causes
a disparate impact on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national
origin." 79 In other words, a plaintiff must prove that an employment
practice is disproportionately harmful to members of a class protected by
74. Id. at 431.
75. Id. at 430, 432.
76. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a), (b)(3)(A).
77. Id. § 12112(a), (b)(6).
78. See id. § 2000e-2(a)(2); id. § 2000e-2(k)(l)(A) (stating that "[an unlawful employment
practice based on disparate impact is established" if the "complaining party demonstrates that a
respondent uses a particular employment practice that causes a disparate impact on the basis of race,
color, religion, sex, or national origin" and "the respondent fails to demonstrate that the challenged
practice is job related for the position in question and consistent with business necessity"). Before
this amendment, some commentators had argued that Title VII's language did not support a
disparate impact theory of discrimination. See, e.g., RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, FORBIDDEN GROUNDS:
THE CASE AGAINST EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAWS 182-204 (1992); George Rutherglen,
DisparateImpact Under Title VII: An Objective Theory of Discrimination,73 VA. L. REv. 1297,
1344-45 (1987) (arguing that the basis of the disparate impact theory "is not to be found in any
provision explicitly enacting it into law or in any passage in the legislative history").
The ADA's "screen out" language is consistent with courts' descriptions of how to prove a
disparate impact under Title VII. See, e.g., Grano v. Dep't of Dev., 637 F.2d 1073, 1081 (6th Cir.
1980) ("In a disparate impact situation... the issue is whether a neutral selection device ... screens
out disproportionate numbers of [the protected class]."). Moreover, the regulations issued by the
EEOC to interpret the employment provisions of the ADA specifically refer to these definitions of
discrimination as based on disparate impact. See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.15(c) (2004) (referring to
defenses to "[o]ther disparate impact charges").
79. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(i).
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the statute. Courts generally have insisted that a plaintiff prove a disparate
impact via statistical evidence showing that the employment practice
disqualified or excluded a disproportionate number of persons in a
protected group.8 ° This is a complicated process, requiring the court to
determine the appropriate comparison group-the relevant applicant or
labor pool it must examine to decide whether the challenged employment
practice causes a disparate impact on the basis of a protected trait.8'
In contrast with Title Vil's statistics-based method of establishing a
disparate impact on a protected group, an ADA plaintiff may prove a
disparate impact by demonstrating that an employer's policy "screen[s] out
or tend[s] to screen out an individual with a disability or a class of
individuals with disabilities. ' 2 In other words, an ADA plaintiff may
establish a disparate impact simply by proving that the challenged policy
had an adverse effect on her because of her disabilities; the plaintiff need
not demonstrate an adverse effect on a class of persons with disabilities.83

80. See Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. 977, 987 (1988) (stating that the
evidence in disparate impact cases "usually focuses on statistical disparities"); Robinson v. MetroN. Commuter R.R., 267 F.3d 147, 160 (2d Cir. 2001) (stating that "statistical proof almost always
occupies center stage in a prima facie showing of a disparate impact claim"); Evers v. Alliant
Techsystems, Inc., 241 F.3d 948, 953 (8th Cir. 2001) (stating that a plaintiff must present
"statistical evidence of a kind and degree sufficient to show that the practice in question caused the
plaintiff to suffer adverse employment action because of his or her membership in a protected
group").
81. See In re Employment Discrimination Litig., 198 F.3d 1305, 1312 (11th Cir. 1999)
(explaining that "to determine whether an employment practice causes a 'disparate' impact [on the
basis of race], the court must gain some handle on the baseline racial composition that the impact
is 'disparate' from; that is, what should the racial composition of the job force look like absent the
offending employment practice"). The parties are likely to disagree on what comparison group is
appropriate. See id. ("The contest between the plaintiff and defendant is one in which both seek to
answer the question of who is qualified, and thus to define the qualified applicant pool on their own
terms.").
The court also must decide what magnitude of disparity is required. The Supreme Court has
stated only that the challenged employment practice must disqualify members of a protected class
at a substantially higher rate than persons outside the class. Watson, 487 U.S. at 994-95; see, e.g.,
Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 426 (1971). The EEOC's Uniform Guidelines on
Employee Selection Procedures provide that a selection rate for any protected group which is less
than four-fifths of the rate for the group with the highest rate generally constitutes evidence of
adverse impact. 29 C.F.R. § 1607.4(D) (2004). Some lower courts have relied on this rule to
determine when a disparity is sufficient. See, e.g., Stout v. Potter, 276 F.3d 1118, 1124 (9th Cir.
2002); Waisome v. Port Auth., 948 F.2d 1370, 1375-76 (2d Cir. 1991); see also Ramona L.
Paetzold & Steven L. Willbom, DeconstructingDisparateImpact: A View of the Model Through
New Lenses, 74 N.C. L. REV. 325, 333 n.22 (1996) ("The four-fifths rule is the dominant approach
for determining whether an employer's selection criterion has systematically damaged the plaintiff's
protected class status.").
82. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(6) (emphasis added).
83. See Gonzales v. City of New Braunfels, 176 F.3d 834, 839 n.26 (5th Cir. 1999) ("In the
ADA context, a plaintiff may satisfy the second prong of his prima facie case by demonstrating an
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The EEOC explains the rationale for allowing individually focused
disparate impact claims under the ADA in its Technical Assistance Manual
to Title I of the ADA:
Disabilities vary so much that it is difficult, if not
impossible, to make general determinations about the effect
of various standards, criteria and procedures on "people with
disabilities." Often, there may be little or no statistical data to
measure the impact of a procedure on any "class" of people
with a particular disability compared to people without
disabilities. As with other determinations under the ADA, the
exclusionary effect of a selection procedure usually must be
looked at in relation to a particular individual who has
particular limitations caused by a disability."
Perhaps because disparate impact is similar to the duty of reasonable
accommodation,85 courts frequently overlook it as a viable theory of
discrimination under the ADA.8 6 Two of the statute's references to
"qualification standards" do receive frequent attention, however: the direct
threat provision and the provision regarding the illegal use of drugs and
alcohol.8 ' The ADA creates a defense for action under a qualification
' 88
standard "shown to bejob-related and consistent with business necessity
and further provides that such a qualification standard "may include a
requirement that an individual shall not pose a direct threat to the health or
safety of other individuals in the workplace,"89 if reasonable
accommodation will not enable the individual to perform the job safely.9"
adverse impact on himself rather than on an entire group."); EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY
COMM'N, A TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE MANUAL ON THE EMPLOYMENT PROVISIONS (TITLE I) OF THE
AMERICANS wrrH DIsABILITIES ACT § 1-4.3(2) (1992), availableat http://www.jan.wvu.edulinks/
ADAtam 1.html ("It is not necessary to make statistical comparisons between a group ofpeople with
disabilities and people who are not disabled to show that a person with a disability is screened out
by a selection standard.").
84. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNHTY COMM'N, supra note 83, § 1-4.3(2).
85. See Jolls, supra note 70, at 645 (contending that "some aspects of antidiscrimination
law-in particular its disparate impact branch-are in fact requirements of accommodation").
86. See, e.g., Foster v. Arthur Andersen, LLP, 168 F.3d 1029, 1032 (7th Cir. 1999) ("Under
the ADA, two distinct categories of disability discrimination claims exist: failure to accommodate
and disparate treatment.").
87. See, e.g., Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Echazabal, 536 U.S. 73, 78-79, 87 (2002) (concluding
that an EEOC regulation authorizing the refusal to hire an individual with a disability because his
performance on the job would pose a direct threat to the individual's own health was permitted by
the ADA, despite the fact that the statute's direct threat defense is more narrow); Burch v. CocaCola Co., 119 F.3d 305, 319 n. 14 (5th Cir. 1997); Maddox v. Univ. of Tenn., 62 F.3d 843, 847-48
(6th Cir. 1995).
88. 42 U.S.C. § 12113(a) (2000).
89. Id. § 12113(b).
90. Id. § 12113(a); see also Echazabal, 536 U.S. at 78-79 (describing the direct threat
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In addition, the ADA provides that an employer
may hold an employee who engages in the illegal use of drugs
or who is an alcoholic to the same qualification standards for
employment orjob performance and behavior that such entity
holds other employees, even if any unsatisfactory
performance or behavior is related to the drug use or
alcoholism of such employee.9 '
The statute also provides that "any employee or applicant who is currently
engaging in the illegal use of drugs," is not a qualified individual with a
disability when the employer acts on the basis of such use.92 Individuals
who formerly engaged in the illegal use of drugs but have been
rehabilitated, however, maybe qualified individuals with disabilities under
the Act.93
Alcoholism is an impairment under the ADA,94 and courts have held
that it may substantially limit a major life activity of an individual, such
that the individual is disabled.95 Similarly, courts have held that recovering
drug addicts may be disabled within the meaning of the statute.96
Individuals who are alcoholics or are addicted to drugs sometimes engage
in conduct that employers find objectionable and that is causally connected
defense).
91. 42 U.S.C. § 12114(c)(4).
92. 1d. § 12114(a).
93. Id. § 12114(b)(1). Individuals may also be protected if they are "participating in a
supervised rehabilitation program" and are no longer engaged in the illegal use of drugs. Id.
§ 12114(b)(2).
94. Reg'l Econ. Cmty. Action Program, Inc. v. City of Middletown, 294 F.3d 35,46 (2d Cir.
2002).
95. E.g., id. at 47-48 (holding, in a case arising under Title II of the ADA, that the plaintiffs'
alcoholism was a disability because it substantially limited their ability to care for themselves, given
that they could not "live independently without suffering a relapse"). Most courts agree, however,
that if the plaintiff cannot show that alcoholism substantially limited one ofthe plaintiff's major life
activities, the plaintiff is not disabled. E.g., Bailey v. Ga.-Pac. Corp., 306 F.3d 1162, 1169 (1st Cir.
2002) (finding that the plaintiff's alcoholism was not a disability because it did not limit any of his
major life activities, including the activity of working); Burch v. Coca-Cola Co., 119 F.3d 305, 316
(5th Cir. 1997) (finding that the plaintiff, despite being an alcoholic, "offered no evidence that he
suffered from any substantially limiting impairment of any significant duration"). But see Brown
v. Lucky Stores, Inc., 246 F.3d 1182, 1187 (9th Cir. 2001) (stating, without qualification, that
"alcoholism is a protected disability under the ADA").
96. E.g., MX Group, Inc. v. City of Covington, 293 F.3d 326, 328, 337-39 (6th Cir. 2002)
(holding, in a case arising under Title II of the ADA, that the plaintiffs, who were recovering from
drug addiction, were substantially limited in the major life activities of "working, functioning
socially and parenting," and that despite their methadone treatments, the plaintiffs remained
substantially limited because of the likelihood of relapse); Thompson v. Davis, 295 F.3d 890, 896
(9th Cir. 2002) ("Drug addiction that substantially limits one or more major life activities is a
recognized disability under the ADA.").
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to their disabilities. 97 As discussed above, the ADA expressly provides that
employers may hold employees who are alcoholics or addicted to drugs to
the same qualification standards as other employees.9" Accordingly, if an
employer would discharge a nondisabled employee for certain conduct, it
may discharge an individual disabled by alcoholism or drug addiction who
engages in that conduct, despite any argument that the disability caused the
conduct. 99
Are there any other disabilities that might be causally connected to
conduct that employers find objectionable? And if so, does the ADA
impose any limitations on the ability of employers to discharge disabled
employees for such conduct? Part II answers the first question and
explores how courts have answered the second question.
III. THE ADA AND MISCONDUCT
A.

DisabilitiesThat May Involve Causally ConnectedMisconduct

Several impairments that may substantially limit one or more of an
individual's major life activities-in other words, several disabilities-are
likely to manifest themselves in the form of conduct. Such disabilityrelated misconduct is particularly common with mental impairments, such
as bipolar disorder,"° major depression, post-traumatic stress disorder
(PTSD), or obsessive compulsive disorder (OCD).'0 '

97. For example, employees discharged for being arrested for driving under the influence
have claimed that their alcoholism caused them to drive while intoxicated. Despears v. Milwaukee
County, 63 F.3d 635, 636 (7th Cir. 1995); Maddox v. Univ. of Tenn., 62 F.3d 843, 846 (6th Cir.
1995); see also Pemice v. City of Chicago, 237 F.3d 783, 786 (7th Cir. 2001) (plaintiff contended
that "his drug addiction compelled him to possess drugs" and thus caused the possession of cocaine
for which he was arrested); Burch v. Coca-Cola Co., 119 F.3d 305,310-11 (5th Cir. 1997) (plaintiff
contended that his alcoholism caused him to mouth obscene words and make a "let's leave the
room"-presumably to fight-gesture at another manager during a company social event); Little
v. FBI, 1 F.3d 255, 257 (4th Cir. 1993) (plaintiff contended that his alcoholism caused him to be
intoxicated while on duty); Rodgers v. Fed. Express Corp., No. 92-3747, 1993 WL 220556, at *1
(6th Cir. June 23, 1993) (plaintiff contended that his drug addiction caused his positive drug test
at work); Teahan v. Metro-N. Commuter R.R., 951 F.2d 511, 514 (2d Cir. 1991) (plaintiff
contended that his alcoholism caused his excessive absenteeism).
98. See text accompanying note 91 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 12114(c)(4)).
99. See Pernice,237 F.3d at 785 ("Although the ADA might protect a plaintiff from adverse
employment action taken because of his alcoholism or drug addiction, it provides no bar to
discipline for employee misconduct."); Nielsen v. Moroni Feed Co., 162 F.3d 604,609 (10th Cir.
1998) (stating that "unsatisfactory conduct caused by alcoholism and illegal drug use does not
receive protection under the ADA").
100. According to Susan Stefan, "schizophrenia and bipolar disorder are the diagnoses most
likely to be considered disabilities under the ADA." SUSAN STEFAN, HOLLOw PROMISES:
EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION AGAINST PEOPLE WITH MENTAL DISABILITIES 55 (2002).
101. See Den Hartogv. Wasatch Acad., 129 F.3d 1076, 1087 (10th Cir. 1997) ("Mental illness
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It is undisputed that all of the conditions listed above are
impairments,10 2 but it is disputed whether these impairments constitute
disabilities under the ADA. Whether an impairment is disabling is an
individualized inquiry, focusing on the effect of the impairment on the
individual plaintiff. 13 Accordingly, the fact that a court may have held that
a plaintiff with major depression, for example, is disabled in one case does
not mean that major depression will always constitute a disability under the
ADA. Moreover, because courts must consider the mitigating effects of
medication in determining whether an impairment is substantially limiting,
many plaintiffs with mental impairments will be unable to prove that they
are disabled within the meaning of the Act."4
Despite these obstacles, some plaintiffs with mental impairments have
proven that their impairments substantially limited major life activities and
thus constitute disabilities. 105 Courts have held that plaintiffs with bipolar
disorder raised a jury issue as to whether their condition substantially
limited them in the major life activities of thinking, caring for oneself,
is manifested by abnormal behavior, and is in fact normally diagnosed on the basis of abnormal
behavior."); STEFAN, supra note 100, at 154 ("Many disabilities manifest themselves in forms of
behavior or conduct, and psychiatric disability is manifested almost completely in this way.").
102. Regulations issued by the EEOC provide that mental impairments include "[a]ny mental
or psychological disorder, such as mental retardation, organic brain syndrome, emotional or mental
illness, and specific learning disabilities." 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(h)(2) (2004). The EEOC's
Enforcement Guidance on the ADA and Psychiatric Disabilities describes "emotional or mental
illness[es]" as including "major depression, bipolar disorder, anxiety disorders (which include panic
disorder, obsessive compulsive disorder, and post-traumatic stress disorder), schizophrenia, and
personality disorders." EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMM'N, supra note 67, at 2; see also
Duda v. Bd. of Educ., 133 F.3d 1054, 1059 (7th Cir. 1998) (holding that "medically diagnosed
mental conditions" are impairments under the ADA). The statute further provides that
homosexuality and bisexuality are not impairments, and that compulsive gambling, kleptomania,
pyromania, and sexual behavior disorders such as transvestitism and pedophilia are not disabilities.
42 U.S.C. § 1221 l(a)-(b).
103. Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471, 483 (1999).
104. See, e.g., Mannie v. Potter, No. 01 C 9097, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13501, at *29-31
(N.D. Ill. Aug. 4,2003) (holding that a plaintiff with paranoid schizophrenia, who "takes medicine
daily, as prescribed by her doctor, which controls the symptoms of her illness," does not have a
disability because she "provided no evidence that any of her major life functions is impeded by her
schizophrenia."); see also Randal 1.Goldstein, Note, Mental Illness in the Workplace After Sutton
v. United Air Lines, 86 CORNELL L. REv. 927, 929 (2001) (noting that after Sutton, many
individuals with mental illnesses "who may have previously been considered disabled will now fall
outside the statutory coverage because their medications effectively control their illnesses").
105. Interestingly, since Sutton, no reported case has found that a plaintiff with schizophrenia
was disabled under the ADA. E.g., Mannie, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13501, at *30-31; Boyer v.
K.R.S. Computer & Bus. Sch., 171 F. Supp. 2d 950,964 (D. Minn. 2001) (holding that a plaintiff
with drug-induced schizophrenia could not prove that he was substantially limited in any major life
activity where he was able to work and engage in normal daily functions). But see Deily v. Waste
Mgmt., No. 00-1100, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8555, at *5 (E.D. Pa. June 25, 2001) (assuming that
plaintiff with schizophrenia made out a prima facie case of disability discrimination).
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sleeping, and working.° 6 Plaintiffs with major depression have raised fact
issues as to whether they were substantially limited in thinking, sleeping,
working, concentrating, and interacting with others." 7 Plaintiffs with
PTSD have demonstrated that they might be substantially limited in the
major life activities of sleeping and working,"0 8 while plaintiffs with OCD
106. See, e.g., Taylor v. Phoenixville Sch. Dist., 184 F.3d 296, 302 (3d Cir. 1999) (holding
that a factual issue existed as to whether the plaintiff's bipolar disorder substantially limited her in
the major life activity of thinking even when she was taking lithium); EEOC v. Voss Elec. Co., 257
F. Supp. 2d 1354, 1357, 1360 (W.D. Okla. 2003) (holding that a plaintiff with bipolar disorder
raised factual issue as to whether his condition substantially limited him in the major life activity
of caring for himself); Hansen v. Smallwood, 119 F. Supp. 2d 1296, 1297, 1301 (M.D. Fla. 2000)
(holding that factual issue existed as to whether a plaintiff's bipolar disorder substantially limited
him in major life activity of working); Stewart v. Bally Total Fitness, No. 99-3555, 2000 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 10047, at *13 (E.D. Pa. July 20, 2000) (holding that factual issue existed as to whether
plaintiff's bipolar disorder substantially limited him in major life activities of sleeping and
working). As with any impairment, however, not all plaintiffs with bipolar disorder succeed in
establishing that their condition is disabling, particularly when they assert "working" as the
substantially limited major life activity. See, e.g., Kramer v. Hickey-Freeman, Inc., 142 F. Supp.
2d 555, 559 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (holding that a plaintiffwith bipolar disorder was not substantially
limited in major life activity of working where medication controlled his condition and allowed him
to perform all his job duties); McConnell v. Pioneer Hi-Bred Int'l, Inc., CIV. 98-4060-KES 2000
DSD2, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3335, at * 19-20 (D.S.D. Jan. 25, 2000) (holding that a plaintiffwith
bipolar disorder who took medication was not substantially limited in major life activity of
working).
107. See, e.g., Snead v. Metro. Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 237 F.3d 1080, 1085, 1088-1089 (9th
Cir. 2001) (holding that a factual issue existed as to whether a plaintiff with depression and PTSD
was substantially limited in her ability to work); Cohen v. Ameritech Corp., No. 02 C 7378, 2003
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23166, at *17 (N.D. Iil. Dec. 24, 2003) (holding, on defendant's motion for
summary judgment, that a plaintiff with depression may have been substantially limited in his
ability to work); Ferrero v. Henderson, 244 F. Supp. 2d 821, 830 (S.D. Ohio 2002) (holding that
a plaintiff with anxiety disorder may have been substantially limited in sleeping, working, and
thinking); Schopmeyer v. Plainfield Juvenile Corr. Facility, No. IP 00-1029-CH/F, 2002 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 19209, at *13-15 (S.D. Ind. Sept. 17, 2002) (holding that a plaintiff with depression may
have been substantially limited in sleeping, concentrating, interacting with others, and working).
Butsee Doyal v. Okla. Heart, Inc., 213 F.3d 492,495-99 (10th Cir. 2000) (holding that a plaintiff
with depression and anxiety attacks could not show that she was substantially limited in learning,
sleeping, thinking, or interacting with others); Schneiker v. Fortis Ins. Co., 200 F.3d 1055, 1062
(7th Cir. 2000) (holding that a plaintiff with depression could not demonstrate that she was
substantially limited in her major life activity of working); Rohan v. Networks Presentation LLC,
175 F. Supp. 2d 806, 812 (D. Md. 2001) (holding that a plaintiff's depression and PTSD did not
substantially limit her ability to care for herself).
108. See, e.g., Snead, 237 F.3d at 1085, 1089 (holding that a plaintiff's PTSD and depression
may substantially limit her ability to work); Rohan, 175 F. Supp. 2d at 812, 813 (holding that a
plaintiff's PTSD and depression may substantially limit her major life activity of sleeping); Felix
v. N.Y. City Transit Auth., 154 F. Supp. 2d 640, 654 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (holding that a plaintiff's
PTSD may substantially limit her major life activity of sleeping). But see Hewitt v. Alcan
Aluminum Corp., 185 F. Supp. 2d 183, 189 (N.D.N.Y. 2001) (holding that a plaintiff's PTSD did
not substantially limit his ability to work); Rohan, 175 F. Supp. 2d at 808, 812 (holding that
plaintiff's depression and PTSD did not substantially limit her ability to care for herself).
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have asserted successfully substantial limitations on caring for
themselves. 09
The definitions of each of these impairments indicate that they are
likely to manifest themselves in the form of conduct. The Diagnostic and
Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, Fourth Edition (DSM-IV) defines
Bipolar I Disorder as "characterized by one or more Manic or Mixed
Episodes, usually accompanied by Major Depressive Episodes.""' Manic
episodes, "defined by a distinct period during which there is an abnormally
and persistently elevated, expansive, or irritable mood," may include
"[e]xpansiveness, unwarranted optimism, grandiosity, and poor judgment
[which] often lead to an imprudent involvement in pleasurable activities
such as buying sprees, reckless driving, foolish business investments, and
sexual behavior unusual for the person, even though these activities are
likely to have painful consequences.'. Speech during a manic episode "is
typically pressured, loud, rapid, and difficult to interrupt," and "may be
marked by complaints, hostile comments, or angry tirades.""' 2 The
connection between a manic episode and conduct is highlighted by the fact
that, in order to identify a manic episode, "[t]he impairment resulting from
the disturbance must be severe enough to cause marked impairment in
functioning or to require hospitalization to protect the individual from the
negative consequences of actions that result from poor judgment.""' '
Plaintiffs have alleged that conduct ranging from "loud, abusive, and
insubordinate" behavior in the workplace,"' to providing the employer
with false medical excuses and engaging in sexual behavior in the
workplace,1 5 was causally connected to their bipolar disorder.

109. See Humphrey v. Mem'l Hosps. Ass'n, 239 F.3d 1128, 1134-35 (9th Cir. 2001) (holding
that a plaintiff with OCD was substantially limited in the major life activity of caring for herself
where it took her "significantly more time than the average person to accomplish the basic tasks of
washing and dressing"). But see Steele v. Thiokol Corp., 241 F. 3d 1248, 1251, 1254-55 (10th Cir.
2001) (holding that a plaintiff with OCD was not substantially limited in either sleeping or
interacting with others).
110. Am. PSYCHIATRICASS'N, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICALMANUALOFMENTALDISORDERS
317 (4th ed. 1994). Bipolar II Disorder, in contrast, is characterized by one or more major
depressive episodes and at least one hypomanic episode. Id. at 318.
111. Id. at 328-29.
112. Id. A hypomanic episode, necessary for a diagnosis of Bipolar II Disorder, involves
similar but less severe or extreme characteristics as involved in a manic episode. Id. at 318, 335;
see id.at 335 ("In contrast to a Manic Episode, a Hypomanic Episode is not severe enough to cause
marked impairment in social or occupational functioning or to require hospitalization .....
113. Id. at 329.
114. Carrozza v. Howard County, 847 F. Supp. 365, 367-68 (D. Md. 1994).
115. Hogarth v. Thomburgh, 833 F. Supp. 1077, 1080-82 (S.D.N.Y. 1993); see also Landefeld v.
Marion Gen. Hosp., Inc., 994 F.2d 1178, 1179-81 (6th Cir. 1993) (involving a plaintiff physician who
alleged that his stealing mail from the hospital mailboxes of other physicians was causally connected
to his bipolar disorder); Maes v. Henderson, 33 F. Supp. 2d 1281, 1283, 1286-87 (D. Nev. 1999)
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A major depressive episode, necessary for a diagnosis of bipolar
disorder and both necessary and sufficient for a diagnosis of major
depression, also may influence an individual's conduct. Such an episode,
which is defined by a "depressed mood or the loss of interest or pleasure
in nearly all activities" for a period of at least two weeks, may include
increased irritability and impaired ability to think, concentrate, or make
decisions.116 To identify a major depressive episode, "there must be either
clinically significant distress or some interference in social, occupational,
or other important areas of functioning."' 17 Plaintiffs have alleged that their
poor work performance" 8 and absenteeism" 9 were causally connected to
their depression.
Post-traumatic stress disorder involves "the development of
characteristic symptoms following exposure to an extreme traumatic
stressor," and characteristic symptoms include "persistent reexperiencing
of the traumatic event..., persistent avoidance of stimuli associated with
the trauma and numbing of general responsiveness," and "persistent
symptoms of increased arousal."' 2° The persistent symptoms of increased
arousal may include sleeping difficulties, irritability or outbursts of anger,
and difficulty concentrating or completing tasks. 2 ' Plaintiffs with PTSD
have alleged that their condition caused them to fight with co-workers,
1 23
22
both verbally and physically,' and to make threatening statements.
A diagnosis of obsessive compulsive disorder requires "recurrent
obsessions or compulsions . . . that are severe enough to be time
1 24
consuming ... or cause marked distress or significant impairment.
OCD is likely to manifest itself in the employment context through
interference with "occupational functioning" due to obsessions and
compulsions, which "can displace useful and satisfying behavior and can
has
be highly disruptive to overall functioning.' ' 25 At least one plaintiff
26
claimed that her OCD caused her tardiness and absenteeism.1
(involving a plaintiff who alleged that his "inappropriate sexual joking and... verbal abuse of his
employees" was causally connected to his bipolar disorder).
116. AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS'N, supra note 110, at 320-22.
117. Id. at322.
118. Andrews v. United Way of Southwest Ala., Inc., No. 98-1142-P-C, 2000 WL 210694,
at *24,*9 (S.D. Ala. Jan. 26,2000); Rogers v. CH2M Hill, Inc., 18 F. Supp. 2d 1328, 1333 (M.D.
Ala. 1998); Adams v. Rochester Gen. Hosp., 977 F. Supp. 226, 230, 236 (W.D.N.Y. 1997).
119. Brookins v. Indianapolis Power & Light Co., 90 F. Supp. 2d 993, 1101 (S.D. Ind. 2000).
120. AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS'N, supra note 110, at 424.
121. Id. at425.
122. Hamilton v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 136 F.3d 1047, 1052 (5th Cir. 1998) (involving
a plaintiff with PTSD who argued that an angry encounter with a co-worker, during which the
plaintiff slapped her hand down, was caused by PTSD).
123. Jones v. American Postal Workers Union, 192 F.3d 417, 421-22, 429 (4th Cir. 1999).
124. AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS'N, supra note 110, at 417.

125. Id. at 419.
126. Humphrey v. Mem'I Hosps. Ass'n, 239 F.3d 1128, 1130-31 (9th Cir. 2001).
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Another mental impairment that manifests itself in the form of conduct
is Tourette's Syndrome, a diagnosis of which requires multiple motor tics
and one or more vocal tics. 127 "A tic is a sudden, rapid, recurrent,
nonrhythmic, stereotyped motor movement or vocalization," which "is
experienced as irresistible but can be suppressed for varying lengths of
time., ,128 For some individuals with Tourette's Syndrome, vocal tics
include coprolalia, which involves "use of socially unacceptable words,
frequently obscene.,'129 Not surprisingly, at least one plaintiff with
Tourette's Syndrome has claimed that the condition caused him to make
profane outbursts in the workplace. 3 °
Even some physical impairments may lead to conduct that employers
find objectionable. For example, during periods of low blood sugar,
individuals with diabetes may experience disorientation, difficulty in
concentrating, difficulty standing, irritability, and mood swings.' 3 '
Plaintiffs with diabetes have alleged that the condition caused them to be
uncooperative and confrontational in the workplace, 3 2 and one plaintiff-a
police officer-alleged that his erratic driving of a squad car at high speed
was due to a diabetic reaction.'33 In addition, some plaintiffs with physical
impairments have claimed that medication for their impairments caused
them to behave inappropriately in the workplace by falling asleep, for
example,134 or by fighting.'35
In light of the fact that some disabilities, particularly mental ones,
manifest themselves in the form of conduct, how should courts analyze
cases in which an employer discharges the plaintiff for conduct causally
connected to his or her disability? The next section examines the majority
approach and the two minority approaches to such cases.

127. Am. PSYCHIATRIC ASS'N, supra note 110, at 101. Individuals with Tourette's Syndrome
may be substantially limited in the major life activity of communicating with others, such that the
impairment constitutes a disability under the ADA. Ray v. Kroger Co., 264 F. Supp. 2d 1221, 1226
(S.D. Ga. 2003), aff'd, 90 Fed. Appx. 384 (11th Cir. 2003).
128. Am. PSYCHIATRIC ASS'N, supra note 110, at 100.

129. Id.
130. Ray, 264 F. Supp. 2d at 1224-25.
131. See Siefken v. Vill. of Arlington Heights, 65 F.3d 664, 665-66 (7th Cir. 1995); BuggBarber v. Randstad US, L.P., 271 F. Supp. 2d 120, 122-23,126 (D.D.C. 2003).
132. United States v. Miss. Dep't of Pub. Safety, 309 F. Supp. 2d 837, 839 (S.D. Miss. 2004);
Bugg-Barber, 271 F. Supp. 2d at 129-30. Individuals with diabetes may be substantially limited in
the major life activity of eating. Miss. Dep't of Pub. Safety, 309 F. Supp. 2d at 840.
133. Sieflken, 65 F.3d at 665-66.
134. Buie v. BFGoodrich Textile Chems., Inc., 60 F. Supp. 2d 522, 522 (W.D.N.C. 1999)
(involving a plaintiff who claimed that medication he took for his diabetes and kidney disorder
caused him to fall asleep on the job).
135. Taylor v. Dover Elevator Sys., Inc., 917 F. Supp. 455,463 (N.D. Miss. 1996) (involving
a plaintiffwho claimed that medication he took for epilepsy caused him to be more volatile, which
caused him to fight with a co-worker).
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B. CurrentApproaches to Cases Involving Disability-

Related Misconduct
1. Majority Approach
Most courts have held that disabled employees who engage in
misconduct are unprotected by the ADA because they are unable to prove
the causation element of a disability discrimination claim. For example, in
Hamilton v. Southwestern Bell Telephone Co., the plaintiff, who suffered
from PTSD, was fired after he angrily confronted a co-worker with
profanity.136 The plaintiff contended that his outburst was caused by his
PTSD, "3 7 but the court found that contention irrelevant, reasoning that "the
ADA does not insulate emotional or violent outbursts blamed on an
impairment., 138 In support of that proposition, the court cited a case
involving misconduct by an employee who was an alcoholic,' 3 9 despite the
fact that the ADA has a special provision regarding qualification standards
for employees who are alcoholics or addicted to drugs."4 According to the
court, "[t]he cause of Hamilton's discharge was not discrimination based
on PTSD but was rather his failure to recognize the acceptable limits of
behavior in a workplace environment."'' The court further stated that
"Hamilton 2 can not hide behind the ADA and avoid accountability for his
14
actions.'

Consistent with the reasoning of the Hamilton court, other courts have
held that the discharges of a grocery store clerk with Tourette's Syndrome

136. 136 F.3d 1047, 1052 (5th Cir. 1998). The court found that the plaintiff's PTSD did not
substantially limit a major life activity and thus was not a disability under the ADA. Id.at 1050-51.
Nonetheless, the court also analyzed whether the plaintiff could prove that he was fired "because
of his disability." Id.at 1052.
137. Id. at 1052. Loss of temper was one of the symptoms of PTSD reported by the plaintiff.
Id. at 1051.
138. Id. at 1052.
139. Id. at 1052 n.19 (citing Little v. FBI, I F.3d 255 (4th Cir. 1993)).
140. See text accompanying note 91 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 12114(c)(4) (2000)).
141. Hamilton, 136 F.3d at 1052.
142. Id.Similarly, in Maes v. Henderson,the court rejected the claim ofaplaintiffwith bipolar
disorder who was demoted for sexual harassment, reasoning that "if a disabled employee engages
in misconduct, an employer may terminate or discipline that employee without incurring liability
under the Rehabilitation Act or the Americans with Disabilities Act." 33 F. Supp. 2d 1281, 1288
(D. Nev. 1999). In support of this proposition, the court cited Hamilton and several other cases; all
but Hamilton and one other case involved misconduct committed by employees who were
alcoholics or addicted to drugs. Id. The court stated that "the Act serves to protect individuals from
being treated differently on the basis of their disability" but that it "cannot be used as a sword to
allow disabled employees to engage in behavior that would justify the discipline or discharge of any
other employee." Id. at 1289.
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vulgar language and racial slurs,"' 4 3 a cartographer
for "blurting out
with frontal lobe dysfunction for bizarre behavior such as quacking at a coworker who was carrying a duck head umbrella,'" and a clerk-typist with
bipolar disorder for "insubordinate behavior and outbursts directed towards
her supervisors,""' failed to implicate the ADA because the employees
were discharged because of their conduct, rather than because of their
disabilities.'4 6 Other courts have relied upon the distinction between
discharge due to disability and discharge due to conduct in upholding the
terminations of a physician with sleep apnea for falling asleep during
surgical procedures, 4 7 a postal worker with PTSD for threatening the life
of his supervisor,'48 and an employee with epilepsy for fighting on
company premises.'4 9 In support of this distinction, the courts relied
primarily on cases involving misconduct by alcoholic or drug-addicted
employees, failing to mention the ADA's special provision regarding
qualification standards for such employees."'

143. Ray v. Kroger Co., 264 F. Supp. 2d 1221, 1228-29 (S.D. Ga. 2003), affd, 90 Fed. Appx.
384 (11 th Cir. 2003).
144. Gasper v. Perry, No. 97-1542, 1998 U.S. App. LEXIS 14933, at *6, *22-33 (4th Cir. July
2, 1998).
145. Carrozza v. Howard County, 847 F. Supp. 365, 367-68 (D. Md. 1994).
146. Ray, 264 F. Supp. 2d at 1228 (finding that "Ray cannot sustain his burden of showing that
he was discharged because of his disability" rather than for "his constant outbursts of vulgar
language and racial slurs"); Gasper,1998 U.S. App. LEXIS 14933, at *22 (relying on "the principle
that an employer may terminate an employee for misconduct, even if that misconduct is allegedly
related to the employee's disability"); Carrozza,847 F. Supp. at 367 (reasoning that "[w]here there
is misconduct, even if the misconduct was caused by a qualifying handicap," the Rehabilitation Act
does not bar termination).
147. Brohm v. JH Props., Inc., 947 F. Supp. 299,300-01 (W.D. Ky. 1996), aft'd, 149 F.3d 517
(6th Cir. 1998) ("It is clear in this case that Dr. Brohm was fired for sleeping, not for having sleep
apnea."). The plaintiff in Brohm alleged disability discrimination under the Kentucky Civil Rights
Act, but according to the court, the protections of that statute mirrored those under the ADA. Id.
at 300.
148. Jones v. Am. Postal Workers Union, 192 F.3d 417, 421, 429 (4th Cir. 1999) ("The law
is well settled that the ADA is not violated when an employer discharges an individual based upon
the employee's misconduct, even if the misconduct is related to a disability.").
149. Taylor v. Dover Elevator Sys., Inc., 917 F. Supp. 455,463 (N.D. Miss. 1996) (reasoning
that the "ADA is not designed to give disabled persons preferential treatment" and that "employers
are not required to ignore a disabled employee's disregard ofcompany rules"). The plaintiffclaimed
that the new medication he had been taking for his epilepsy made him more volatile than usual,
such that his fighting was causally connected to his epilepsy. Id.
150. The Carrozzacourt, for example, only cited Little v. FBI, 1 F.3d 255 (4th Cir. 1993), the
same case involving an alcoholic employee relied upon by the Hamilton court. 847 F.Supp. at 36768. Both the Gasper and Taylor courts only cited cases involving misconduct by alcoholic and
drug-addicted employees. Gasper, 1998 U.S. App. LEXIS 14933, at *20-22; Taylor, 917 F. Supp.
at 462. The Jones and Brohm courts each cited several cases, only two of which involved an
employee with a disability other than alcoholism or drug addiction. Jones, 192 F. 3d at 429; Brohm,
947 F. Supp. at 301.
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The reasoning of some of these courts suggests that disabled employees
who commit misconduct, even misconduct causally connected to their
disabilities, fall completely outside the protection of the ADA.' 5 ' The
courts emphasize that a plaintiff must prove discrimination because of
disability and state that a plaintiff who was discharged for misconduct
cannot prove that the employer discriminated because of the plaintiff's
disability. 5 2 It is, of course, true that in order to recover under the ADA,
plaintiffs must prove that they experienced discrimination because of their
disabilities.'53 What courts often fail to clarify, however, is that there are
three ways in which an employer's action can constitute discrimination
because of disability.'54 Courts thus make statements such as "[the] ADA
is not designed to give disabled persons preferential treatment,"'5 5 ignoring
the fact that two of the three theories of prohibited disability
discrimination-failure to provide reasonable accommodations and
disparate impact-involve a contention by plaintiffs that mere equal
treatment serves to deny them equal opportunity. 56 Moreover, courts often
fail to identify under which theory of discrimination they are analyzing a
plaintiff's ADA claim. 7

151. In Carrozza,for example, the court stated that "[w]here there is misconduct, even if the
misconduct was caused by a qualifying handicap .. . , the Rehabilitation Act does not bar
termination or other disciplinary proceedings." 847 F. Supp. at 367. According to the court, "[e]ven
though [plaintiff's] behavior might have been caused-in-fact by plaintiff's bi-polar disorder, the
employer was justified under Little in pursuing adverse employment action against her, to and
including her termination, for her misbehavior in the work place." Id.at 367-68. Similarly, the
Maes court stated that "an employer may discipline an employee for misconduct without violating
the Rehabilitation Act, regardless of whether the misconduct can be directly attributed to the
employee's disability." Maes v. Henderson, 33 F. Supp. 2d 1281, 1288 (D. Nev. 1999); see also
Hamilton v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 136 F.3d 1047, 1052 (5th Cir. 1998) ("An employee who
is fired because of outbursts at work directed at fellow employees has no ADA claim.").
152. See, e.g., Gasper, 1998 U.S. App. LEXIS 14933, at *28 (distinguishing between
"termina[tion] because of... disability" and "discipline or termination as a result of misconduct,
even ifthat misconduct is related to the disability"); Ray v. Kroger Co., 264 F. Supp. 2d 1221, 1228
(S.D. Ga. 2003), aft'd, 90 Fed. Appx. 384 (11 th Cir. 2003) (stating that because the plaintiff
"presented no evidence that Kroger terminated him for any reason other than his constant outbursts
of vulgar language and racial slurs," he "cannot sustain his burden of showing that he was
discharged because of his disability"); Brohm, 947 F. Supp. at 302 (quoting Sietkin v. Vill. of
Arlington Heights, 65 F.3d 664,666 (7th Cir. 1995)) ("An employee may not 'bootstrap his disease
into the line of causation' ... by showing that the misconduct relied on by the employer would not
have occurred 'but for' the disability.").
153. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a) (2000). Plaintiffs also must prove that they are qualified individuals
with disabilities. Id.
154. See supra Part II.B.
155. See Taylor, 917 F. Supp. at 463.
156. See supra Parts II.B.2., II.B.3.
157. See, e.g., Jones v. Am. Postal Workers Union, 192 F.3d 417, 429 (4th Cir. 1999)
(rejecting plaintiff's ADA claim without stating whether it alleged disparate treatment, disparate
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Nonetheless, courts rejecting disability discrimination claims in
misconduct cases due to a lack of causation appear to be proceeding under
the disparate treatment theory of discrimination. In Maes v. Henderson,for
example, the court expressly stated that the plaintiff claimed intentional
discrimination.158 Several courts refer to the plaintiff's inability to establish
a prima facie case of discrimination,159 which indicates that they are using
the burden-shifting approach to proving disparate treatment first developed
in the Title VII context. 6 In Taylor v. Dover Elevator Systems, Inc., the
court explained that if the plaintiff could establish a prima facie case
showing "illegal motivation" by his employer, the court should apply
"Title VIl's shifting of evidentiary burdens." '' The court found that the
plaintiff was unable to establish the element of a prima facie case that "he
suffered adverse employment action because of his disability" as he was
actually terminated because of misconduct.'62
Many of the courts rejecting misconduct-related disability
discrimination claims under the disparate treatment theory do not consider
whether the plaintiff could prove discrimination under either the
reasonable accommodation or the disparate impact theory. 163 Moreover,
those courts that have discussed the duty of reasonable accommodation

impact, or failure to accommodate).
158. 33 F. Supp. 2d 1281, 1287 (D. Nev. 1999).
159. See, e.g., Hamilton v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 136 F.3d 1047, 1050 (5th Cir. 1998);
Ray v. Kroger Co., 264 F. Supp. 2d 1221, 1225 (S.D. Ga. 2003), aff'd, 90 Fed. Appx. 384 (11 th
Cir. 1996).
160. See supranotes 46-50 and accompanying text.
161. 917 F. Supp. 455, 460 (N.D. Miss. 1996).
162. Id. at 462. Other courts have engaged in similar reasoning. See, e.g., Hamilton, 136 F.3d
at 1050, 1052 (including as an element of a prima facie case that "an adverse employment decision
was made because of [plaintiff's] disability" and finding plaintiff unable to satisfy that element
because he "was not terminated because of his disability but rather because he violated BELL's
policy on workplace violence"); Ray, 264 F. Supp. 2d at 1225, 1228 (including as an element of
a prima facie case that plaintiff was "discriminated against based upon his disability," and finding
that plaintiff "cannot sustain his burden of showing that he was discharged because of his
disability" rather than because of "his constant outbursts of vulgar language and racial slurs").
The Taylor court reasoned, moreover, that even if the plaintiff could establish a prima facie
case, his employer articulated a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the plaintiff's
discharge-his misconduct, specifically his fighting on company premises. 917 F. Supp. at 462-63;
see also Ray, 264 F. Supp. 2d at 1229 (stating that "Kroger had a legitimate basis for terminating
[plaintiff's] employment"). According to the court, there was no evidence that the asserted reason
was pretext for discharge because of disability. Taylor, 917 F. Supp. at 463; see also Buie v.
Quad/Graphics, Inc., 366 F.3d 496, 508 (7th Cir. 2004) ("The disparate treatment of similarlysituated employees who were involved in misconduct of comparable seriousness, but did not have
a similar disability, could establish pretext."); Hamilton, 136 F.3d at 1052-53 (stating that it did not
regard the employer's asserted reason as pretextual).
163. This is probably because the plaintiffs in those cases failed to assert anything other than
intentional discrimination.
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generally have held that discharges due to misconduct do not violate the
duty. As discussed above, most courts agree that the duty of reasonable
accommodation is always prospective in nature and is not triggered until
an employee requests an accommodation from the employer."6 In most
cases in which an employee has been discharged for disability-related
misconduct, however, the employee made no request for accommodation
before committing the misconduct.' 65 Accordingly, the only
accommodation that would assist the employee is a second chance, which
the ADA does not require.'66
Under the majority approach, employees who engage in disabilityrelated misconduct are generally unsuccessful in demonstrating
discriminatory discharge under the ADA. Courts typically find that these
plantiffs were discharged due to their misconduct rather than their
disabilities, rejecting the plaintiffs' claims because of a lack of disparate
treatment. The few courts that consider the reasonable accommodation
theory of discrimination reject the claims of most plaintiffs because the
plaintiffs failed to request an accommodation before engaging in the
misconduct. Accordingly, under the majority approach, the ADA imposes
few limitations on the ability of employers to discharge employees for
disability-related misconduct. A minority of courts, however, interpret the
ADA as providing considerably more protection for employees whose
disabilities manifest themselves in the form of conduct.

164. See supra notes 66-68 and accompanying text; see also Maes v. Henderson, 33 F. Supp.
2d 1281, 1290 (D. Nev. 1999) (stating that "an employer has no duty to provide reasonable
accommodation until it has been made aware of the disability-related limitations of an employee").
165. See, e.g., Bugg-Barber v. Randstad US, L.P., 271 F. Supp. 2d 120, 130 (D.D.C. 2003)
(reasoning that the plaintiff needed "to notify her employer on a timely basis-beforeher conduct
became unruly in a business setting-that she needed an accommodation of some sort" and that
there was no evidence that she "ever requested an accommodation that was denied"); Burmistrz v.
City of Chi., 186 F. Supp. 2d 863, 875 (N.D. I11. 2002) (noting, in a case in which the plaintiff, who
had some mental problems, was terminated for failing to call in to notify his employer that he would
be absent, that "[n]othing in the record suggests Plaintiff ever requested or was given an
accommodation of not being required to notify the City when he would be absent"); Maes, 33 F.
Supp. 2d at 1291 (finding that the plaintiff "has not provided any evidence that he ever requested
an accommodation").
166. See Bugg-Barber,271 F. Supp. 2d at 131 (reasoning that the plaintiff "is not looking for
an 'accommodation' under the ADA, but a complete pardon... [which] the law does not require");
Walsh v. Andersen Consulting LLP, No. 00 C 2743, 2000 WL 1809960, at *7 (N.D. I11.Dec. 11,
2000) (holding that "[r]equesting an accommodation after an employer has made a legitimate
decision to terminate does not entitle an employee to an accommodation" because "[a]n employer
is not required to give an employee a second chance as an accommodation").
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2. Minority Approach
a. Teahan v. Metro-North Commuter Railroad
The seminal case rejecting the majority approach to disability-related
misconduct is Teahan v. Metro-North CommuterRailroad167 The plaintiff
in Teahan was a substance abuser who missed a great deal of work as a
telephone and telegraph maintainer for a railroad, allegedly because of his
alcohol and drug abuse.1 68 His employer decided to terminate him because
of his excessive absenteeism, and on that same day-before receiving
notice of his employer's decision-the plaintiff entered a substance abuse
rehabilitation program.'69 The plantiff's employer was unable to terminate
him immediately because of the provisions of a collective bargaining
agreement. 7° Several months later, after the plaintiff successfully
completed the rehabilitation program and returned to work, his employer
completed the disciplinary procedures required by the collective bargaining
agreement and terminated the plaintiff.'7 '
The plaintiff sued the employer under the Rehabilitation Act of
1973 172-the precursor to the ADA, applicable to employers receiving
federal funds-contending that he was discharged "solely by reason of' his
17
handicap of alcoholism and drug addiction, in violation of the statute.
The district court found that the plaintiff could not prove that he was
terminated "solely by reason of' his handicap because he was discharged
due to his absenteeism, which was a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason
for his termination.'74 According to the district court, the plaintiff thus had
to show that the employer's "asserted reason was pretextual, which
showing he failed to carry.' 171 In short, the district court rejected the
plaintiffs claim because he was unable to prove disparate treatment.
The Second Circuit reversed, holding that a plaintiff satisfies the
"solely by reason of' handicap requirement of the Rehabilitation Act by
showing that the employer "justifies termination based on conduct caused
by the handicap."' 76 The district court erred, in other words, by

167. 951 F.2d 511 (2d Cir. 1991).
168. Id. at 513.
169. Id.
170. Id.
171. Id.
172. 29 U.S.C. §§ 701-796(1) (2000).
173. Teahan, 951 F.2dat 514.
174. Id.
175. Id.
176. Id.at 516. At the time of Teahan, the Rehabilitation Act did not contain a special
provision explicitly authorizing employers to hold employees disabled by alcoholism or drug
addiction to the same conduct standards as nondisabled employees, like the ADA's 42 U.S.C.
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"distinguish[ing] between a handicap and its consequences.' 77 The Second
Circuit reasoned that accepting such a distinction would mean that an
employer could base an employment decision on a consequence of a
handicap, rather than on the handicap itself, and avoid any scrutiny into
were relevant to the
whether the handicap and its consequences
78
job.1
particular
a
for
qualifications
The court provided the example of an employee with a permanent limp,
which the court assumed was a handicap under the Rehabilitation Act. 79
The limp caused the employee to make a loud "thump" when he walked,
and his employer fired him because of the thump. 8 ° The court reasoned
that distinguishing between the handicap--the limp--and one of its
consequences-the thump--would mean that the employee could not
prove that his employer discharged him "solely by reason of' his
handicap.' 8 ' Because the employee could not satisfy that essential element
of a Rehabilitation Act claim, it would be irrelevant whether the employee
was otherwise qualified despite the handicap, a result which the court
found contrary to the purposes of the Act.' 82
Accordingly, the court held that if the plaintiff could prove that his
substance abuse caused his absenteeism, his discharge due to absenteeism
occurred "solely by reason of"' his handicap and thus violated the ADA,
unless the employee was not otherwise qualified for the job.'83 The court
remanded the case to the district court to decide the "otherwise qualified"
issue.'"

§ 12114(c)(4). See Mercado v. N.Y. City Hous. Auth., No. 95 CIV. 10018 (LAP), 1998 WL
151039, at *12 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 31, 1998) (noting that "Teahan was brought under the pre-1992
Rehabilitation Act, which did not contain an analog to 42 U.S.C. § 11214(c)(4) [sic]"); cf 29
U.S.C. § 794(d) (2000) ("The standards used to determine whether this section has been violated
in a complaint alleging employment discrimination under this section shall be the standards applied
under title I of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990.").
177. Teahan, 951 F.2d at 516.
178. Id. at 516-17.
179. Id. at 516.
180. Id.
181. Id.
182. Id. at 516-17.
183. Id. at 517. The court noted that "[i]f only a small percentage of Teahan's absences can
be shown to have been 'caused' by his alcoholism, and a sufficiently great number of absences are
not so caused, such would provide ground for Metro-North to terminate appellant as not prompted
solely by reason of his handicap." Id.
184. Id. at 521. On remand, the district court found that the plaintiff was not otherwise
qualified for his job because of the likelihood of a relapse of his substance abuse problems, such
that his discharge did not violate the Rehabilitation Act; and the Second Circuit affirmed. Teahan
v. Metro-N. Commuter R.R., 88 Civ. 5376, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18448, at *29-30 (S.D.N.Y.
Dec. 27, 1994), aff'd, 80 F.3d 50, 55 (2d Cir. 1996).
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District courts in the Second Circuit have followed the Teahan
approach, finding that discharge due to disability-related misconduct
satisfies the causation element of a disability discrimination claim, such
that the employer is liable unless the plaintiff was not qualified for his or
her job.' 85 In Husowitz v. Runyon, for example, the plaintiff was a postal
worker with bipolar disorder who engaged in repeated disruptive and
uncooperative behavior, including "episodes of loud singing, playing the
radio at excessively high volumes, procrastination, disturbing co-workers,
and other instances of misconduct and insubordination. ' 18 6 After his

185. E.g., Hogarth v. Thomburgh, 833 F. Supp. 1077, 1080, 1085 (S.D.N.Y. 1993) (holding
that the plaintiff's discharge for providing his employer with false medical excuses and for engaging
in sexual acts at the agency's offices was because of his disability and relying on expert testimony
indicating that the plaintiff's behavior was attributable to his bipolar disorder). The court stated that
"if a handicap manifests itself in certain behavior, and an employee is discharged because of that
behavior, he has been terminated 'solely by reason of' the handicap." Id.at 1085. However, because
the plaintiff's job required access to classified information and because his disability caused him
"substantial breaks from reality," the court concluded that the plaintiff was not qualified for his
position. Id. at 1080, 1086-87.
One district court has questioned whether Teahan is good law under the ADA, rather than the
Rehabilitation Act, where the plaintiff's disability is alcoholism or drug addiction, in light of the
ADA provision explicitly authorizing employers to hold employees with such disabilities to the
same conduct standards as nondisabled employees. Mercado v. N.Y. City Housing Auth., No. 95
CIV. 10018 (LAP), 1998 WL 151039, at *12 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 31, 1998) (noting that "Teahan was
brought under the pre-1992 Rehabilitation Act, which did not contain an analog to 42 U.S.C. §
11214(c)(4) [sic]").
Even a few courts outside the Second Circuit have followed Teahan. See, e.g., Berkey v.
Henderson, 120 F. Supp. 2d 1189, 1190, 1193 (S.D. Iowa 2000) (reasoning that the plaintiff, who
was discharged for tardiness allegedly related to various mental disorders, was discharged because
of his disability, but finding that plaintiff was "unqualified to perform the essential function of
regular and reliable attendance"); Ambrosino v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 899 F. Supp. 438,444 (N.D.
Cal. 1995) (reasoning that "termination based on conduct caused by chemical dependency and
status which results from the dependency and/or the conduct caused by the dependency is
termination based on the disability of chemical dependency"); Ham v. State, 788 F. Supp. 455,45758 (D. Nev. 1992) (reasoning that an employer's termination of an alcoholic plaintiff following an
arrest for driving under the influence was "admittedly based upon [p]laintiff's alcoholism" "[s]ince
the drunk driving was a causally connected manifestation of the alleged handicap"). Moreover, in
Schmidt v. Safeway Inc., although the court did not cite Teahan, it engaged in the same reasoning
that "terminating an employee because of a symptom of that disability"-in Schmidt, terminating
an alcoholic employee because he had a trace ofalcohol in his urine---"is tantamount to terminating
him because of the disability." 864 F. Supp. 991, 1001-02 (D. Or. 1994); see also Humphrey v.
Mem. Hosps. Ass'n, 239 F.3d 1128, 1130-31, 1139-40 (9th Cir. 2001) (stating, in a case in which
an employee with obsessive compulsive disorder was discharged for absenteeism and tardiness, that
"[f]or purposes of the ADA, with a few exceptions, conduct resulting from a disability is considered
to be part of the disability, rather than a separate basis for termination") (footnote call number
omitted).
186. 942 F. Supp. 822, 826 (E.D.N.Y. 1996). Moreover, although the plaintiff held a "lead"
position, such that he was in charge of certain clerks, whenever a clerk asked him a question, he
would abruptly respond, "go see a supervisor." Id. at 825 n.5, 826.
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supervisor reprimanded the plaintiff for using a telephone in a restricted
area, the plaintiff implicitly threatened the supervisor by referring to an
incident in which a postal worker in Oklahoma killed several co-workers
and then himself. 87
' Following this incident, the Postal Service suspended
the plaintiff,'88 and the plaintiff claimed that the suspension constituted
disability discrimination in violation of the Rehabilitation Act. 8 9
Although the Postal Service argued that it had suspended the plaintiff
based on his conduct rather than his disability, the court noted that "[t]he
Second Circuit rejects the distinction between a handicapping condition
and specific conduct for determining if an employer's decision to take
action against an employee is based on the plaintiff s disability."' 90 Finding
that the plaintiffs misconduct was "the direct result of his mental
disability," the court held that the plaintiff established that he was
suspended because of his disability.' 9' The court then examined whether
the plaintiff could perform the essential functions of his job with or
without reasonable accommodation, such that he was "otherwise qualified"
for his position. 92 Stating that the plaintiff "was a disruptive influence by
his threatening behavior," the court concluded that the plaintiff was not
able to perform the essential functions of his job without a reasonable
accommodation.' 93 Although the Postal Service attempted to accommodate
the plaintiff by permitting either him or his co-workers to work apart from
each other and by providing him opportunities to improve his conduct
before he was suspended, the plaintiff's "relationship with his co-workers
continued to be marked with conflict."' 94 Because the plaintiff was not

187. Id. at 828. The plaintiff told his supervisor, "'[D]o you remember Oklahoma?... if Igo
down, you are coming with me."' Id.
188. Id. On his first day back from this suspension, the plaintiff again told his supervisor,
"'Lou, do you remember Oklahoma? When I go down, I am bringing others with me."' Id. at 829.
189. Id. at 824.
190. Id. at 832.
191. Id. at 832-33.
192. Id. at 833.
193. Id. at 834-35. The court quoted another case in which it was stated that "[i]t is certainly
a 'job-related requirement' that an employee, handicapped or not, be able to get along with coworkers and supervisors." Id. at 834 (quoting Misek-Falkoffv. IBM Corp., 854 F. Supp. 215,227
(S.D.N.Y. 1994)).
Curiously, after concluding that the plaintiff could not perform the essential functions ofhisjob,
the court stated that it found that the Postal Service's decision to suspend plaintiff "was lawful,
unless the plaintiff demonstrates that the decision was a pretext for discrimination against him on
the basis of his handicap." Id. at 834. Given that the court had already held - based on the Teahan
rule--that suspending plaintiffbecause ofhis disability-related conduct was an action taken because
of the plaintiff's disability, it is odd that the court then questioned whether there was pretext.
194. Id. at 835. The court noted that "[a]s many as seven different co-workers complained that
they could not work in the same area as the plaintiff" Id.
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qualified for his job, his suspension did not violate the Rehabilitation
Act. 195
The Teahanapproach to disability-related misconduct, like the majority
approach, relies on the disparate treatment theory of discrimination.
Disparate treatment occurs when an employment decision is caused by an
individual's protected trait, such as disability. Under the majority
approach, decisions based on the plaintiff's misconduct are not caused by
his or her disability and thus do not constitute disparate treatment. In
contrast, the Teahan approach equates employment decisions based on
disability-related misconduct to decisions based on disability status.'9 6
Such decisions constitute disparate treatment on the basis of disability and
are prohibited by the ADA unless the plaintiff is not qualified for his or her
position, thereby falling outside the ADA's protection.
b. Den Hartogv. Wasatch Academy
Like the Second Circuit in Teahan, the Tenth Circuit also has rejected
a bright-line distinction between discharge due to disability and discharge
due to disability-related misconduct. In Den Hartogv. Wasatch Academy,
the court noted that the ADA expressly provides that a disabled person can
be held to the same conduct standards as a nondisabled person solely in the
specific context of employees who are alcoholics or addicted to drugs. 97
The plaintiff argued that this specific provision indicates that Congress
"did not intend to extend the same employer prerogative to employees with
other disabilities."' 98 The court agreed that, outside the context of
alcoholism and drug addiction, employment decisions based on disabilitycaused misconduct violate the ADA unless the conduct standard at issue
is job-related and consistent with business necessity.199
In further support of its rejection of a dichotomy between disability and
disability-related misconduct, the Den Hartog court noted that mental
illness manifests itself by abnormal behavior and reasoned that "[t]o permit
195. Id.
196. See Teahan v. Metro-N. Commuter R.R., 951 F.2d 511, 516 (2d Cir. 1991) (explaining
that the district court erred in"distinguish[ing] between a handicap and its consequences"). Anyone
doubting that the Teahan approach equates decisions based on disability-related misconduct to
decisions based on disability status should note that none of the cases applying this approach
examines whether the employer asserted a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for its action. The
Teahan approach, in other words, does not provide that a decision based on disability-related
misconduct is presumptively caused by the employee's disability, satisfying the causation element
of a prima facie case. Rather, such a decision always constitutes disparate treatment on the basis
of disability.
197. 129 F.3d 1076, 1086 (10th Cir. 1997) (referencing 42 U.S.C. § 12114(c)(4) (1994)); see
supra text accompanying note 91 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 12114(c)(4)).
198. Den Hartog, 129 F.3d at 1086.
199. Id.
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employers carte blanche to terminate employees with mental disabilities on
the basis of any abnormal behavior would largely nullify the ADA's
protection of the mentally disabled. 2 0 The court further observed that
many of the cases recognizing such a dichotomy involved alcoholic or
drug-addicted employees, the one category of employees upon whom the
ADA expressly permits the imposition of uniform conduct standards. 2 1'
The court concluded that an employer faced with an employee who
engaged in disability-related misconduct should first consider whether a
reasonable accommodation could remedy the misconduct, and if so, the
employer should attempt the accommodation. 0 2 If not, the employer may
discharge or discipline the employee only if an affirmative defense
applies, 203 like the "job-related and consistent with business necessity"
defense or the "direct threat" defense. 2" "Otherwise," according to the
court, "the employer must tolerate eccentric or unusual conduct caused by
the employee's mental disability, so long as the
employee can satisfactorily
20 5
perform the essential functions of his job.
In later cases, the Tenth Circuit reiterated its Den Hartogholding that
the ADA protects disability-related misconduct outside the alcoholism and
drug addiction context unless the employer can prove that the relevant
conduct standard is job-related and consistent with business necessity, or
that the employee poses a direct threat to the health and safety of others in
the workplace.20 6 Moreover, at least one court outside the Tenth Circuit has
2 °7
followed the reasoning in Den Hartog.
200. Id. at 1087.
201. Id. The court also provided other reasons for rejecting a dichotomy between disability and
disability-related misconduct, such as the facts that an employer need not make an accommodation
that would impose an undue hardship, and that an employer may discharge an employee who
presents a direct threat to the health and safety of others in the workplace. Id. According to the
court, "[t]he availability of these affirmative defenses establishes that there are certain levels of
disability-caused conduct that need not be tolerated or accommodated by employers. However, the
necessary corollary is that there must be certain levels of disability-caused conduct that have to be
tolerated or accommodated." Id. The problem with the court's reasoning is that an undue hardship
or a direct threat could arise in circumstances not involving conduct. For example, very expensive
specialized computer equipment necessary to enable a disabled employee to perform his or herjob
might impose an undue hardship on an employer, and an employee could pose a direct threat
because he or she has a contagious disease.
202. Id.at 1088.
203. Id.
204. See 42 U.S.C. § 12113(a), (b) (2000).
205. Den Hartog, 129 F.3d at 1088.
206. Doebele v. Sprint/United Mgmt. Co., 342 F.3d 1117, 1134 (10th Cir. 2003); McKenzie
v. Dovala, 242 F.3d 967, 974 (10th Cir. 2001); Nielsen v. Moroni Feed Co., 162 F.3d 604, 608
(10th Cir. 1998).
207. Walsted v. Woodbury County, 113 F. Supp. 2d 1318, 1342 (N.D. Iowa 2000) (holding
that, outside the context of alcoholism and illegal drug use, "as the Tenth Circuit held in Den
Hartog, the ADA protects both the disability and the conduct caused by the disability"); see also

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2005

35

Florida Law Review,
Vol. LAW
57, Iss.
2 [2005], Art. 2
REVIEW
FLORIDA

[Vol. 57

Unlike the majority and the Teahan minority approaches to disabilityrelated misconduct, which rely on the disparate treatment theory of
discrimination, the Den Hartog minority approach utilizes the disparate
impact theory. The disparate impact basis of the court's opinion-while
never mentioned expressly by Den Hartog or its progeny-is apparent
from the court's statement that "an employer may not hold a disabled
employee to precisely the same standards of conduct as a nondisabled
employee, unless such standards are job-related and consistent with
business necessity."2'0 The court based the "job-related and consistent with
business necessity" limit2 .9 on one of the ADA provisions regarding
disparate impact challenges to employment decisions, which states that it
is a defense to a claim of discrimination "that an alleged application of
qualification standards, tests, or selection criteria that screen out or tend to
screen out or otherwise deny a job or benefit to an individual with a
disability" has been demonstrated as "job-related and consistent with
business necessity, and such performance cannot be accomplished by
reasonable accommodation."21 The court appeared to view conduct rules
as standards that may tend to screen out individuals with disabilities,
having a disparate impact on such individuals, and reasoned that these
rules violate the ADA unless they are job-related and consistent with
business necessity.
A minority of courts reject the majority rule of a bright-line distinction
between discharge because of disability and discharge resulting from
disability-related misconduct. Some of these courts follow the approach in
Teahan, holding that discharging employees for disability-related
misconduct is disparate treatment on the basis of disability, violating the
ADA unless the employees were not qualified for theirjobs. Others follow
the Den Hartog approach, holding that, due to the disparate impact of
conduct rules on the disabled, employees cannot be discharged because of
disability-related misconduct unless the employer can prove that the
relevant conduct standard is job-related and consistent with business
necessity or that the employees pose a direct threat to the health and safety
of others. Do any of these approaches correctly interpret the ADA's
prohibition against discrimination because of disability? To answer this
question, it is first necessary to explore what courts mean by "misconduct."

Mercado v. N.Y. City Hous. Auth., No. 95 CIV. 10018 (LAP), 1998 WL 151039, at *10 (S.D.N.Y.
Mar. 31, 1998) (stating that the ADA does not shield alcoholic employees "from the consequences
of their conduct," "in stark contrast to its treatment of other disabilities").
208. 129 F.3d at 1086.
209. Id. at 1086 n.8.
210. 42 U.S.C. § 12113(a) (2000).
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IV. How SHOULD DISABILITY-RELATED MISCONDUCT BE ANALYZED
UNDER THE ADA?
A. What Does "Misconduct" Mean, and Should It Even Matter?
According to a majority of courts, employees who engage in disabilityrelated misconduct cannot demonstrate discriminatory discharge under the
ADA because their employers discharged them due to their misconduct
rather than their disabilities. A court's conclusion that a disabled employee
engaged in misconduct is thus often fatal to the employee's ADA claim.
How do courts determine what behavior by an employee constitutes
misconduct?
The case of Martinson v. Kinney Shoe Corp.21' raises this issue, albeit
indirectly. The plaintiff in Martinson, an epileptic, occasionally had
seizures at work, and his employer admitted firing him because of his
seizures.212 The plaintiffs employer argued-and the district court
found-that the plaintiff could not prove that his employer discriminated
against him due to his disability because the employer discharged him
not because he suffered from the "general disability"
based on his21seizures,
3
of epilepsy.
The Fourth Circuit rejected that argument, stating that "[t]o fire for
seizures is to fire for a disability., 214 The court also noted, however, that
"misconduct-even misconduct related to a disability-is not itself a
disability, and an employer is free to fire an employee on that basis., 215 The
court appeared to recognize no contradiction between its rejection of the
defendant's argument that there was a difference between discharge
because of seizures and discharge because of epilepsy and its recitation of
the majority rule that discharge because of misconduct is always
permissible.
Consistent with the Fourth Circuit's approach in Martinson,outside the
misconduct context, other courts have held that discharges based on
symptoms or consequences of an employee's disability constitute disparate
treatment on the basis of disability.216 Such discharges violate the ADA
211. 104 F.3d 683 (4th Cir. 1997).
212. Id.at 685. The plaintiff's employee separation report stated that the plaintiff's discharge
was due to "'[s]eizures in store, sales floor, and stockroom. Inability to control timing of same."'
Id.
213. EEOC v. Kinney Shoe Corp., 917 F. Supp. 419, 430-31 (W.D. Va. 1996).
214. Martinson, 104 F.3d at 686.
215. Id.at 686 n.3.
216. In a case arising under the Rehabilitation Act, the Supreme Court held that an
employment decision based on an employee's contagiousness, an effect ofher disability, constituted
disparate treatment because of disability. Sch. Bd. v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273, 282 (1987) (reasoning
that "[i]t would be unfair to allow an employer to seize upon the distinction between the effects of
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unless the plaintiff is unqualified for his or herjob.21 7 In Milton v. Scrivner,
Inc., for example, the employer instituted faster production standards and
discharged the plaintiffs because of their inability to meet the pace of the
new standards.218 The plaintiffs contended that their inability to satisfy the
new standards was a consequence of their disabilities and that terminating
them because of that inability constituted disparate treatment.21 9 Rather
than distinguishing between discharge because of disability and discharge
because of a consequence of a disability,22 the court examined whether the
plaintiffs were qualified for their jobs.221 Concluding that speed was
essential for the plaintiffs' jobs, the court found that the plaintiffs were not
qualified.222
In short, courts' treatment of employment decisions based on
manifestations of a disability often hinges upon whether the courts
characterize those manifestations as misconduct. If courts do not
characterize the manifestations as misconduct, they are likely to find
disparate treatment on the basis of disability, which violates the ADA
unless the plaintiff was unqualified for his or her job. If they consider the
manifestations to be misconduct, most courts find the plaintiff unable to
establish discrimination because of disability. Accordingly, under the
approach taken by most courts, it is important to determine what
manifestations of a disability constitute misconduct.
The Martinson court distinguished between discharge because of
seizures and discharge because of misconduct. What if, however, the
employer in Martinson argued that seizures on the job constituted
misconduct, in violation of a neutral work rule that employees had to be
alert and attentive-and upright 223-at all times while on the job? Would

a disease on others and the effects of a disease on a patient and use that distinction to justify
discriminatory treatment"); cf Vande Zande v. State of Wis. Dep't of Admin., 44 F.3d 538,543-44
(7th Cir. 1995) (rejecting employer's argument that it need not accommodate the plaintiffs pressure
ulcers, a consequence of her disability of paralysis, because "an intermittent impairment that is a
characteristic manifestation of an admitted disability is, we believe, a part of the underlying
disability and hence a condition that the employer must reasonably accommodate"). The authors
of a widely-used employment discrimination casebook summarize Arline and Vande Zande as
holding that "a decision based on the symptoms ofa disability, symptoms which may not be shared
by all individuals suffering from the disability and which may be experienced by non-disabled
individuals as well, are [sic] decisions based on the disability itself." MICHAEL J. ZIMMER ET AL.,
CASES AND MATERIALS ON EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION 749 (5th ed. 2000).
217. See 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a) (2000).
218. 53 F.3d 1118, 1120 (10th Cir. 1995).
219. See id.
220. One of the employer's arguments in its motion for summaryjudgment was that "plaintiffs
failed to offer evidence of intentional discrimination." Id. at 1123.
221. Id. at 1124.
222. Id. at 1124-25.
223. The court noted that "on one occasion, a supervisor discovered [the plaintiff] lying on the

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol57/iss2/2

38

2005]

Timmons:
Acommodating
Misconduct
Under
the Americans
with Disabilities
Act
225
ACT
WITH DISABILITIES
AMERICANS
UNDER THE
MISCONDUCT
ACCOMMODATING

the employer's discharge of the plaintiff then fall outside the ADA's
coverage? This suggestion is not entirely fanciful. In Ray v. Kroger Co.,
the court held that an employer's discharge of an employee with Tourette's
Syndrome for profane outbursts did not implicate the ADA because a
termination based on an employee's misconduct-even if that misconduct
is related to a disability--does not violate the ADA. 224 The Ray court cited
Martinsonin support of this proposition. 225 Because the court characterized
the behavior of the plaintiff in Ray as misconduct, it did not consider
whether discharge because of profane outbursts equates to discharge
because of Tourette's Syndrome in the same way that to fire for seizures
is to fire for epilepsy.
How, then, do we determine what behavior constitutes
misconduct-removing a disabled employee from the ADA's protection
in the view of most courts-and what behavior is simply a manifestation
of an employee's disability, like seizures are to epilepsy? 226 The courts that

floor in the stockroom with a lit cigarette on his chest and on another occasion, a supervisor found
him supine behind the sales counter holding a charge slip." Martinson v. Kinney Shoe Corp., 104
F.3d 683, 685 n.1 (4th Cir. 1997).
224. 264 F. Supp. 2d 1221, 1228-29 (S.D. Ga. 2003), aff'd, 90 Fed. Appx. 384 (11th Cir.
2003). The plaintiff worked as a clerk in the frozen food section of a Kroger grocery store. Id. at
1224. He was discharged after complaints about his outbursts from a co-worker, a customer, and
a contractor. Id.The court found the plaintiff unable to satisfy his burden of showing that he was
discharged due to his disability because he had "no evidence that Kroger terminated him for any
reason other than his constant outbursts of vulgar language and racial slurs." Id.at 1228. The court
also found that the plaintiff was not qualified for his job, reasoning that "interacting with customers
without offending them was an essential function of [the plaintiff's] job." Id.
225. Id.at 1228-29.
226. The case of Humphrey v. Memorial HospitalsAss 'n provides an interesting example of
a court wrestling with this problem. 239 F.3d 1128 (9th Cir. 2001). The plaintiff, who suffered from
obsessive compulsive disorder (OCD), was discharged for absenteeism and tardiness. Id. at 1130,
1133. The plaintiff contended that her absenteeism and tardiness were due to her OCD, which
caused her to "engage[] in a series of obsessive rituals that hindered her ability to arrive at work on
time." Id. The court held that a reasonable jury could find a causal link between the plaintiff's OCD
and her attendance problems and thus could conclude that her discharge constituted disparate
treatment based on disability because "[f]or purposes of the ADA, with a few exceptions, conduct
resulting from a disability is considered to be part of the disability, rather than a separate basis for
termination." Id. at 1139-40 (footnote call number omitted).
The "few exceptions" noted by the court focused primarily on cases involving employees who
were alcoholics or addicted to drugs, pursuant to the ADA provision authorizing employers to hold
such employees to the same qualification standards as nondisabled employees. Id. at 1139 n. 18.
However, the Humphrey court was forced to distinguish Newland v. Dalton. Id. In Newland v.
Dalton,the court had held that "firings precipitated by misconduct rather than any handicap"-even
misconduct causally connected to the handicap-did not violate the Rehabilitation Act. 81 F.3d
904, 906 (9th Cir. 1996). The Humphrey court reasoned that Newlandstood for the proposition that
"egregious and criminal conduct" was an exception to the general rule that there was no distinction
between discharge for disability and discharge for disability-related conduct, and it concluded that
"[a]ny such exception would not be applicable to Humphrey's absences or tardiness." 239 F.3d at
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have recognized a bright-line distinction between discharge because of
disability and discharge because of disability-related misconduct generally
have engaged in little effort to define the term "misconduct." One
definition occasionally asserted is that "misconduct" implies behavior that
the employee can control as opposed to behavior that is compelled. Judge
Posner made this argument in Despears v. Milwaukee County, a case
involving an employee who was demoted when his driver's license was
revoked after his fourth DUI conviction.227 Judge Posner accepted the
plaintiff s argument that his alcoholism caused his drunk driving and thus
his demotion but reasoned that "a cause is not a compulsion (or sole
cause); and we think the latter is necessary to form the bridge that
228Despears
seeks to construct between his alcoholism and his demotion.,
Under this theory, if the employee can control the behavior that the
employer finds objectionable-rather than the disability compelling that
behavior-the behavior is misconduct. Such a dividing line may support
a distinction between discharging an employee with Tourette's Syndrome
for profane outbursts, on the one hand, and discharging an alcoholic
employee for drunk driving, on the other. The disease of alcoholism does
not compel an individual to drive while intoxicated, and an alcoholic
employee has some control over his or her decision to drink and drive.229
It may be incorrect to say, however, that an individual with Tourette's
Syndrome has no ability to control his or her outbursts; according to the
DSM-IV, the tics characteristic of the impairment are "experienced as
irresistible but can be suppressed for varying lengths of time., 230 Does this

1140 n. 18. The Newland court, however, did not indicate that its holding was so limited but rather
stated broadly that "a termination based on misconduct rather than the disability itself [is] valid."
81 F.3d at 906.
227. 63 F.3d 635, 635 (7th Cir. 1995).
228. Id. at 636. Similarly, in EEOCv. Amego, Inc., the court implied that it might accept the
argument that discharge for conduct caused by a disability constitutes discharge because of
disability in cases involving "certain conduct which is in fact more closely compelled by the
disability (e.g., profanity from Tourette's Syndrome sufferers)." 110 F.3d 135, 149 (1st Cir. 1997).
The court rejected that argument, however, as applied to a former team leader in a facility serving
severely disabled people who was discharged because of her two suicide attempts involving
overdose on medications. Id. at 137, 149. The court found no evidence that the plaintiffs
"depression compelled her to overdose on medications, as opposed to other methods of attempting
suicide." Id.
229. Ofcourse, even if the disability of alcoholism compelled individuals to engage in certain
behavior, the ADA expressly provides that employers are free to discharge such individuals because
of that behavior if they would take the same action against nondisabled employees. See 42 U.S.C.
§ 12114(c)(4) (2000). Curiously, Judge Posner did not mention this provision of the statute in
Despears. See 63 F.3d 635 (7th Cir. 1995).
230. Am.PSYCHIATRIC ASS'N, supra note 110, at 100; see, e.g., Purcell v. Penn. Dep't of
Corr., No. 95-6720 1998, U.S. Dist. LEXIS 105, at *3 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 9, 1998) (stating that plaintiff
with Tourette's Syndrome had "difficulty suppressing his verbal and motor tics"; "he is able to do
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ability to exercise some control over the timing of one's outbursts mean
that a profanity-laden outburst by an individual with Tourette's Syndrome
constitutes misconduct?
What about an individual with bipolar disorder who shouts at
colleagues during a manic episode, given that characteristics of such an
episode may include "an abnormally and persistently... irritable mood,"
"poor judgment," and "speech . . . marked by complaints, hostile
" ' Should the fact that an individual with
comments, or angry tirades"?23
bipolar disorder may find it considerably more difficult to control his or
her temper during a manic episode be enough to exclude such shouting
from the category of misconduct? Or, as Despears suggests, must the
individual demonstrate that during a232manic episode, it is impossible for
him or her to refrain from shouting?
Judge Posner's reasoning in Despears suggests that plaintiffs whose
disabilities manifest themselves in the form of conduct should argue that
their disabilities compel such conduct.233 Such an argument, however, may
ultimately be more harmful than helpful to plaintiffs with mental
disabilities, because "[tihe view that people with psychiatric disabilities
have no control over their behavior, which equates the behavior with the
disability, may perpetuate the very stereotypes that the ADA was intended
to eliminate. '2 34 Moreover, the ADA claim of a plaintiff making such an
argument is still likely to fail. If a plaintiff with bipolar disorder, for
example, has no ability to control angry tirades during a manic episode, the
reasoning of Despears suggests that discharge due to angry tirades
constitutes disparate treatment because of bipolar disorder. The ADA
protects plaintiffs from such disparate treatment, however, only if they are
qualified, meaning they are able to perform the essential functions of their
jobs with or without reasonable accommodation. Courts are likely to find that
so for short spans of time, [but] it is uncomfortable later and he must 'explode' by releasing the
built-up tics").
231. AM. PSYCHIATRIC Ass'N, supra note 110, at 328-29.
232. Perhaps it is more difficult for alcoholics to refrain from drunk driving, but the Despears
court required evidence that the plaintiff, being an alcoholic, "could not have avoided becoming
a drunk driver." 63 F.3d at 636.
233. At least one plaintiff has relied on Despearsto argue that his behavior was compelled by
his disability, such that his employer's discharge of him for that behavior constituted disparate
treatment on the basis of disability. Pemice v. City of Chicago, 237 F.3d 783, 786 (7th Cir. 2001).
In Pernice,the plaintiff was discharged after he was arrested for possession of cocaine in violation
of a work rule prohibiting possession of controlled substances. Id. at 784. The plaintiff contended
that his disability of drug addiction compelled him to possess drugs, such that his misconduct could
not be separated from his disability. Id. at 786. The court rejected the plaintiff's compulsion
argument, reasoning that "[w]hether or not his alleged disability of drug addiction created a wholly
involuntary need to possess drugs, Pemice made a conscious choice to actuallypossess drugs." Id
at 787.

234. STEFAN, supra note 100, at 65.
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plaintiffs with no ability to control their angry tirades--or any other
conduct-are not qualified for their jobs. 35
Rather than compelling particular conduct regardless of the
circumstances, mental disabilities may manifest themselves only at certain
times and in certain environments or contexts.236 In particular, workplace
stress and abuse by supervisors or co-workers are likely to trigger the
manifestations of mental disabilities through related conduct.237 The
context-dependent nature of such conduct suggests that individuals with
mental disabilities may be qualified for theirjobs despite their disabilities
and that reasonable accommodation of the disabilities is possible.2 38 The
fact that disability-related behavior depends on context, however, pulls
against the idea that the disability compels the behavior. Without such
compulsion, according to the Despearscourt, the behavior is misconduct239
and, in the view of most courts, prevents plaintiffs from proving
discriminatory discharge under the ADA.24
The difficulty in determining what is misconduct suggests that the mere
label "misconduct" should not play such a significant role in ADA cases.
As Susan Stefan has noted:
The first step toward coherent doctrine in this area is to
avoid the use of the word "misconduct." If an employee's
conduct is framed at the outset as misconduct, the deck is
stacked against a careful examination of the facts of a case.
Calling behavior "misconduct" predetermines outcomes
because it assumes both intentionality and choice and has
connotations in our society that make it utterly opposed to
"disability." It is easy for a court to hold that an employer
235. See, e.g., Misek-Falkoffv. IBM, 854 F. Supp. 215, 218, 227 (S.D.N.Y. 1994) (holding
that plaintiff, who had a physical disorder related to the nervous system that sometimes caused "fits
of rage, emotional outbursts, crying episodes and similar behavior," was not qualified for her job
because "[iut is certainly a 'job-related requirement' that an employee, handicapped or not, be able
to get along with co-workers and supervisors").
236. Susan Stefan, "You'd Have to Be Crazy to Work Here": Worker Stress, the Abusive
Workplace, and Title I of the ADA, 31 LoY. L.A. L. REv. 795, 811 (1998); see also STEFAN, supra
note 100, at 58 ("Psychiatric disability can be greatly exacerbated or greatly ameliorated by the
quality of interpersonal contact and the nature of the environment."); Ann Hubbard, The ADA, the
Workplace, and the Myth of the "DangerousMentally Il,"34 U.C. DAVIs L. REv. 849, 878 (2001)
(explaining, in the context of misconduct taking the form of violence, that "violence [often] results
from situational contexts ....rather than inhering in an individual").
237. See Hubbard, supranote 236, at 904-05 (stating that "workplace stresses or conflicts can
trigger confrontations that lead to violence"); Stefan, supranote 236, at 818 ("The very essence of
most psychiatric disabilities ... is that they can be triggered or exacerbated by environmental
stimuli, principally stress and stressful interactions with others.").
238. Stefan, supra note 236, at 818.
239. See supra notes 227-28 and accompanying text.
240. See supra Part III.B. 1.
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should not have to tolerate misconduct in the workplace. This
is simply another way of phrasing the conclusion that the
employee loses the case.24
Interestingly, Judge Posner, who wrote the Despears opinion suggesting
that disability-related behavior is not misconduct if it is compelled by the
disability,242 has moved away from the position that the concept of
"misconduct" should be significant in ADA cases. In Matthews v.
Commonwealth Edison Co., the Seventh Circuit, in an opinion written by
Judge Posner, examined
whether an employer ever can be said to have fired a disabled
worker on grounds of disability when he fired him because of
a condition positively correlated with a disability; and
whether it is ever proper to fire an employee because of a
condition that is at once positively correlated with a disability
and not probative of the employee's current ability to do the
job.243
The court answered no to the first question and yes to the second,
reasoning that "[e]ven if [an] individual is qualified, if his employer fires
him for any reason other than that he is disabled"-"even if the reason is
the disability"-"there is no discrimination 'because
the consequence of
'2
of the disability. 1
The Matthews court provided the example of an employer who rejected
a dyslexic applicant for a position involving considerable reading in favor
of another applicant because of the other applicant's greater speed at
reading. 245 Despite noting that "[iut is not the dyslexic worker's 'fault' that
he can't read as well as his competitor; it is due entirely to his
disability,' ' 246 the court concluded that it was not disparate treatment on the

241. STEFAN, supranote 100, at 153.
242. See Despears v. Milwaukee County, 63 F.3d 635, 636-37 (7th Cir. 1995).
243. 128 F.3d 1194, 1195 (7th Cir. 1997).
244. Id. at 1196. In support of the proposition that there is no disparate treatment based on
disability under those circumstances, the court cited HazenPaperCo. v. Biggins,507 U.S. 604,611
(1993), an age discrimination case in which the Supreme Court held that employment decisions
based on factors empirically correlated with age did not constitute disparate treatment on the basis
of age. Matthews, 128 F.3d at 1196. In light of this reasoning, one wonders whether the Matthews
court would agree with the district court in Martinsonthat discharging an employee for seizures is
not disparate treatment based on the disability of epilepsy. See supra notes 211-16 and
accompanying text.
245. 128 F.3d at 1196. The court assumed that, despite his slow speed at reading, the dyslexic
applicant was qualified for the position, such that he was protected by the ADA from disparate
treatment based on his disability. Id.
246. Id. Slow reading, in other words, may be compelled by the disability of dyslexia; cf.
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basis of disability for the employer to prefer the other applicant.24 7
According to the court, an employee fired or not hired based on a condition
positively correlated with a disability-like the dyslexic worker in the
example-can establish disability discrimination under the ADA only by
proving disparate impact, "challeng[ing] the qualification on the basis of
its effect and its reasonableness rather than on the basis of its
motivation."248
Matthews suggests that the proper approach to cases involving
discharge because of any manifestation of a disability-whether or not that
manifestation is deemed to be "misconduct"--is scrutiny under the
disparate impact theory of discrimination.249 In other words, Matthews
supports the Den Hartog minority approach to disability-related
misconduct.25 ° Perhaps because it never uses the term "misconduct," courts
have not cited Matthews in cases involving employees discharged for
misconduct causally connected to a disability.25 ' Nonetheless, Matthews
accurately predicted the approach to disability-related misconduct taken by
the Supreme Court in its December 2003 decision in Raytheon Co. v.
Hernandez.252
B. Raytheon Co. v. Hernandez: The Supreme Court Considers
Disability-RelatedMisconduct
The Supreme Court granted the petition for certiorari in Raytheon Co.
v. Hernandezon the question "whether the ADA confers preferential rehire

Despears, 63 F.3d at 636 (suggesting that if alcoholism compelled drunk driving, an employment
decision based on a DUI conviction would constitute disparate treatment on the basis of disability).
247. Matthews, 128 F.3d at 1196.
248. Id.The plaintiff in Matthews was discharged by his employer as part of a reduction in
force, where the employer based its decision on whom to retain on recent performance. Id. at 1197.
The plaintiff's recent performance was weak compared to that of his co-workers because the
plaintiff had missed a great deal of work due to his disability. Id.The court found the plaintiff
unable to establish disparate treatment, reasoning that the plaintiff "was not discharged because of
his disability" but rather "because of a consequence of the disability-his absence from work the
last half of 1991 and his not working full-time the following year." Id.at 1198. Because the plaintiff
had waived any disparate impact claim, his ADA case failed. Id. at 1197-98.
249. Id. at 1195-96.
250. See id.; supra notes 197-210 and accompanying text.
251. The one exception is Lottinger v. Shell Oil Co., 143 F. Supp. 2d 743, 758 (S.D. Tex.
2001) (stating that because "[tihe ADA does not prohibit adverse action due to a consequence of
a disability," it "does not insulate an employee from adverse action taken by an employer because
of misconduct in the workplace, even if his improper behavior is arguably attributable to an
impairment"). The Lottinger court did not apply the disparate impact theory of discrimination to
the plaintiff's claims. See id. at 757 (stating that "[t]o recover under the ADA, the plaintiff must
prove that he was discriminated against on the basis of his disability").
252. See Raytheon Co. v. Hernandez, 540 U.S. 44,52-53 (2003); Mdatthews, 128 F.3d at 1195-
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rights on disabled employees lawfully terminated for violating workplace
conduct rules."2 3 Had the Court answered that question, it would have
gone a long way toward answering the question posed by this Article:
whether and to what extent the ADA restricts the ability of employers to
discharge employees who engage in disability-related misconduct. If the
ADA confers preferential rehire rights on disabled former employees
terminated for misconduct, it stands to reason that disabled current
employees who commit disability-related misconduct might have some
protection from discharge. The Court, however, did not reach the question
on which it granted certiorari. 2 4 Nonetheless, the Court's opinion provides
substantial guidance on which of the lower courts' approaches to
disability-related misconduct is correct.
Joel Hemandez, the plaintiff in Raytheon, failed a drug test given by
Raytheon, his employer, in 1991.215 He chose to resign in lieu of discharge,
and the employee separation summary documenting his resignation
26
indicated that he left Raytheon due to "discharge for personal conduct. 1
More than two years later, after receiving treatment for his drug and
alcohol addictions, Hemandez applied to be rehired by Raytheon. 257 As
requested on the application, he noted that he had previously worked for
the company.258 An employee in the company's labor relations department
reviewed his application, and noting that Hemandez had previously
worked for Raytheon and was terminated for misconduct, determined that
he was ineligible for rehire.25 9 The employee claimed that she reached this
conclusion based on Raytheon's unwritten policy of not rehiring former
employees who were previously discharged or who resigned in lieu of
discharge. 2" She also claimed that she was unaware of the conduct
underlying Hemandez's resignation at the time she rejected his
26 ' Hernandez contested the employee's testimony on that
application.
2
point.

26

253. Raytheon Co., 540 U.S. at 46. Raytheon acquired the defendant employer in this case,
Hughes Missile Systems Company, subsequent to the employer's decision not to rehire the plaintiff.
Id. at 46-47 & n. 1.The case was captioned Hernandez v. Hughes Missile Systems Co. in the Ninth
Circuit. 298 F.3d 1030 (9th Cir. 2002). For the sake of clarity, this Article refers to the employer
as "Raytheon" or "the company" and to the case as Raytheon Co. v. Hernandez, its caption before
the Supreme Court.
254. Raytheon Co., 540 U.S. at 46.
255. Id. at 47.
256. Id.
257. Id.
258. Id.
259. Id.
260. Id.
261. Id.
262. Id. at 49. Hernandez had attached to his application for re-employment a copy of his
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Hernandez filed suit under the ADA, contending that in rejecting his
application for re-employment, Raytheon discriminated against him
because of a disability in violation of the ADA.263 After the district court
granted Raytheon's motion for summary judgment, the Ninth Circuit
reversed and remanded the case for trial.2 4
The Ninth Circuit first examined whether Hernandez could state a
prima facie case of disability discrimination,265 indicating that the court
was examining his claim under the disparate treatment theory of
discrimination.266 The court stated the elements of a prima facie case as (1)
the plaintiff has a disability; (2) he is qualified; and (3) "his employer
terminated or refused to rehire him because of his disability."2 67 The court
had little difficulty deciding that Hernandez established a genuine issue of
material fact on the first two elements of the prima facie case,2 68 but its
approach to the third element was more complex. First, the court explained

resume and two reference letters. Id. at 47. One of the letters was from a counselor who stated that
Hernandez regularly attended Alcoholics Anonymous meetings and was in recovery. Id. According
to Hemandez, his application packet thus provided the labor relations employee with actual notice
that Hernandez was a recovering alcoholic. Id.at49. Raytheon's statement to the EEOC in response
to Hernandez's charge of disability discrimination also casts some doubt on the company's asserted
reason for rejecting Hernandez's application. See id. at 48. Although the letter stated that "[tihe
Company maintains it's [sic] right to deny re-employment to employees terminated for violation
of Company rules and regulations," the letter explained more specifically that "[Hemandez's]
application was rejected based on his demonstrated drug use while previously employed and the
complete lack of evidence indicating successful drug rehabilitation." Id.
263. Id.at 48.
264. Hernandez v. Hughes Missile Sys. Co., 298 F.3d 1030, 1033, 1037 (9th Cir. 2002).
265. Id. at 1033.
266. See supra notes 46-53 and accompanying text.
267. Hernandez, 298 F.3d at 1033.
268. See id.at 1033-35. Regarding the first element, the court noted that
it is not disputed that Hernandez was a drug addict and that his positive drug test
formed a record of his addiction. In other words, it is not disputed that Hernandez
was "disabled" within the meaning of the ADA at the time he resigned in lieu of
termination, and a record of that disability existed.
Id.at 1033 n.9.
Regarding the "qualified" element, Hughes did not contest that Hernandez was qualified for the
job of Product Test Specialist at the time of his resignation in 1991, when his employee separation
sheet indicated that his work performance was both "good" and "fair." Id.at 1035. Hughes
contended, however, that Hernandez was not qualified for the position in 1994 when he sought
reemployment. Id.Hughes based this contention on the fact that in 1999, after Hernandez sued
Hughes, the company offered him the position of Product Test Specialist if he passed the required
examination, and Hernandez failed that test. Id.The court reasoned that, since Hernandez was
qualified in 1991 and was not qualified in 1999, whether he was qualified in 1994--"a date
considerably closer to the time during which he satisfactorily performed thejob"-when he applied
for rehire was a genuine issue of material fact. Id.

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol57/iss2/2

46

2005]

Timmons:
Acommodating Misconduct Under the Americans with Disabilities Act
233
ACCOMMODATING MISCONDUCT UNDER THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT

that there was a fact issue on causation because of the need for credibility
determinations on whether the labor relations employee knew of
Hemandez's record of drug addiction when she rejected his application.269
Second, the court explained that even if the employee had been unaware
of his record of drug addiction, Hernandez could still prove that his
disability caused the rejection of his application.
The court's reasoning on this point is convoluted and interwoven with
its rejection of Raytheon's asserted legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for
not rehiring Hemandez-the company's policy not to rehire employees
who were discharged or resigned in lieu of discharge for violating the
company's conduct rules. 271' Raytheon contended that this policy did not
discriminate against former employees with a record of drug addiction
"because it does not single out such employees or treat them differently
from employees who violated other personal conduct rules (such as
fighting or stealing from the company). 272 The court rejected this
argument, stating that Hernandez "may not be denied
273 re-employment
addiction.,
drug
of
record
past
his
of
because
simply
This statement indicates that the court relied implicitly on the Teahan
approach to finding disparate treatment, reasoning that Hemandez's
disability caused his positive drug test, and thus failure to rehire based on
the consequences of that drug test-Hernandez's resignation in lieu of
discharge-constituted disparate treatment on the basis of disability.274 The
court's implicit reliance on Teahanbecomes more apparent when the court
states that even if the labor relations employee were not aware of the
circumstances behind Hemandez's resignation, her ignorance would be
irrelevant because "her lack of knowledge would have been due solely to
[Raytheon's] unlawful policy which shields its employees from the
knowledge that an employment decision may be illegal., 27 5 If the staff
member who made an employment decision was unaware of the

269. Id. at 1034; see supranote 262.
270. Hernandez, 298 F.3d at 1036 n.18.
271. See id. at 1035. The court states in two footnotes that the same rationale for rejecting
Raytheon's asserted legitimate nondiscriminatory reason also establishes the causation element of
Hernandez's prima facie case. Id. at 1034 n.10, 1036 n.18.
272. Id. at 1035.
273. Id. at 1036.
274. To use the example provided by the Teahan court, failing to hire a former drug addict
based on his drug-related resignation is analogous to failing to hire an employee with a limp
because of the thump he makes when he walks. See Teahan v. Metro-N. Commuter R.R., 951 F.2d
511, 516-17 (2d Cir. 1991). Employers are rejecting both applicants because of consequences of
their disabilities.
275. Hernandez, 298 F.3d at 1036. The court stated further that "[h]aving willfully induced
ignorance on the part of its employees who make hiring decisions, an employer may not avoid
responsibility for its violation of the ADA by seeking to rely on that lack of knowledge." Id.
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applicant's disability, it would seem that the disability could not have
caused her decision. Rather than such a staff member being unaware of the
fact that she is committing an unlawful act, she could not have committed
an unlawful-meaning intentionally discriminatory-act unless she knew
of the disability and made her decision on that basis.27 6 The only way the
court's statement makes sense is if the court was equating employment
decisions based on a consequence of a disability to employment decisions
based on disability status, as did the Teahan court.277 Because the plaintiff
established a prima facie case and the employer's only asserted legitimate
nondiscriminatory reason was unlawful, the Ninth Circuit reversed the
grant of summary judgment to Raytheon.278
The Supreme Court,27 9 however, held that the Ninth Circuit erred in
rejecting the neutral no-rehire policy as a legitimate nondiscriminatory
reason for Raytheon's failure to rehire Hernandez. 28 ' According to the
Court, the company's no-rehire policy was a "quintessential legitimate
nondiscriminatory reason for refusing to rehire an employee who was
terminated for violating workplace conduct rules., 281' Noting that disparate
treatment requires evidence that "the protected trait.., actually motivated
the employer's decision, 28 2 the Court reasoned that if Raytheon rejected
Hemandez's application pursuant to a neutral and generally applicable noin no way, be said to have been motivated
rehire policy, that decision "can,
2 3
disability.
[Hemandez's]
by
276. The Ninth Circuit in Raytheon is not the only court to suggest that a decisionmaker's
ignorance of a plaintiff's membership in a protected class is somehow troubling in a disparate
treatment case. See Lenoir v. Combined Ins. Co. of Am., No. 01C5267, 2002 WL 1949735, at *11
Aug. 23, 2002). In Lenoir v. Combined Insurance Co. of America, the employer
(N.D. 111.
contended that the manager who decided to fire the plaintiff, based on the plaintiff's alleged theft
of forty-five cents worth of scrambled eggs from the company cafeteria, had no knowledge of the
plaintiff's disability, such that the plaintiff could not prove disparate treatment based on disability.
Id. at *3, * 10-11. The court rejected the employer's argument, reasoning that "[i]femployers could
simply isolate termination decisions to only those members of management with no knowledge of
employees' protected statuses, they could then immunize themselves from the strictures of
employment discrimination statutes." Id at *11. Interestingly, in Lenoir, unlike in Raytheon and
the other cases discussed in this Article, the plaintiff did not argue that her disability caused her
misconduct. See id. at *3-4 (discussing plaintiff's challenges to her termination).
277. See supra notes 167-78 and accompanying text.
278. Hernandez, 298 F.3d at 1037.
279. The opinion, written by Justice Thomas, was joined by all of the other members of the
Court, except Justice Souter, who took no part in the decision of the case, and Justice Breyer, who
took no part in the consideration or decision of the case. Raytheon Co. v. Hernandez, 540 U.S. 44,
45 (2003).
280. Id. at 54-55. Raytheon did not contest on appeal that Hernandez had established a prima
facie case of discrimination. Id. at 50.
281. Id.at 54-55.
282. Id.at 52 (quoting Hazen Paper Co. v. Biggins, 507 U.S. 604, 610 (1993)).
283. Id. at 55.
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The Supreme Court implicitly rejected the Teahan approach to
disability-related misconduct and its equating of decisions based on
consequences of disabilities to decisions based on disability status. 284 The
Court stated that if the labor relations employee was unaware of
Hernandez's disability, her hiring decision could not have been motivated
by his disability and thus could not have constituted disparate treatment. 85
Moreover, the Court noted that the Ninth Circuit's suggestion that
Raytheon's decision not to rehire Hernandez violated the ADA because his
"workplace misconduct is related to his disability" conflicted with the
Court's rejection of a similar argument in a case arising under the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act.286
Rather than expressly rejecting Teahan, however, the Court's precise
holding in Raytheon focused on the Ninth Circuit's improper use of
disparate impact reasoning in a disparate treatment case.287 Hernandez had
waived any disparate impact claim by failing to assert it in a timely
manner. 288 Nonetheless, the Ninth Circuit stated that Raytheon's "blanket
policy against rehire of all former employees who violated company
policy ... screens out persons with a record of addiction who have been
successfully rehabilitated" and thus violated the ADA. 28 9 As the Supreme
Court noted, a policy's effect on members of a protected class is a factor
under disparate impact analysis, not under disparate treatment.29 °

284. See supra notes 167-78 and accompanying text.
285. Raytheon Co., 540 U.S. at 54 n.7.
286. Id. at 54 n.6 (citing Hazen Paper Co., 507 U.S. at 611).
287. Id. at 53-55. The Court stressed that it "has consistently recognized a distinction between
claims of discrimination based on disparate treatment and claims of discrimination based on
disparate impact." Id. at 52.
288. Id. at 49.
289. Hernandez v. Hughes Missile Sys. Co., 298 F.3d 1030, 1036 (9th Cir. 2002).
290. Raytheon Co., 540 U.S. at 54. The Ninth Circuit apparently realized that it was
proceeding under the rubric of disparate impact. In response to a Petition for Rehearing and
Rehearing En Banc filed by Raytheon, the court issued an amended opinion. Hernandez,298 F.3d
at 1031. The "screens out" language was a new addition in the amended opinion. Id. at 1031. The
sentence had previously provided that maintaining such a blanket policy "discriminates on account
of past disability against persons with a record of addiction who have been successfully
rehabilitated." 292 F.3d 1038, 1044 (9th Cir. 2002) (original opinion). Another change in the
amended opinion was the addition of a footnote: "We note that Hughes has not raised a business
necessity defense, and we do not consider when, if ever, such a defense might be available with
respect to the hiring of a rehabilitated drug addict." 298 F.3d at 1037 n. 19 (citation omitted); cf 292
F.3d at 1045 (original opinion). Business necessity is not a defense to claims of disparate treatment;
it is a defense only to claims of disparate impact. See Raytheon Co., 540 U.S. at 52.
In short, the court appeared to want to rule in favor of Hernandez because of the disparate
impact of Raytheon's policy on persons with a record of addiction, but the court had to
acknowledge that Hernandez waived any disparate impact claim. The court tried to force its
reasoning into the prima facie case and legitimate nondiscriminatory reason rubric of disparate
treatment, which explains the convoluted nature of the opinion.
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Accordingly, the Supreme Court held that the Ninth Circuit wrongly
"conflat[ed] the analytical framework for disparate-impact and disparatetreatment claims" by holding that a neutral no-rehire policy could never
constitute a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason "in a case where the
employee was terminated for illegal drug use, because such a policy has a
disparate impact on recovering drug addicts." 29 ' Because Raytheon
articulated a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for not rehiring him,
Hemandez could establish liability only by proving that the asserted reason
was pretextual and did not actually cause the company's decision.292
C. The Lessons of Raytheon: DisparateTreatment and
DisparateImpact
1. Disparate Treatment
a. Implicit Rejection of Teahan Minority Approach
Raytheon provides substantial guidance on the limitations imposed by
the ADA on employers' ability to discharge employees for disabilityrelated misconduct. 93 As discussed above, the Supreme Court implicitly
rejected the Teahan minority approach to such misconduct.294 Plaintiffs
cannot prove disparate treatment merely by establishing that their
employers discharged them based on workplace conduct related to their
disabilities. 95
The Raytheon Court's citation of the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act (ADEA)296 decision of Hazen Paper Co. v. Bigginsz97
reinforces this point.2 9 In Hazen Paper,the Supreme Court rejected the

291. Raytheon Co., 540 U.S. at 51-52.
292. Id. at 51-52 (stating that because the "neutral no-rehire policy [was], by definition, a
legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason under the ADA... the only remaining question would be
whether respondent could produce sufficient evidence from which a jury could conclude that
'petitioner's stated reason for respondent's rejection was in fact pretext"') (quoting McDonnell
Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 804 (1973)) (footnote call number omitted).
293. See supra Part IV.B.
294. See supra notes 284-85 and accompanying text.
295. See supra note 286 and accompanying text.
296. 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (2000).
297. 507 U.S. 604 (1993).
298. 540 U.S. at 54 n.6. The Seventh Circuit's decision in Matthews v. Commonwealth Edison
Co., discussed supranotes 243-48 and accompanying text, predicted the Supreme Court's suggestion
that the disparate impact theory of discrimination is the appropriate means to analyze employment
decisions based on consequences of a disability. The Matthewscourt also cited Hazen Paperin support
of the proposition that such employment decisions do not constitute disparate treatment because of
disability. Matthews v. Commonwealth Edison Co., 128 F.3d 1194, 1196 (7th Cir. 1997).
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plaintiff's argument that by discharging him to prevent his pension benefits
from vesting-a factor "that is empirically correlated with age"-his
employer discriminated against him because of his age in violation of the
ADEA.299 The Court noted that the ADEA's prohibition against disparate
treatment was intended to prevent employers from relying on "inaccurate
and stigmatizing stereotypes" about the abilities of older workers.3"'
"When the employer's decision is wholly motivated by factors other than
age, the problem of inaccurate and stigmatizing stereotypes disappears,"
the Court reasoned, "even if the motivating factor is correlated with age,
as pension status typically is." '' The employer's reliance on an agecorrelated factor will constitute disparate treatment only when the
employer chooses that factor as a proxy for age, with the purpose of
discriminating against older employees because of their age.30 2
The authors of a widely used employment discrimination casebook
acknowledge Hazen Paper's holding that, at least in the context of age
discrimination, disparate treatment occurs only when an employer makes
a decision based on an employee's protected status, and it does not occur
when the employer utilizes another factor, even one related to that status.30 3
In that regard, Hazen Paperis similar to GeneralElectric Co. v. Gilbert,
in which the Court held that, even though only women can become
pregnant, discrimination on the basis of pregnancy does not constitute sex
discrimination in violation of Title VII. 3 4 Nonetheless, the casebook's
authors suggest that disparate treatment under the ADA should be viewed
30 5
more broadly than disparate treatment under the ADEA or Title VII.
Similarly, one of the courts arguing in favor of the Teahan minority
approach to disability-related misconduct asserted that a broad view of
disparate treatment is necessary to fulfill Congress's intent in proscribing
disability discrimination in employment. In Hogarth v. Thornburgh, the
court noted that drawing a distinction between discharge because of

299. 507 U.S. at 608-09.
300. Id.at 610.
301. Id. at 611.
302. See id. at 612-13 (stating that the Court "do[es] not preclude the possibility that an
employer who targets employees with a particular pension status on the assumption that these
employees are likely to be older thereby engages in age discrimination").
303. ZIMMER ET AL., supra note 216, at 749.
304. 429 U.S. 125, 135-36 (1976). Congress overruled Gilbert by passing the Pregnancy
Discrimination Act of 1978, which amended Title VII to provide that employment decisions based
on pregnancy constitute decisions made on the basis of sex. See Pub. L. No. 95-555, 92 Stat. 2076,
2076 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (2000)).
305. See ZIMMER ET AL., supra note 216, at 749 (noting cases in which courts have held that
decisions based on a disability's symptoms constitute disparate treatment on the basis of disability).
(querying whether there
Whether the authors agree with this suggestion is unclear, however. See id.
is "any reason to treat disability discrimination differently from age discrimination in this respect").
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disability and discharge because of disability-related misconduct "appears
to invite an inquiry into the state of mind of the employer."3 °6 Such an
inquiry was inappropriate, according to the Hogarth court, because
"' [d]iscrimination against the handicapped was perceived by Congress to
be most often the product, not of invidious animus, but rather of
thoughtlessness and indifference-of benign neglect.' 3 7 The court
reasoned that "[t]he congressional goal of eliminating such thoughtless
discrimination is hardly advanced if an employer is permitted to raise a
'pure heart, empty head' defense, claiming that it was unaware of the
relation between the handicap and its manifestations. "'308
A broader view of disparate treatment, however, is not necessary to
achieve Congress's goal of eliminating discrimination against the disabled
caused by thoughtlessness and indifference. Rather, the ADA's objective
of equal opportunity, as opposed to equal treatment, is served through the
statute's prohibition of disparate impact discrimination 3 9 and its
requirement of reasonable accommodation. Accordingly, there is no need
to expand the meaning ofdisparate treatment based on disability-in a way
that differs from the meaning of disparate treatment based on other
prohibited factors-in order to serve the purposes of the ADA. Disabled
employees who want to challenge the effect of employment policies that
are not based on disability status must utilize the disparate impact theory
of discrimination or the duty of reasonable accommodation.
b. Assessment of the Majority Approach: Proper Disparate
Treatment Analysis of Disability-Related Misconduct
The fact that the Teahan minority approach to disability-related
misconduct is incorrect does not mean, however, that all cases applying the
majority approach are correct. Some of the cases applying the majority
approach suggest that disabled employees who commit misconduct fall
completely outside the protection of the ADA.310 Neither the text of nor the
policy behind the ADA supports such a blanket exclusion. Congress
drafted the ADA to cover mental as well as physical disabilities,311 and

306. 833 F. Supp. 1077, 1085 (S.D.N.Y. 1993) (arising under the Rehabilitation Act).
307. Id.(quoting Alexander v. Choate, 469 U.S. 287, 295 (1985)).
308. Id.
309. The Hogarthcourt quotes from the Supreme Court decision of Alexander v. Choate to
support its argument that the state of mind of the employer should be irrelevant in determining
whether disparate treatment occurred. Id.(quoting 469 U.S. at 295). Notably, however, the quoted
passage from Alexander occurs in the context of the Court's discussion that the Rehabilitation Act
must prohibit disparate impact discrimination in some circumstances. 469 U.S. at 295-97.
310. See supra note 151.
311. See 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(A) (2000) (defining "disability" as "a physical or mental
impairment that substantially limits one or more of the major life activities of such individual")
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mental disabilities generally manifest themselves in the form of
the ease with which any behavior could be deemed
behavior. 1 2 Given
"misconduct,"313 holding that disabled employees who commit misconduct
fall outside the protection of the ADA would diminish substantially the
ADA's protection of the mentally disabled.314
In addition, the incorrectness of the Teahan minority approach to
disability-related misconduct does not mean that employees purportedly
discharged due to such misconduct never will be able to prove disparate
treatment.31 5 In Raytheon, although the employer asserted that it refused to
rehire Hernandez pursuant to its neutral no-rehire rule, Hernandez had the
opportunity on remand to demonstrate that the asserted reason was pretext
(emphasis added).
312. See STEFAN, supra note 100, at 154 ("Many disabilities manifest themselves in forms of
behavior or conduct, and psychiatric disability is manifested almost completely in this way."); Den
Hartog v. Wasatch Acad., 129 F.3d 1076, 1087 (10th Cir. 1997) ("Mental illness is manifested by
abnormal behavior, and is in fact normally diagnosed on the basis of abnormal behavior.").
313. See supra Part IV.A.
314. See Den Hartog, 129 F.3d at 1087 ("To permit employers carte blanche to terminate
employees with mental disabilities on the basis of any abnormal behavior would largely nullify the
ADA's protection of the mentally disabled.").
Moreover, the ADA provision authorizing employers to hold alcoholic and drug addicted
employees to the same qualification standards as other employees indicates that employees disabled
by alcoholism and drug addiction cannot use either the disparate impact theory or the duty of
reasonable accommodation to challenge neutral, uniformly-applied conduct rules. See id at 1086
(stating that 42 U.S.C. § 12114(c)(4) means that "employers need not make any reasonable
accommodations for employees who are illegal drug users and alcoholics"). The fact that this
authorization of neutral rules is limited to employees disabled by alcoholism and drug addiction
suggests that employees with other disabilities can challenge those rules under the disparate impact
theory or the duty of reasonable accommodation. See id. (accepting plaintiff's argument that
"because Congress only expressly permitted employers to hold illegal drug users and alcoholics to
the same objective standards of conduct as other employees even though their disability causes
misconduct or poor performance, Congress implicitly did not intend to extend the same employer
prerogative to employees with other disabilities").
At some points in its opinion, the Den Hartog court suggests that outside the context of drug
addiction and alcoholism, employment decisions based on disability-related misconduct constitute
disparate treatment on the basis of disability in violation of the ADA. See, e.g., id. (stating that "the
disability v. disability-caused conduct dichotomy seems to be unique to alcoholism and drugs").
This, of course, is the Teahan minority approach to disability-related misconduct, which the
Supreme Court rejected in Raytheon. Throughout most of DenHartog,however, the court indicates
that employees must use the duty of reasonable accommodation or the disparate impact theory of
discrimination to challenge discharge due to disability-related misconduct. See, e.g., id. at 1088
(stating that when disability-related misconduct occurs, "an employer should normally consider
whether a mentally disabled employee's purported misconduct could be remedied through a
reasonable accommodation," and if not, the employer may discipline the employee if the conduct
rule is job-related and consistent with business necessity or the employee poses a direct threat).
315. In other words, while it is incorrect to say, as Teahandid, that discharge due to disabilityrelated misconduct is per se disparate treatment, it is also incorrect to say that discharge purportedly
based on such misconduct is per se not disparate treatment.
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for disability discrimination.3" 6 A plaintiff purportedly discharged for
disability-related misconduct could prove pretext by demonstrating that his
or her employer did not terminate all employees who engaged in such
misconduct, which would raise an inference that the employer treated the
plaintiff differently because of his or her disability. Such a plaintiff also
could prove pretext by demonstrating that-even though the conduct rule
in question may appear neutral-the employer actually adopted it because
of its effect on employees with disabilities or with a particular disability.3 7
Some of the courts applying the majority rule to disability-related conduct
have stated that plaintiffs could establish disparate treatment if they had
this kind of evidence of pretext.318
Under the burden-shifting approach to demonstrating disparate
treatment, however, courts do not reach the pretext stage of the analysis
unless the plaintiff has established a prima facie case of discrimination.3 9
As discussed in Part lII.B.1 supra, many courts applying the majority
approach to disability-related misconduct conclude that the plaintiff cannot
establish a prima facie case because he or she cannot prove that the
employer discharged the plaintiff due to the plaintiffs disability.32 °

316. Raytheon Co. v. Hernandez, 540 U.S. 44, 52 (2003) (stating that "the only remaining
question [is] whether respondent could produce sufficient evidence from which a jury could
conclude that 'petitioner's stated reason for respondent's rejection was in fact pretext"') (quoting
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 804 (1973)).
317. Cf Hazen Paper Co. v. Biggins, 507 U.S. 604, 612-13 (1993) (stating that the Court
"do[es] not preclude the possibility that an employer who targets employees with a particular
pension status on the assumption that these employees are likely to be older thereby engages in age
discrimination").
318. See, e.g., Buie v. Quad/Graphics, Inc., 366 F.3d 496, 508 (7th Cir. 2004) ("The disparate
treatment of similarly-situated employees who were involved in misconduct of comparable
seriousness, but did not have a similar disability, could establish pretext."). In Taylor v. Dover
Elevator Systems, Inc., the court discussed several ways that the plaintiff could attempt to show
pretext: by introducing evidence that the employer "failed to rely on the reason in past decision
making"; that the employer "failed to articulate the reason at the time of discharge and advanced
conflicting reasons as the litigation progressed"; or that "a similarly situated employee... did not
suffer the adverse employment action as well." 917 F. Supp. 455,463 (N.D. Miss. 1996). None of
these methods for demonstrating pretext helped the Taylor plaintiff, however, who was discharged
for fighting on company premises. Id. at 458, 463. The court noted that the employer "invoked a
rule which had been in place prior to the altercation," "consistently maintained through all the many
meetings that the altercation was the cause for termination," and also fired the other employee who
was involved in the altercation. Id.at 463.
319. See supra notes 46-49 and accompanying text.
320. See, e.g., Hamilton v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 136 F.3d 1047, 1050, 1052 (5th Cir.
1998) (reasoning that plaintiff could not show that "an adverse employment decision was made
because of his disability" because he "was fired for his misconduct in the workplace"); Ray v.
Kroger Co., 264 F. Supp. 2d 1221, 1225, 1228 (S.D. Ga. 2003), aff'd,90 Fed. Appx. 384 (1 th Cir.
2003) (reasoning that plaintiff could not show that "he was discriminated against based upon his
disability" because he was discharged for "his constant outbursts of vulgar language and racial
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Including causation as an element of the prima facie case is problematic in
light of the fact that plaintiffs use the burden-shifting approach because
they lack direct evidence of causation. It would be more consistent with the
purposes of the burden-shifting approach to provide that the plaintiff must
prove merely that he or she "suffered an adverse employment action under
circumstances from which an inference of unlawful discrimination
arises."32 '
Moreover, a plaintiff who is a qualified individual with a disability
should be able to create such an inference-thus establishing a prima facie
case of disability discrimination-by demonstrating that he or she was
discharged because of conduct causally connected to the disability. Such
an approach would provide more protection to plaintiffs, many of whom
will have disabilities that manifest themselves through conduct. In arguing
in favor of its approach to disability-related misconduct, the Teahan court
contended that, unless discharge because of a consequence of a disability
was equated to discharge because of disability, employers could violate the
ADA surreptitiously. 22 An employer could claim, for example, that it is
firing a disabled employee with a limp because of the thumping sound the
employee makes when he walks, not because of the employee's
disability.3 23 To avoid this result, however, it is not necessary to adopt the
broad approach to disparate treatment applied in Teahan. Rather, because
the employer's stated reason-the thump-is causally connected to the
employee's disability, the plaintiff can establish a prima facie case of
disability discrimination. The employer will assert the plaintiffs
misconduct-in this example, the thump-as its legitimate,
nondiscriminatory reason for the discharge. The plaintiff then has the
opportunity to demonstrate that this reason is a pretext for disability
discrimination, by showing, for example, that the employer did not
discharge other noisy employees. This evidence could lead a reasonable

slurs").
321. Young v. Warner-Jenkinson Co., 152 F.3d 1018, 1021-22 (8th Cir. 1998); see also Butler
v. City of Prairie Vill., 172 F.3d 736, 748 (10th Cir. 1999) (stating that "to establish the third
element of a prima facie case of disability discrimination, the plaintiff must show that she was
terminated because of her disability, or that the employer terminated the plaintiff 'under
circumstances which give rise to an inference that the termination was based on her disability')
(quoting Morgan v. Hilti, Inc., 108 F.3d 1319, 1323 (9th Cir. 1997)); Hutchinson v. UPS, Inc., 883
F. Supp. 379, 395 (N.D. Iowa 1995) (holding that "the plaintiff need not show at the prima facie
case phase that he or she was terminated 'because of' a disability," but rather "need only make a
showing that gives rise to an inference of discrimination on the basis of disability"); supra notes
57-59 and accompanying text.
322. Teahan v. Metro-N. Commuter R.R., 951 F.2d 511, 516-17 (2d Cir. 1991).
323. See id. Or, under the Raytheon facts, an employer could claim that it is not rehiring a
former employee who is a recovered alcoholic because the employee resigned in lieu of discharge,
not because of the employee's record of disability.
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jury to conclude that the employer's true reason for discharging the
plaintiff was the plaintiffs disability.
Allowing a qualified plaintiff with a disability to establish a prima facie
case by showing discharge due to conduct causally related to disability
would not mean that employers never could obtain summary judgment. In
the Title VII context, although it is easy for plaintiffs to establish a prima
facie case, employers frequently obtain summary judgment because the
plaintiff cannot create ajury issue on pretext.324 Similarly, even if an ADA
plaintiff establishes a prima facie case by showing discharge due to
disability-related conduct, the employer likely will obtain summary
judgment on the plaintiff's disparate treatment claim if it discharged the
plaintiff pursuant to a long-standing and uniformly applied conduct rule.325
A remaining question regarding disparate treatment is whether the
plaintiff must prove as an element of his or her prima facie case that the
employer knew of the plaintiffs disability at the time of the discharge
decision. Employer knowledge ofthe plaintiff s membership in a protected
class is not an issue in most discrimination cases because that membership
is often obvious; employers typically do not assert, for example, that they
were unaware of the plaintiff's race or gender.326 Where the plaintiffs
protected status is not apparent, however, as in cases alleging disparate
treatment because of pregnancy or religion, courts often have required
evidence
of employer knowledge of that status as part of the prima facie
327
case.

324. See generally Jeffrey A. Van Detta, "Le Roi Est Mort; Vive Le Roi! ": An Essay on the
QuietDemise ofMcDonnell Douglas and the TransformationofEvery Title VII CaseAfter Desert
Palace, Inc. v. Costa into a "Mixed-Motives" Case, 52 DRAKE L. REv 71, 105-08 (2003)
(discussing summary judgment under Title VII).
325. See, e.g., Taylor v. Dover Elevator Sys., Inc., 917 F. Supp. 455,463 (N.D. Miss. 1996)
(holding that, even if the plaintiff could establish a prima facie case, the employer was entitled to
summaryjudgment because the plaintiffcould not prove that the employer's stated reason for firing
the plaintiff-the plaintiff's fighting on company premises-was pretextual).
326. See Geraci v. Moody-Tottrup, Int'l, Inc., 82 F.3d 578, 581 (3d Cir. 1996) ("The
traditional McDonnell Douglas-Burdinepresumption quite properly makes no reference to the
employer's knowledge of membership in a protected class because, in the vast majority of
discrimination cases, the plaintiff's membership is either patent (race or gender), or is documented
on the employee's personnel recoid (age)."); Hedberg v. Ind. Bell Tel. Co., 47 F.3d 928, 932 (7th
Cir. 1995) ("In race or sex discrimination, the protected characteristic of the employee is
immediately obvious to the employer ...").
327. See, e.g., Geraci, 82 F.3d at 581 ("If the pregnancy is not apparent and the employee has
not disclosed it to her employer, she must allege knowledge and present, as part of her prima facie
case, evidence from which a rational jury could infer that the employer knew that she was
pregnant."); Galloway v. Alltel Communications, Inc., No. C99-2097, 2001 WL 34149071, at *4
(N.D. Iowa Jan. 19,2001) (noting employer's argument that the plaintiffcould not establish a prima
facie case of religious discrimination because the decisionmakers did not know that the plaintiffwas
Mormon when they decided to discharge her). The Geraci court reasoned that "it is counterintuitive to infer that the employer discriminated on the basis of a condition of which it was wholly
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Similarly, courts have held that an employer must have knowledge of
an employee's disability for its discharge of the employee to constitute
disparate treatment on the basis of disability.328 In Hedbergv. IndianaBell
Telephone Co., the court reasoned as follows:
At the most basic level, it is intuitively clear when viewing
the ADA's language in a straightforward manner that an
employer cannot fire an employee "because of' a disability
unless it knows of the disability. If it does not know of the
disability, the employer is firing the employee "because of'
some other reason.
The Raytheon Court's rejection of the Teahan approach to disabilityrelated misconduct makes clear that what matters for disparate treatment
purposes is discrimination based on disability status; discrimination based
on the consequences of a disability does not suffice. Accordingly, it stands
to reason that an employer must be aware of a plaintiff s disability status
in order to discriminate on that basis.
Employer knowledge of the plaintiff's disability must play some role
in cases alleging disparate treatment on the basis of disability, but the
nature of that role is uncertain. One possibility is requiring the plaintiff to
prove employer knowledge as an element of the prima facie case, distinct
from the requirement that the plaintiff demonstrate an adverse employment
action under circumstances creating an inference of unlawful
discrimination, which the plaintiff can satisfy by proving discharge due to
disability-related misconduct. 33" The Hedbergcourt, despite emphasizing
the importance of employer knowledge, did not make such a holding,
however.33 ' A better possibility may be for evidence that the employer did

ignorant." 82 F.3d at 581.
328. E.g., Hedberg,47 F.3d at 932 (holding that "an employer cannot be liable under the ADA
for firing an employee when it indisputably had no knowledge of the disability"); Landefeld v.
Marion Gen. Hosp., Inc., 994 F.2d 1178, 1181-82 (6th Cir. 1993) (finding the plaintiff unable to
prove that his disability caused his discharge under the Rehabilitation Act because "[e]ven if
plaintiff's behavior was caused by his mental illness, [his employer] had no knowledge of this").
329. 47 F.3d at 932.
330. In Landefeld, the court reasoned that the plaintiff's inability to show that his employer
knew of his disability at the time of his discharge prevented the plaintiff from satisfying the
causation element of a prima facie case of disability discrimination. 994 F.2d at 1180-82. Under
the approach advocated by this Article, however, the fact that the plaintiff was terminated for
conduct-stealing mail from the hospital mailboxes of his fellow physicians-that was causally
connected to his disability of bipolar disorder would create an inference of causation.
331. The court stated that it "need not decide the precise elements of a prima facie case of
discrimination under the ADA." Hedberg,47 F.3d at 933 n.5. Although the court acknowledged
that one possibility would be to include employer knowledge of the disability as an element of a
plaintiff's prima facie case, the court stated that its holding was merely that "where there is no
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not know of the plaintiff's disability to come into play at the pretext stage
of the analysis, making it more difficult for the plaintiff to demonstrate that
the employer's asserted reason is a pretext for disability discrimination.
Cases discussing what evidence indicates employer knowledge of a
plaintiff's disability generally arise in the context of a claim that the
employer failed to accommodate the plaintiff s disability, not in the context
of a claim that the employer intentionally treated the plaintiff differently
because of his or her disability.332 Those cases have tended to interpret
narrowly what evidence suffices,33 3 but it is arguable that courts should
require less of an evidentiary showing of knowledge when the plaintiff is
arguing for mere equal treatment rather than equal opportunity.
For example, in Miller v. National Casualty Co., the plaintiff missed
work for an extended period without providing medical documentation to
her employer, causing her discharge.3 34 The plaintiff claimed that she failed
to report to work and to notify her employer because of her disability of
manic depression, and argued that her employer should have
accommodated her by allowing her extra time to obtain a medical excuse
before termination.335 The court held that, because the ADA requires
employers to accommodate limitations of disabilities, not disabilities
themselves, the plaintiffs sister's statement to the employer that the
plaintiff "was mentally falling apart and the family was trying to get her
into the hospital" was insufficient to trigger the duty to accommodate.336

genuine issue that an employer did not know of an employee's disability when it decided to fire
him, the employee cannot make out a case of discriminatory discharge."Id. But see Monette v. Elec.
Data Sys. Corp., 90 F.3d 1173, 1186 (6th Cir. 1996) (stating that plaintiff must prove as part of a
prima facie case that "the employer knew or had reason to know of the plaintiff's disability");
Dikcis v. Nalco Chem. Co., 974 F. Supp. 669, 674 (N.D. Ill. 1997) (holding that plaintiff "cannot
establish a prima facie case of disability discrimination because there is no evidence that [his
employer] knew of his disability").
332. See, e.g., Taylor v. Principal Fin. Group, 93 F.3d 155, 163-64 (5th Cir. 1996) (holding
that plaintiff's statement to his supervisor that he was suffering from bipolar disorder failed to give
rise to a duty to accommodate because the employer was unaware of "any limitations experienced
by the [plaintiff] as a result of that disability"); Miller v. Nat'l Cas. Co., 61 F.3d 627, 629-30 (8th
Cir. 1995) (holding that plaintiff's sister's statement that plaintiff "was mentally falling apart and
the family was trying to get her into the hospital" failed to give rise to a duty to accommodate
because it was insufficient to "alert[] the company to the fact that [plaintiff] suffered from a mental
disability that the ADA would require the company to accommodate").
333. See Susan Stefan, Delusions of Rights: Americans with Psychiatric Disabilities,
Employment Discriminationand the Americans with DisabilitiesAct, 52 ALA. L. REV. 271, 290
(2000) (citing Taylorand Miller in support of the proposition that "courts have been extraordinarily
restrictive in interpreting the requirement that the employer must be aware of the employee's
disability").
334. 61 F.3d at 629.
335. Id.
336. Id.at 629-30.
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Regardless of the correctness of that holding in the reasonable
accommodation context, it should be clear that if the plaintiff were
claiming disparate treatment-that her employer treated her differently
because of her disability and would not have discharged employees who
missed work without documentation for reasons other than "mentally
falling apart"-she would have presented sufficient evidence of employer
knowledge of her disability. Because of the tendency to incorrectly import
into the disparate treatment context the stricter standard for employer
knowledge under reasonable accommodation,3 37 it may be best for courts
to consider evidence of employer knowledge or lack thereof at the pretext
stage of disparate treatment analysis, rather than at the stage of the prima
facie case. Under this approach, fact-finders can assess all of the evidence
indicating that a plaintiff's disability may have caused her discharge, rather
than focusing too stringently on any single element.
2. Disparate Impact
The outcome in Raytheon suggests that the disparate impact theory of
discrimination, rather than disparate treatment, is the proper means to
challenge discharge for disability-related misconduct.33 Where a plaintiff
is challenging the effect of a rule adopted by his or her employer-rather
than the employer's motivation in adopting or applying that rule-the
plaintiff is making a disparate impact argument (or asking for reasonable
accommodation).339 Raytheon thus indicates that the Den Hartogminority
approach to disability-related misconduct is a viable means for challenging
discharge based on such misconduct." More analysis is necessary,
337. See, e.g., Stefan, supra note 333, at 290-91 (citing the Taylor and Miller reasonable
accommodations cases in support of the proposition that, in the disparate treatment context, "courts
have been extraordinarily restrictive in interpreting the requirement that the employer must be aware
of the employee's disability").
338. See Raytheon Co. v. Hemandez, 540 U.S. 44, 47, 53-55 (2003). In Matthews v.
Commonwealth Edison Co., the Seventh Circuit anticipated this conclusion with respect to
challenging discharge based on any consequence of a disability, rather than on disability status. 128
F.3d 1194, 1196-97 (7th Cir. 1997).
339. See Raytheon Co., 540 U.S. at 54 (noting that the Ninth Circuit's observation that the
employer's policy "'screens out persons with a record of addiction"' raised a factor relevant to
disparate impact claims) (quoting Hernandez v. Hughes Missile Sys. Co., 298 F.3d 1030, 1036-37
(9th Cir. 2002)); Matthews, 128 F.3d at 1196 (stating that a dyslexic worker not promoted because
of slowness in reading could try to prove pretext and thus disparate treatment--"that he lost the
promotion because his employer dislikes people with disabilities, not because his inability to read
quickly made him the worse choice for the job"-or "he has to switch to the disparate-impact
approach and challenge the qualification on the basis of its effect and its reasonableness rather than
on the basis of its motivation").
340. Den Hartog v. Wasatch Acad., 129 F.3d 1076, 1086 (10th Cir. 1997) (stating that "an
employer may not hold a disabled employee to precisely the same standards of conduct as a nondisabled employee unless such standards are j ob-related and consistent with business necessity").
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however, before deciding that plaintiffs discharged for disability-related
misconduct can utilize the disparate impact theory of discrimination to
challenge their discharge. In addition, Den Hartogmight not represent a
correct application of the disparate impact theory to disability-related
misconduct.
a. The Meaning of "Qualification Standards, Employment Tests,
or Other Selection Criteria"
As discussed in Part II.B.3. supra, the ADA contains two provisions
prohibiting disparate impact discrimination. One provision prohibits
employers from "utilizing standards, criteria, or methods of
administration" "that have the effect of discrimination on the basis of
disability., 34 1 The other provision, which is more specific, prohibits
employers from "using qualification standards, employment tests or other
selection criteria that screen out or tend to screen out an individual with a
disability or a class of individuals with disabilities unless the standard, test
or other selection criteria, as used by [the employer], is3 42shown to be jobrelated ... and ... consistent with business necessity.
Can a plaintiff challenge a policy directly targeting workplace
misconduct under the disparate impact theory? Arguably, the statute's
reference to "qualification standards, employment tests, or other selection
criteria" indicates that plaintiffs can use the ADA's disparate impact
provisions to challenge only employer policies that pose barriers to hiring
or promoting disabled employees.343 In fact, outside the ADA context,
most disparate impact cases-and all of the disparate impact cases decided
by the Supreme Court-have involved challenges to an employer's
qualification standards or selection practices for hiring or promoting
employees. 3" Workplace conduct rules are likely to pose barriers to
disabled employees' retaining their jobs, rather than to such employees
obtaining those jobs in the first place. Raytheon does not provide an
answer to this question because the policy at issue in Raytheon, although
misconduct-related, imposed a barrier to hiring certain individuals: those
whom the employer had discharged previously for misconduct.

341. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(3) (2000).
342. Id. § 12112(b)(6).
343. See id.
344. See, e.g., Connecticut v. Teal, 457 U.S. 440,442-43 (1982) (discussing requirement that
employees pass a written test to be considered for promotion); Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321,
327-29 (1977) (discussing requirement that applicants for employment be of a certain minimum
height and weight); Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 425-28 (1971) (discussing
requirement that employees have a high school diploma and pass two standardized tests in order
to be assigned initially or transferred into certain departments).
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Courts should construe the disparate impact provisions of the ADA as
encompassing challenges to policies prohibiting workplace misconduct.
The statute's reference to "qualification standards . . . [and] selection
criteria" can be interpreted as including an employer's standards for
existing employees to remain qualified as opposed to being selected for
discharge.345 The fact that the statute's other reference to the disparate
impact theory mentions "standards, criteria, or methods of administration,"
without using the modifiers of "qualification" and "selection," further
workplace misconduct certainly
supports this view.3" Policies prohibiting
3 47
criteria.
and
standards
constitute
In addition, the ADA provision regarding employees who are alcoholics
or engaged in illegal drug use supports an understanding of "qualification
standards" as including workplace conduct rules.348 The provision states
that an employer "may hold an employee who engages in the illegal use of
drugs or who is an alcoholic to the same qualification standardsfor
employment orjobperformanceand behaviorthat such entity holds other
employees. 3 49 While this provision indicates that employees disabled by
alcoholism or drug addiction cannot use the disparate impact theory to
challenge neutral, uniformly applied conduct rules, it suggests that
employees with other disabilities can contend that such rules constitute
qualification standards that screen them out. Finally, the EEOC's
Enforcement Guidance on the ADA and Psychiatric Disabilities directly
contemplates the availability of the disparate impact theory to challenge
policies prohibiting workplace misconduct. In response to the question
"[m]ay an employer discipline an individual with a disability for violating
a workplace conduct standard if the misconduct resulted from a disability,"
the EEOC states, "Yes, provided that the workplace conduct standard is

345. See 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(6).
346. See id. § 12112(b)(3)(A).
347. In Taylor v. Dover Elevator Systems, Inc., for example, the employer discharged the
plaintiff for violating "company rule three which prohibits 'fighting, brawling, or attempting injury
to another person while on company premises,"' and which "additionally provides that a violation
thereof could result in discharge." 917 F. Supp. 455, 459 (N.D. Miss. 1996). Company rule three
established a "standard" of conduct for employees.
348. See 42 U.S.C. § 12114(c)(4). Moreover, the ADA provision regarding the direct threat
defense also suggests that current employees can utilize the disparate impact theory. The provision
states that "[t]he term 'qualification standards' may include a requirement that an individual shall
not pose a direct threat to the health or safety of other individuals in the workplace."Id. § 12113(b).
This provision must apply to existing employees as well as applicants for hire or promotion; it
would not make sense to prohibit an employer from terminating an existing employee
who-perhaps due to acquiring a contagious disease-became a direct threat to the health of others
in the workplace.
349. Id. § 12114(c)(4) (emphasis added).
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job-related for the position in question and is consistent with business
necessity."35
Aside from the express language of the statute, the purposes of the
ADA also support the availability of the disparate impact theory to
challenge policies on workplace misconduct. The ADA was intended to
ensure more than just equal treatment of individuals with disabilities in the
workplace. As the duty ofreasonable accommodation makes clear, another
goal of the statute was to ensure equal access to employment
opportunities. 1 Just as workplaces that are not physically equipped to
allow wheelchair access present obstacles to the employment opportunities
of some disabled individuals,3 52 so too can workplace conduct policies that
deem as disqualifying misconduct behavior that an individual with a
disability may find impossible or nearly impossible to control. The social
model of disability,353 which underlies the ADA, views disability not as the
product of limitations inherent in an individual's body or mind, but rather

350. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMM'N, supra note 67, at 31 (Question 30). As
support for this answer, the EEOC cites the "qualification standards... that screen out" component
of the ADA's definition of disability discrimination. Id. (citing 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(6) (1994)).
351. See Anita Silvers, Formal Justice, in DISABILITY, DIFFERENCE, DISCRIMINATION:
PERSPECTIVES ON JUSTICE IN BIOETHICS AND PUBLIC POLICY 13, 120 (1998) (noting that the ADA
"promotes ...the view that not special benefits but, instead, access similar to other people's is a
basic requirement for acknowledging that the lives of people with disabilities are as worth living
as others' lives are"); Michelle A. Travis, Leveling the PlayingField or Stacking the Deck? The
"Unfair Advantage'" Critique of PerceivedDisability Claims, 78 N.C. L. REV. 901, 958 (2000)
("While the ADA's duty of reasonable accommodation is obviously inconsistent with a sameness
model, it is nevertheless entirely consistent with the ADA's goal of equal opportunity for
individuals with actual disabilities.").
352. See Samuel R. Bagenstos, Subordination,Stigma, and "Disability,"86 VA. L. REV. 397,
429 (2000) (providing the example of a person with paralysis who will be unable to work if
workplace entrances are too narrow to accommodate a wheelchair or accessible only by stairs).
353. Martha Minow explains this model, which she calls the "social-relations model," as
follows:
As a method of legal analysis, the social-relations approach demands analysis
of difference in terms of the relationships that construct it. The approach solicits
challenges from the perspective of those labeled different, and it treats existing
institutional arrangements as a conceivable source of the problem of difference
rather than an unproblematic background.
MARTHA MINOW, MAKING ALL THE DIFFERENCE: INCLUSION, EXCLUSION, AND THE AMERICAN LAW

112 (1990). Wendy Hensel describes the social model of disability as viewing "the limitations
experienced by the disabled. .. as the result of discrimination, explicit or implicit, from self-titled
'normal' people rather than from the actual impairments." Wendy F. Hensel, Interacting with
Others: A MajorLife Activity Underthe Americans with DisabilitiesAct?, 2002 WiS. L. REV. 1139,
1145, 1170. In contrast to the earlier medical model of disability, which focused on curing the
disabled individual, the social model "focuses on changing attitudes and eradicating barriers" to the
full participation of individuals with disabilities in society. Id. at 1144-45.
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as "the interaction between societal barriers (both physical and otherwise)
and the impairment. 31 4 This approach envisions the physical structures of
a work environment as contingent rather than natural, and thus as subject
to change if necessary to open the workplace to individuals with
disabilities."' Similarly, courts should view workplace policies as
contingent rather than natural, and thus as subject to change or exception
if they tend to harm disproportionately an individual with a disability or a
class of such individuals, and if the employer cannot prove that the policies
are job-related and consistent with business necessity. It would be a
cramped understanding of equal opportunity to allow disabled individuals
to enter the workplace but to then force them to comply with workplace
policies-developed based on the norm of a worker with no
disabilities-that they will find extremely difficult to follow due to their
disabilities, where the employer cannot show a need for such policies.356

354. Bagenstos, supranote 352, at 426, 428. Bagenstos explains that much of the ADA "can
be seen as implementing disability rights activists' attempt to eliminate 'disability' as a
disadvantaged group status by eliminating the physical, social, and attitudinal structures that make
particular physical or mental conditions generally disadvantageous." Id.at 433.
355. Bagenstos provides the example of a person with paralysis who will be unable to work
if workplace entrances are too narrow to accommodate a wheelchair or are accessible only by stairs.
Id. at 429. He notes that, although the person's paralysis is real, "it is not her physical impairment
that has disabled her: What has disabled her is the set of social choices that has created a built
environment that confines wheelchair users to their homes." Id. at 429; see also Hensel, supranote
353, at 1145 (describing an individual confined to a wheelchair as disabled only "as a result of the
design and construction of the facility rather than any inherent biological problem").
356. Although most Title VII disparate impact cases involve challenges to employers'
qualification standards or selection practices for hiring or promoting employees, one line of cases
involves a challenge to an employer's conduct policy as having a disparate impact on members of
a protected class. This line of cases-which supports allowing disparate impact challenges to
conduct policies under the ADA-involves English-only policies, in which an employer adopts a
rule that only English can be spoken on the job. See, e.g., Gutierrez v. Mun. Court, 838 F.2d 1031,
1036, 1053 (9th Cir. 1988), vacatedasmoot, 409 U.S. 1016 (1989); Garcia v. Gloor, 618 F.2d 264,
266, 270 (5th Cir. 1980) (finding that employer's rule did not discriminate on the basis of national
origin); EEOC v. Synchro-Start Prods., Inc., 29 F. Supp. 2d 911, 912-14 (N.D. Ill. 1999); Long v.
First Union Corp., 894 F. Supp. 933,937, 940-41 (E.D. Va. 1995) (granting employer's motion for
summary judgment).
In the most well-known case, Garciav. Spun Steak Co., Spanish-speaking employees sued their
employer for adopting a policy whereby only English could be spoken in connection with work. 998
F.2d 1480, 1183 (9th Cir. 1993). Although the Garciacourt ultimately ruled against the plaintiffs,
the court reasoned that Title VII permitted disparate impact challenges to employer policies outside
the hiring and promotion context. Id. at 1485. The court explained that
Regardless whether a company's decisions about whom to hire or to promote are
infected with discrimination, policies or practices that impose significantly harsher
burdens on a protected group than on the employee population in general may
operate as barriers to equality in the workplace and, if unsupported by a business
justification, may be considered "discriminatory."
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b. Assessment of the Den HartogMinority Approach: Proving that
Conduct Rules Have a Disparate Impact
Assuming that plaintiffs can use the disparate impact theory of
discrimination to challenge conduct rules, how might a plaintiff establish
disparate impact under the ADA? Although the Den Hartog minority
approach to disability-related misconduct is based on the disparate impact
theory of discrimination, that court failed to explain how a plaintiff proves
that a conduct rule has a disparate impact. In fact, by stating that "an
employer may not hold a disabled employee to precisely the same
standards of conduct as a non-disabled employee unless such standards are
' the court implies that
job-related and consistent with business necessity,"357
a plaintiff need prove nothing in order to shift onto the employer the
burden to establish the validity of its conduct rules.
Contrary to the implication of the Den Hartog court, the text of the
ADA makes clear that an employer bears the burden of justifying its
conduct rules only after the plaintiff demonstrates that the rules "screen out
or tend to screen out an individual with a disability or a class of individuals
' Moreover, assuming that individuals with mental
with disabilities."358
disabilities-the category of disability at issue in Den Hartog-cannot
comply with conduct rules also conflicts with the policy underlying the
ADA. Such an assumption would reinforce the stereotype that persons with
mental disabilities are crazy, dangerous, and completely out of control-a
stereotype that suggests that such persons simply do not belong in the
workplace.359 Although the disparate impact theory of discrimination
focuses on the differences between persons in furtherance of the equal
opportunity goal of the ADA, it cannot be forgotten that the ADA also
embraces the goal of equal treatment. 36" Encouraging employers to assume

Id.
Similarly, regardless of whether an employer's hiring or promotion decisions discriminate on
the basis of disability, employer policies prohibiting conduct causally connected to disabilities may
impose significantly harsher burdens on employees with those disabilities, operating as a barrier
to equality in the workplace. If such policies are not job-related and consistent with business
necessity, courts could find them discriminatory in violation of the ADA.
357. Den Hartog v. Wasatch Acad., 129 F.3d 1076, 1086 (10th Cir. 1997).
358. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(6) (2000); see also id. § 12113(a).
359. See Jean Campbell & Caroline L. Kaufmann, Equality and Difference in the ADA:
UnintendedConsequencesfor Employment of Peoplewith Mental HealthDisabilities,in MENTAL
DISORDER, WORK DISABILITY, AND THE LAW 221, 228 (Richard J. Bonnie & John Monahan eds.,
1997) (noting that "many studies demonstrate that employers have strong negative perceptions of
persons known or thought to have a mental illness"); Hubbard, supranote 236, at 850-51 ("Surveys
consistently show that the public harbors widespread fear of 'the mentally ill.').
360. In fact, when considering the duty ofreasonable accommodation-the more well-known
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that disabled employees cannot comply with conduct rules would conflict
with that goal.361
Accordingly, to rely on the disparate impact theory of discrimination,
a plaintiff must prove that a conduct rule has a disparate impact. However,
as discussed supra in Part II.B.3, it is easier for a plaintiff to prove
disparate impact under the ADA than it is under Title VII because the
ADA allows individually focused disparate impact claims. Rather than
needing to produce statistical evidence showing that the challenged policy
disqualified or excluded a disproportionate number of persons in a
protected group, an ADA plaintiff need prove only that the policy had an
adverse effect on the plaintiff because of his or her disabilities.36 2 More
precisely, the ADA plaintiff must prove that the policy had an
"exclusionary effect" on the plaintiff due to the "particular limitations
' This showing is very similar to what
caused by [his or her] disability."363

embodiment of the ADA's goal of equal opportunity-it appears that equal treatment is the default
goal of the statute in the employment context. Employers are required to treat employees the same,
regardless of disability, unless and until the employee asks for different treatment in the form of a
request for reasonable accommodation. See 29 C.F.R. app. § 1630.9 (2004) (stating that generally
"it is the responsibility of the individual with a disability to inform the employer that
accommodation is needed").
361. See Carlos A. Ball, PreferentialTreatment andReasonable Accommodation Under the
Americans with DisabilitiesAct, 55 ALA. L. REV. 951, 955 (2004) (stating that "this model of
equality requires that the disabilities in question be deemed irrelevant to the ability of the disabled
employees to perform their jobs, in the same way that their race and sex are deemed irrelevant");
Karlan & Rutherglen, supra note 40, at 10 (stating that the model "would condemn decisions made
on the basis of 'myths, fears, and stereotypes associated with disabilities' that assume that
individuals with physical or mental impairments are not equally capable of doing a particular job")
(quoting 29 C.F.R. app. § 1630.2(1) (1995)).
362. See 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(6) (2000) (referring to qualification standards "that screen out
or tend to screen out an individual with a disability or a class of individuals with disabilities")
(emphasis added); see also Keith R. Fentonmiller & Herbert Semmel, Where Age and Disability
DiscriminationIntersect: An Overview of the ADA for the ADEA Practitioner,10 GEO. MASON U.
CIv. RTS. L.J. 227, 275-76 (2000) (contending that allowing individually-focused disparate impact
claims under the ADA "appears to make practical sense because 'whether a person has a disability
under the ADA is an individualized inquiry,' a determination that 'is not necessarily based on the
name or diagnosis of the impairment the person has, but rather on the effect of that impairment on
the life of the individual"'; in contrast, individualized inquiries are rarely required to identify a
person's race or gender, "thereby making race or sex discrimination claims far more amenable to
a statistical analysis") (quoting Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471, 483 (1999))
(footnote call numbers omitted).
363. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMM'N, supra note 83, § 1-4.3(2). The ability of
ADA plaintiffs to establish disparate impact discrimination on an individual rather than a class-wide
basis serves a valuable policy role in avoiding some of the stigmatization that otherwise may arise
through use of the disparate impact theory. The disparate impact model of discrimination is based
on the differences between groups of people, and focusing on such differences can reinforce the
paternalistic idea that one group is inferior and thus in need of special treatment. Martha Minow
has called this the "dilemma of difference," explaining that "[t]he stigma of difference may be
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is required to assert a claim of failure to accommodate, that the employer
failed to "mak[e] reasonable accommodations to the known physical or
mental limitations of an otherwise qualified individual with a disability."3"

recreated both by ignoring and by focusing on it.... The problems of inequality can be exacerbated
both by treating members of minority groups the same as members of the majority and by treating
the two groups differently." MINOw, supra note 353, at 20.
Even under the individually-focused version of disparate impact, ADA plaintiffs must highlight
the differences between themselves and other persons in the workplace. Without such differences,
of course, a plaintiff could not prove that a policy had a disparate impact on him or her because of
the plaintiff's disability. Underthe individually-focused version, however, aplaintiffneed not argue
that the policy would have a disparate impact on all persons with disabilities, or even on a narrower
group such as all persons with mental disabilities or all persons with major depression. The plaintiff
need not try to argue that workplace conduct standards disproportionately harm persons with major
depression, which would send the message that all or most persons with major depression are
unable to behave in an appropriate manner.
364. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A). Christine Jolls has noted the similarities between the
concepts of disparate impact discrimination and accommodation. See Jolls, supra note 70, at 645
(stating that the disparate impact branch of antidiscrimination law contains requirements of
accommodation, such that "antidiscrimination and accommodation are overlapping rather than
fundamentally distinct categories"). Jolls defines accommodation as
a legal rule that requires employers to incur special costs in response to the
distinctive needs (as measured against existing market structures) of particular,
identifiable demographic groups of employees, such as individuals with
(observable) disabilities, and imposes this requirement in circumstances in which
the employer has no intention of treating the group in question differently on the
basis of group membership (or "discriminating against" the group in the canonical
sense).
Id. at 648. Similarly, according to Jolls,
[e]mployers are often required by disparate impact law to incur special costs in
response to the distinctive needs or circumstances (measured against existing
market structures) of particular groups, and these requirements may arise in
situations in which the employer had no intention of treating the group differently
on the basis of group membership.
Id. at 652.
Jolls argues that in several categories of cases, those courts finding employers liable under Title
VII's disparate impact theory are actually requiring such employers to accommodate employees.
For example, courts have held that no-beard policies may violate Title VII because of their disparate
impact on black men, many of whom have a skin condition that makes it difficult or impossible for
them to shave. Id. at 653-56 (discussing Bradley v. Pizzaco of Neb., Inc., 7 F.3d 795 (8th Cir.
1993)). Jolls also discusses cases involving disparate-impact challenges to English-only policies
in the workplace. Id. at 658-60; see also supra note 356 (analogizing the English-only cases to
discharges of employees for engaging in disability-related misconduct, where the conduct rule is
not job-related and consistent with business necessity).
Jolls notes that the typical remedy in Title VII disparate impact cases is to strike down entirely
the offending policy, rather than just permitting the impacted employees to refrain from following
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In the context of disability-related misconduct, a plaintiff would
establish that a particular conduct rule had a disparate impact on her by
showing that the "particular limitations caused by [her] disability"
interfered with her ability to comply with the rule.365 This approach raises
the question, however, of what limitations the court must consider. Assume
that the plaintiffs impairment is PTSD and that the court found the
impairment to be a disability because it substantially limited the plaintiff's
major life activity of sleeping.366 Assume also that the impairment causes
the plaintiff to be irritable and abrupt with her co-workers,3 67 in violation
of a workplace
conduct rule requiring employees to be courteous to each
36
other.

1

Can the plaintiff challenge the conduct rule as having a disparate
impact on her due to limitations caused by her disability of PTSD, which
include irritability? Or can the plaintiff challenge only rules that impact the
limitation that made her impairment of PTSD a disability, her sleeping
problems?3 69 Reinforcing the similarities between disparate impact and the
duty of reasonable accommodation, the same issue arises in the reasonable
accommodation context: is a plaintiff entitled only to accommodations that

the policy, as is the norm under the duty of reasonable accommodation. Jolls, supranote 70, at 655.
In the no-beard cases, however, courts generally have required employers to exempt employees with
the skin condition from the policy, highlighting that those cases involve accommodation
requirements. Id. Moreover, the fact that the ADA, unlike Title VII, allows plaintiffs to prove
disparate impact discrimination on an individual rather than class-wide basis reinforces the
similarities between disparate impact and the duty to accommodate in the ADA context.
365. EQuALEMPLOYMENTOPPORTUNrrYCOMM'N, supra note 83, § 1-4.3(2). Such a showing
may have a stigmatizing effect on the particular plaintiff-by highlighting that her disability made
it difficult or impossible for her to comply with a workplace conduct rule-but it will not stigmatize
wrongfully all persons with disabilities, most of whom will have no difficulty complying with
workplace conduct standards. See Stefan, supranote 236, at 799-800 (noting that most ADA cases
brought by plaintiffs with psychiatric disabilities do not involve plaintiffs disciplined for
misconduct who then claimed that their disability caused the misconduct). Moreover, to the extent
that a plaintiff's disability actually interferes with her ability to comply with a conduct rule, it is
more harmful to her for the law to ignore the limitations caused by her disability, holding her to a
standard that she cannot meet, than it is to recognize those limitations and require the employer to
prove a need for the rule.
366. See, e.g., Felix v. N.Y. City Transit Auth., 154 F. Supp. 2d 640,653-54 (S.D.N.Y. 2001),
aftd, 324 F.3d 102, 103 (2d Cir. 2003).
367. See AM. PSYCHIATRICASS'N,supra note 110, at 425 (stating that the persistent symptoms
of increased arousal characteristic of PTSD may include irritability).
368. The EEOC Guidance on the ADA and Psychiatric Disabilities gives this as an example
of a conduct rule that might not be job-related and consistent with business necessity if the
employee's job is such that he or she does not come into regular contact with other employees.
EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNrrY COMM'N, supranote 67, at 30 (Question 30, Example C).
369. For example, a rule requiring employees to begin work at 7 a.m. would impact the
sleeping problems caused by the plaintiff's PTSD.
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are causally connected to the major life activity substantially limited by the
plaintiff's impairment?
Courts are divided on this issue,3 7' but the better view is that an
employer must accommodate any limitation caused by the plaintiffs
impairment, not just limitations causally connected to the substantially
limited major life activity that renders the impairment a disability.37' While
the ADA's definition of disability requires that the plaintiff's impairment
substantially limit one or more of her major life activities,372 the statute's
requirement of reasonable accommodation applies to the plaintiffs

370. The first case to address this issue directly was Felix v. New York City TransitAuthority,
324 F.3d 102, 104 (2d Cir. 2003). The plaintiff in Felix, a railroad clerk, developed PTSD after the
firebombing of a token booth. Id. at 103. At the time of the bombing, the plaintiff was on her way
to relieve the clerk in that token booth, and that clerk was killed in the incident. Id. The plaintiff's
condition "included feelings of apprehension and anxiety, recurrent problems with insomnia, and
an inability to work in the subways." Id. at 104. As a reasonable accommodation, the plaintiff
requested reassignment to a position that would not require work in the subways, but her employer
did not grant her request. Id. The court held that the employer's refusal did not violate the ADA
because "there must be a causal link between the specific condition which limits a major life
activity and the accommodation required." Id.at 104, 107; see also Wood v. Crown Redi-Mix, Inc.,
339 F.3d 682, 687 (8th Cir. 2003) (relying on Felix in holding that "there must be a causal
connection between the major life activity that is limited and the accommodation sought").
It was undisputed that the Felix plaintiff had a disability because "her insomnia limits the major
life activity of sleeping." 324 F.3d at 104. The court reasoned, however, that "an employer
discriminates against an employee with a disability only by failing to provide a reasonable
accommodation for the 'disability' which is the impairment of the major life activity." Id. at 105.
Accordingly, the court concluded that the plaintiff was only entitled to accommodations that
"flow[ed] directly from her disability-the mental condition of insomnia that prevents her from
sleeping." Id. at 106. Because her inability to work in the subway did not flow from her insomnia,
she was not entitled to her requested accommodation. Id. at 106-07.
The reasoning of the Felix court is incorrect. The Felix plaintiff's disability was not insomnia,
it was PTSD. See Brief of the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission as Amicus Curiae in
Support of Rehearing En Banc at 1, Felix, 324 F.3d 102 (No. 01-7967), 2003 WL 23197906
(noting that the court's decision "distorts the statutory language in a subtle, but significant way by
defining the term 'disability' to mean the limiting of a major life activity, as opposed to the
underlying physical or mental disorder that causes a substantial limitation of a major life activity").
PTSD, not insomnia, was the plaintiff's mental impairment, which constituted a disability because
it substantially limited the major life activity of sleeping. Because the plaintiff's inability to work
in the subway flowed directly from her disability of PTSD, the court should have considered
whether her requested accommodation was reasonable.
371. See McAlindin v. County of San Diego, 192 F.3d 1226, 1237 (9th Cir. 1999) (stating that
the plaintiff's "sleep disorder and sexual dysfunction merely help to establish that the impairment
(panic disorder after treatment) affects a major life activity; they are not relevant to the reasonable
accommodation discussion, however, which focuses on the post-treatment panic disorder's
manifestations in the workplace and the employer's response to them"); Arnold v. County of Cook,
220 F. Supp. 2d 893, 896 (N.D. I11.2002) ("The only nexus required between the limitation that
qualifies an individual as disabled and the limitation for which the accommodation is requested is
that both be caused by a common physical or mental condition.").
372. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(A) (2000).
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"known physical or mental limitations," without any qualification that
those limitations be substantial or impact a major life activity.3 73 The
requirement that the plaintiff's impairment substantially limit a major life
activity is a threshold issue limiting the class protected by the ADA, but
once the plaintiff falls in that protected class, she is entitled to reasonable
3 74
accommodation for all of the limitations flowing from her impairment.
Similarly, a plaintiff should be able to challenge under the disparate impact
theory a conduct rule that tends to screen her out due to any of the
limitations flowing from her impairment, notjust the limitations connected
to her substantially limited major life activity.375
If a court holds that a plaintiff can challenge (via the disparate impact
theory or the duty of reasonable accommodation) only conduct rules related

373. Id. § 12112(b)(5)(A). The Arnold court made this point in rejecting the Felix holding,
noting that "[t]he reasonable accommodation provision includes nothing to suggest that it applies
only to 'substantial' limitations or limitations that impact 'major life activities."' 220 F. Supp. 2d
at 896.
374. The Arnold court provided the example of an employee with severe allergies to numerous
substances, which render her substantially limited in the major life activity of caring for herself. 220
F. Supp. 2d at 896. Another limitation caused by the employee's allergies is that she is unable to
touch rubber bands, but her employer refuses to allow her to substitute binder clips. Id. Under the
reasoning of the Felix court, such a substitution would not constitute a potential reasonable
accommodation because the employee's inability to use rubber bands is not caused by her
limitations in caring for herself. The Felix court's reasoning indicates that the employee would be
able to require the binder clip substitution as a reasonable accommodation only if using rubber
bands was itself a major life activity. See Felix, 324 F.3d at 105 ("Felix's inability to work in the
subway did not substantially limit any major life activity."). As noted by the court in Arnold,
however, "it is partly because the rubber band limitation is minor that not accommodating it is
unreasonable." 220 F. Supp. 2d at 896.
In its amicus brief in support of rehearing en banc in Felix, the EEOC asserted that the policy
considerations underlying the ADA support requiring employers to accommodate all limitations
flowing from a disability. Brief of the EEOC as Amicus Curiae in Support of Rehearing En Banc
at 6, Felix, 324 F.3d 102 (No. 01-7967), 2003 WL 23197906. Because the threshold showing for
"disability" is so high, few plaintiffs succeed in making such a showing. Id. at 13. Moreover, "[a]
medical condition that is serious enough to substantially limit a major life activity will likely also
limit the individual in other ways, some or all of which affect the workplace." Id. at 14. The EEOC
provides the example of an individual receiving dialysis treatments for a kidney disorder who is
substantially limited in the major life activity of caring for himself, but who also may need some
assistance with lifting heavy items in the workplace. Id. According to the EEOC, "[b]y requiring
accommodation of all such limitations (short of undue hardship), Congress ensured that barriers
relating to the disability will not unnecessarily restrict otherwise qualified individuals with
disabilities from achieving their full potential in the workplace." Id.
375. To use the example discussed by the Arnold court in the reasonable accommodation
context, supra note 374, the plaintiff would challenge the rule requiring usage of rubber bands
rather than binder clips as tending to screen her out due to limitations imposed by her
disability-her allergies-even though rubber band usage is not related to the major life activity
of caring for herself. The employer then could justify the rubber band rule only by proving that it
is job-related and consistent with business necessity.
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to the major life activity substantially limited by the plaintiff s impairment,
that holding will influence the plaintiff's litigation strategy. For example,
although it might be easiest for a plaintiff to prove that her impairment of
PTSD is disabling with reference to the major life activity of sleeping, she
should not utilize that major life activity if she intends to challenge a
conduct rule unrelated to sleeping. If the plaintiff wants to challenge a
conduct rule relating to employee interactions with others because of the
irritability caused by her PTSD, she should assert as her substantially
' The problem with
limited major life activity "interacting with others."376
this approach, however, is that plaintiffs have had great difficulty proving
that they were substantially limited in interacting with others yet
nonetheless qualified for theirjobs. Some courts have expressed doubt that
interacting with others is a major life activity,3 77 while others have
interpreted the "substantially limited" requirement in such a rigorous manner
that only plaintiffs demonstrating total inability to interact with others could
be deemed disabled.37 If a plaintiff is completely unable to interact with

376. In the alternative, the plaintiff could argue that she is substantially limited in the major
life activity of working, which presumably would allow her to make a disparate impact or
reasonable accommodation challenge to any workplace conduct rule. Such an argument is unlikely
to succeed, however, because an individual is substantially limited in working only if her
impairment prevents her from working in a broad class ofjobs. See Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc.,
527 U.S. 471,491 (1999). Moreover, ifa plaintiff asserts that she is substantially limited in working
because of difficulty in getting along with co-workers, a court is likely to find that she is unqualified
for most jobs. See infra note 444 and accompanying text.
377. E.g., Davis v. Univ. of N.C., 263 F.3d 95, 101 n.4 (4th Cir. 2001) (noting "some doubt"
as to whether the "ability to get along with others is a major life activity"); Soileau v. Guilford of
Me., Inc., 105 F.3d 12, 15 (1st Cir. 1997) (noting that "[t]he concept of 'ability to get along with
others' is remarkably elastic, perhaps so much so as to make it unworkable as a definition" and that
interacting with others "is different in kind from breathing or walking, two exemplars which are
used in the regulations"). But see McAlindin v. County of San Diego, 192 F.3d 1226, 1234 (9th
Cir. 1999) (holding that interacting with others is a major life activity because it "is an essential,
regular function, like walking and breathing").
378. See, e.g., Rohan v. Networks Presentations LLC, 375 F.3d 266, 275 (4th Cir. 2004)
(holding that plaintiff with PTSD was not substantially limited in interacting with others even
though she avoided making friends, could only make a minimal effort at having a social life, and
suffered intermittent episodes in which she was completely unable to interact with others); Doebele
v. Sprint/United Mgmt. Co., 342 F.3d 1117, 1131 (10th Cir. 2003) (holding that plaintiff was not
substantially limited in interacting with others because although she "had difficulty interacting with
a number of her co-workers, there is no evidence tending to show she had problems interacting with
people in general"); Heisler v. Metro. Council, 339 F.3d 622, 629 (8th Cir. 2003) (holding that
plaintiff, who alleged that her depression caused her to isolate herself from others, was not
substantially limited in interacting with others because "she also testified that she was still able to
perform her job duties, which required her to supervise other employees"). Wendy Hensel has
summarized the "substantial limitation" cases as "requir[ing] the plaintiff to produce evidence
reflecting a virtual complete inability to interact with other people, both at work and in private life."
Hensel, supra note 353, at 1181.
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others, however, courts are likely to find that she is not qualified for almost
all jobs.379
In contrast, under the proper view, a disabled plaintiff can establish that
a conduct rule has a disparate impact on her by demonstrating that any of
the limitations caused by her disability-even limitations unrelated to her
substantially limited major life activity-interfered with her ability to
comply with the rule." This approach raises another question, however:
how much interference is required? Must the plaintiff prove that it was
impossible for her to comply with the conduct rule due to the particular
limitations imposed by her disability, or is it enough for her to show that
her disability made it more difficult for her to comply with the rule? This
is a question of causation and is the same question faced by courts
attempting to determine what is misconduct: must the plaintiff prove that
her disability compelled her misconduct?
Viewing the necessary level of interference or causation so
strictly-insisting on evidence that the plaintiff's disability compelled her
to violate the rule-is inconsistent with the reality of most mental
disabilities, the type of disability most likely to result in misconduct.
Mental disabilities and their resulting conduct depend greatly on the
individual's environment; such disabilities "can be greatly exacerbated or
greatly ameliorated by the quality of interpersonal contact and the nature
of the environment."3 '' Moreover, the disparate impact theory of
discrimination recognizes that "policies or practices that impose
significantly harsher burdens on a protected group than on the employee
population in general may operate as barriers to equality in the workplace
and, if unsupported by a business justification, may be considered
'discriminatory. ' '38 2 If it is substantially more difficult-although not
379. See, e.g., Gilday v. Mecosta County, 124 F.3d 760, 765 (6th Cir. 1997) ("The ability to
get along with co-workers and customers is necessary for all but the most solitary of
occupations .... "); Misek-Falkoffv. IBM Corp., 854 F. Supp. 215, 227 (S.D.N.Y. 1994) ("It is
certainlya 'job-related requirement' that an employee, handicapped or not, be able to get along with
co-workers and supervisors."); see also Hensel, supra note 353, at 1188 (stating that plaintiffs
asserting substantial limitation in interacting with others "are thus placed in an unenviable Catch22: if they are disabled, they are not qualified, and if they are qualified, they are not disabled").
380. Just as the plaintiffneeds medical testimony to establish that she has a mental or physical
impairment that substantially limits a major life activity, she would need to present medical
testimony regarding the other limitations caused by her disability. To use the PTSD example
discussed earlier, she would need to provide medical evidence that she had been diagnosed as
having PTSD, that her PTSD caused her severe insomnia, and that the condition also caused her
to be irritable.
381. STEFAN, supranote 100, at 58. According to Stefan, "The complex, interactive dynamic
between psychiatric disability and an individual's environment means that courts must focus more
on context and interaction to understand psychiatric disability." Id.
382. Garcia v. Spun Steak Co., 998 F.2d 1480, 1485 (9th Cir. 1993). As discussed in footnote
356, supra,Garciainvolved a challenge to an employer's English-only policy as having a disparate
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impossible-for a plaintiffto comply with a conduct rule due to limitations
caused by the plaintiff's disability, insisting upon compliance with the rule
imposes significantly harsher burdens on the plaintiff than on the employee
population in general. Unless the conduct rule is job-related and consistent
with business necessity, its application to the plaintiff is discriminatory.
However, taking too broad a view of the sufficient level of interference
or causation-allowing evidence that the plaintiff's disability interfered
only slightly with her ability to comply with the rule-also has negative
implications. Holding that a disabled individual need not comply with a
conduct rule where her disability limits only slightly her capacity for
compliance could send the message that individuals with disabilities are
less accountable for their behavior than those without disabilities. Even
though that message might be helpful for an individual plaintiff with a
disability challenging her misconduct-related discharge, it is likely to harm
individuals with disabilities in general. Being viewed as accountable for
one's own actions is an important part of being human,383 and emphasizing
the lack of accountability of individuals with disabilities is likely to
entrench exclusionary and paternalistic stereotypes. As asserted by one
proponent of disability rights, "[a]s important as it is to protect those who
cannot protect themselves, it is equally important to promote the right of
all persons to make their own choices, and, as a corollary, to be
'
accountable for those choices."384
In addition, such a broad view of the sufficient level of interference or
causation is more likely to cause resentment in the workplace. If a
disability causes an employee to have only slightly more difficulty
complying with a conduct rule than individuals without disabilities, it may
seem unfair that only the individual with a disability can challenge the rule
under the disparate impact theory. Finally, allowing disabled individuals
to challenge conduct rules with which they could comply with reasonable
effort reduces the incentive for them to attempt compliance, likely reducing
workplace productivity.385

impact on employees of Hispanic origin. Id.
383. See Anne M. Coughlin, Excusing Women, 82 CAL. L. REV. 1, 12 (1994) (discussing the
fact that, in the criminal law context, the "power to exercise rational choice is seen as an essential
faculty of the, so-called, normal human being"). The most human capacity is the power to choose,
and, because behavior is itself a matter of choice, "it is both moral and respectful to the actor to
hold the actor responsible." Id.at 18 (citing Stephen J.Morse, The Twilight of Welfare
Criminology: A Reply to Judge Bazelon, 49 S. CAL. L. REV. 1247, 1252-54, 1268 (1976)).
384. Donald N. Bersoff, Some Contrarian Concerns About Law, Psychology, and Public
Policy, 26 LAW & HuM. BEHAV. 565, 568 (2002). Bersoff made this statement in the context of
criticizing a constitutional rule prohibiting the execution of people with mental retardation,
contending that "a constitutional ban for these defendants, on the ground that they deserve special
protection and dispensation, is antagonistic to their long range rights and entitlements." Id.
385. See J.H. Verkerke, Is the ADA Efficient?, 50 UCLA L. REV. 903, 919 (2003) (noting that
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The solution may be to find the causation component of disparate
impact discrimination satisfied if the plaintiffs disability substantially
affected her ability to comply with a workplace conduct rule. The modifier
"substantially" is a familiar one in ADA jurisprudence; in the context of
determining when an impairment constitutes a disability, the Supreme
Court has held that "substantially" means "considerable" or "to a large
' Under this view, an employee discharged for yelling at a codegree."386
worker would not be screened out because of her disability by a rule
mandating courtesy to co-workers if she could present evidence only that
the disability caused a slight increase in anger. If, on the other hand, she
could show that her disability made it substantially harder for her to control
her temper, the rule would have a disparate impact on her because of her
disability. The employer could apply the rule to the plaintiff only if it could
prove that the rule was job-related and consistent with business necessity.
V. ACCOMMODATING MISCONDUCT: APPLYING THE LESSONS OF
RAYTHEON TO DISABILITY-RELATED MISCONDUCT

The cases described at the beginning of this Article all involve
employees discharged due to conduct causally connected to their
disabilities. Brohm v. JHProperties,Inc. involved an anesthesiologist with
sleep apnea fired by a hospital for sleeping during surgical procedures.387
Hamilton v. Southwestern Bell Telephone Co. involved a manager with
PTSD who was fired after an angry confrontation with a co-worker during
which he slapped her hand down.388 Ray v. Kroger Co. involved a grocery
store clerk with Tourette's Syndrome who was fired because of outbursts
of profanity and racial slurs in the workplace.3 8 9 Simpkins v. Specialty
Envelope, Inc. involved an administrative employee who was fired for
leaving the workplace without notifying her direct supervisor when she left
work in hysterics and was admitted to a psychiatric hospital.39 ° In each
case, the court held that the plaintiff could not establish a prima facie case

employers generally agree that the possibility of "workplace discipline enhances productivity").
386. Toyota Motor Mfg., Ky. v. Williams, 534 U.S. 184, 196 (2002). Just as a plaintiff's
impairment maybe substantially limiting without completely preventing the plaintifffrom engaging
in a major life activity, a plaintiff's disability could substantially limit her ability to comply with
a workplace conduct rule without compelling her to violate the rule; see Bragdon v. Abbott, 524
U.S. 624, 641 (1998) (emphasizing that the ADA "addresses substantial limitations on major life
activities, not utter inabilities").
387. 947 F. Supp. 299, 299-300 (W.D. Ky. 1996), afl'd, 149 F.3d 517 (6th Cir. 1998).
388. 136 F.3d 1047, 1049, 1052 (5th Cir. 1998).
389. 264 F. Supp. 2d 1221, 1223-24 (S.D. Ga. 2003), affd, 90 Fed. Appx. 384 (11 th Cir.
2003).
390. No. 95-3370, 1996 WL 452858, at *1-2 (6th Cir. Aug. 9, 1996).

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2005

73

FLORIDA
Florida Law Review,
Vol.LAW
57,REVIEW
Iss. 2 [2005], Art. 2

[Vol. 57

of disability discrimination because he or she was terminated due to
misconduct rather than disability.39 '
Raytheon suggests that courts should focus on the distinct forms of
disability discrimination prohibited by the ADA, including disparate
impact, in determining whether discharge due to disability-related
misconduct violates the Act.392 Could the plaintiffs in Brohm, Hamilton,
Ray, or Simpkins prove disparate treatment, disparate impact, or failure to
provide reasonable accommodations?
A. DisparateTreatment
1. Proving Disparate Treatment
Lacking direct evidence of discrimination, each plaintiffwould attempt
to demonstrate disparate treatment using the burden-shifting approach. 93
Assume that each plaintiff could establish ajury issue on whether he or she
had a disability and was a qualified individual, the first elements of a prima
facie case.39 4 Because they were discharged, the plaintiffs can demonstrate
that they suffered adverse employment actions. However, the courts in
each case followed the approach to a prima facie case of disparate
treatment taken by most courts, requiring the plaintiffs to prove that they
were discriminated against because of their disabilities. According to the
courts, the plaintiffs could not establish this element because they were
discharged due to their misconduct.39 '

391. Hamilton, 136 F.3d at 1052; Simpkins, 1996 WL 452858, at *5; Ray, 264 F. Supp. 2d at
1228; Brohm, 947 F. Supp. at 301-02.
392. Raytheon Co. v. Hernandez, 540 U.S. 44, 52-53 (2003).
393. See id. at 50.
394. See Hamilton, 136 F.3d at 1050 (describing elements of a prima facie case). In the actual
cases, the courts concluded that the manager in Hamilton with PTSD and the administrative
employee in Simpkins with major depression were not disabled. In Hamilton, the court found that
the limitations the plaintiff suffered due to his PTSD--overeating to the point of nausea, thoughts
of suicide, difficulty concentrating, and episodes of fatigue--no longer existed. Id. at 1050-51.
Moreover, because the plaintiff admitted that his performance level at work remained above that
of his peers, despite his PTSD-caused loss of temper and difficulty handling stress, the plaintiff was
not substantially limited in the major life activity of working. Id. at 1051. Similarly, the Simpkins
court found that the plaintiff's major depression was not disabling because it was "only a
temporary, non-chronic impairment." 1996 WL 452858, at *6.
In addition, the Ray court held that the plaintiff was not qualified for his job. 264 F. Supp. 2d
at 1228. Although the district court in Brohm did not address the qualified issue, the appellate court
stated that the plaintiffs sleeping on the job "rendered him unqualified to perform his duties as an
anesthesiologist." 149 F.3d 517, 521 (6th Cir. 1998); see infra notes 466-88 and accompanying
text.
395. Hamilton, 136 F.3d at 1052; Simpkins, 1996 WL452858, at *5; Ray, 264 F. Supp. 2d at
1228; Brohm, 947 F. Supp. at 301-02.
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In contrast to the majority approach, courts should find that the
plaintiffs satisfied the final element of a prima facie case because their
discharges for conduct causally connected to their disabilities raise an
inference of discrimination. To receive the benefit of this inference, of
course, each plaintiff must prove that his or her conduct was causally
connected to the disability. Moreover, courts may want to impose a
requirement of proximate causation as well as actual causation, such that
plaintiffs discharged for conduct very loosely connected to their disabilities
cannot rely on the inference.396
Once the plaintiffs establish a prima facie case, their employers have
the opportunity to assert the plaintiffs' misconduct as the legitimate
nondiscriminatory reason for discharging them. Jewish Hospital, the
employer in Brohm, asserted that it fired Dr. Brohm for falling asleep
during surgical procedures.397 Southwestern Bell, the employer in
Hamilton, argued that it fired Hamilton for violating its policy on
workplace violence.3 98 Kroger, the employer in Ray, claimed that it fired
Ray because of his "constant outbursts of vulgar language and racial
slurs."3 99 Specialty Envelope, the employer in Simpkins, contended that it
fired Simpkins because of her violation of its policy against leaving the

396. For example, the plaintiff in Alpert v. DeKalb Office Environments, Inc. wore short
dresses with visible bike shorts underneath them in violation of her employer's dress code. 206 F.
Supp. 2d 1280, 1283-84 (N.D. Ga. 2001). After repeated warnings about her workplace attire,
plaintiff's employer fired her. Id. at 1284. The plaintiff argued that she wore the bike shorts because
of a need to avoid exposing herself when elevating her leg after knee surgery, such that her
misconduct was causally connected to her disabling knee injury. Id. The court rejected plaintiff's
argument, reasoning that even if her knee injury were a disability, "there exists a plethora of other
clothing choices that would have met Defendant's dress requirements and would have served
Plaintiff's needs," such as longer dresses or loose-fitting pants. Id.at 1287. The plaintiff may have
been able to prove actual causation, that but for her knee injury, she would not have violated the
dress code. She could not prove proximate causation, however, because a superceding cause was
her decision-when faced with a variety of other choices-to wear short dresses with bike shorts.
See id. at 1287. Accordingly, a court might find that she did not present evidence that her
misconduct was sufficiently causally connected to her knee injury to raise an inference of disability
discrimination.
Similarly, the plaintiff in Padillav. Tingstol Co. was fired pursuant to her employer's policy
of automatically discharging any employee who fails to call or report to work for three consecutive
Dec. 10, 1997). The plaintiff missed work
days. No. 96 C 3510, 1997 WL 779110, at * 1-2 (N.D. I11.
because of back problems and argued that, accordingly, her misconduct of being absent from work
was causally connected to a disability. Id. at *3-4.Assuming that the plaintiff's back problems were
a but-for cause of her violation of the no-call, no-show policy, they were not a proximate cause
because those problems did not interfere significantly with her ability to call her employer about
her absence. See id. at *6.
397. 149 F.3d at 519-20.
398. 136 F.3d at 1052.
399. 264 F. Supp. 2d at 1228.
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workplace without the permission of her direct supervisor."' Raytheon
makes clear that all of these arguments, despite their arguable adverse
effect on persons with disabilities, constitute legitimate nondiscriminatory
reasons for adverse employment actions.4"' Could any of the plaintiffs
create a jury issue as to whether these asserted reasons are pretext for
intentional discrimination because of disability?
Perhaps the easiest way to demonstrate pretext is by showing that the
employer did not discharge nondisabled employees who engaged in similar
misconduct, a showing that would raise an inference that the employer
treated the plaintiff differently because of his or her disability. Not
surprisingly, Dr. Brohm had no such evidence; it seems unlikely that
Jewish Hospital retained physicians without sleep apnea who repeatedly
fell asleep during surgical procedures. In Simpkins, the court notes the
existence of "undisputed evidence in the record that Specialty had
terminated three other workers for this same infraction of the company's
rules"-leaving the workplace without permission of one's direct
supervisor.4 2 Such evidence certainly suggests a lack of pretext, but the
court also should consider whether Specialty had ever not fired a worker
who committed this infraction with management knowledge. Evidence that
the employer did not always apply this rule might suggest that it chose to
403
apply the rule to Simpkins because of her disability.
In response to this argument for pretext, Specialty is likely to contend
that any evidence that it treated other employees differently is irrelevant
because it had no knowledge of Simpkins's depression. Without such
knowledge, Specialty could not have intentionally discriminated against
Simpkins because of her disability.4 "' The court found this contention
persuasive, holding that "an employer who discharges an employee without
' 40 5
knowledge of the employee's disability is not liable under the ADA."
Noting that Simpkins did not even know that she had a mental disability

400. 1996 WL 452858, at *7.
401. See Raytheon Co. v. Hernandez, 540 U.S. 44, 53 (2003).
402. 1996 WL 452858, at *2.
403. If Specialty ever granted exceptions to this rule, Simpkins's case would appear to be a
strong candidate for such an exception. Simpkins left work following a meeting with her direct
supervisors, during which they put her on "final" warning, despite the fact that no problems with
her performance had been raised previously in her twenty years with the company. After the
meeting, Simpkins was "shaking, hysterical, and repeatedly striking herself with clenched fists,"
and the production manager gave her permission to go home. Id. at *1-2. This manager confirmed
Simpkins's assertions that her direct supervisors were unavailable at the time she left the workplace.
Id.at *2.
404. Specialty is likely to argue that employer knowledge of the plaintiffs disability status
should be an element of the prima facie case or, in the alternative, lack of such knowledge should
be conclusive evidence of lack of pretext. See supra notes 326-31 and accompanying text.
405. Simpkins, 1996 WL452858, at *5.
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until after her breakdown at work, the court reasoned that Specialty could
not have known of her major depression until after it decided to fire her.4 °6
If, however, Specialty's decisionmaker knew that Simpkins was "shaking,
hysterical, and repeatedly striking herself with [her] fists" when she left the
workplace,4 °7 and there was evidence that Specialty had not discharged all
employees who left work without their direct supervisor's permission, a
reasonable jury may be able to conclude that Specialty's knowledge of
Simpkins's mental instability influenced its decision to discharge her. In
other words, Specialty might not have discharged Simpkins for leaving
work if she had not been acting like she was "crazy."4 8 Courts should not
require plaintiffs to prove their employer's knowledge of plaintiffs'
particular diagnosis in order to demonstrate disparate treatment.
Because of the stigma and stereotypes attached to many disabilities,
particularly mental disabilities, 9 employers may be more likely to
discharge individuals with disabilities for conduct which they would view
less seriously if committed by a nondisabled employee.410 As additional
evidence of pretext, courts should look for evidence that an employer
demonstrated more concern about an employee's conduct once it learned
406. Id.
407. Id. at*1.
408. Along this line, a document advising employers on how to avoid liability for disability
discrimination when addressing disability-related misconduct provides that managers should
"document an employee's conduct problem by specifically describing the behavior at issue, without
attributing the behavior to an underlying emotional problem" and should not state "that the
employee's temper outbursts... are symptomatic of 'a nervous breakdown."' LINDA M. EDWARDS,
DISCIPLINE OR ACCOMMODATION? EMPLOYER RESPONSES TO MISCONDUCT AND POOR
PERFORMANCE OF DISABLED EMPLOYEES (1999), availableat http://www.bna.com/bnabooks/aba

bna/mr/99/rnr99-7-05.pdf.
In contrast to Simpkins's behavior, which might have led her employer to believe that she had
a mental disability, consider the case of Zihalav. Illinois Departmentof Public Health, No. 95 C
2129, 1999 WL 116221 (N.D. II1.Feb. 26, 1999). During her first week of employment with a new
employer, Zihala repeatedly failed to follow directions, complained about the work, and contended
that she should be promoted immediately. Id. at *5. Itseems unlikely that Zihala's employer would
have surmised that she had a disability based on this behavior, particularly given that they had no
differing behavior by Zihala with which to compare.
409. See Hubbard, supra note 236, at 850-51 ("Surveys consistently show that the public
harbors widespread fear of 'the mentally ill.').
410. Interestingly, the court in the Ray case may have magnified the seriousness of Ray's
misconduct due to stereotypes about his disability of Tourette's Syndrome. The opinion mentions
only three instances in which Kroger received complaints about Ray's conduct during the year that
he was employed by Kroger: when he directed a racial slur at a Kroger employee, when he made
an outburst in front of a Kroger customer, and when he blurted out the "N word" in front of an
African-American independent contractor with Kroger. Ray v. Kroger Co., 264 F. Supp. 2d 1221,
1224 (S.D. Ga. 2003), af'd,90 Fed. Appx. 384 (11 th Cir. 2003). If Ray had outbursts of profanity
and racial slurs that offended others in the workplace during every shift, it seems likely that Kroger
would have received more than three complaints. Nonetheless, the court twice refers to Ray's
"constant outbursts of vulgar language and racial slurs." Id.at 1228-29 (emphasis added).
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of his or her disability. In Doebele v. Sprint/UnitedManagement Co., for
example, although plaintiff's supervisors purportedly discharged her due
to "attendance problems and lack of personal effectiveness," evidence
suggested that they came to view the plaintiff as a physical threat to other
workers and unable to relate to them after she was diagnosed with and took
disability leave for bipolar disorder.4 '
Hamilton may be another case in which the employer demonstrated
more concern about an employee's behavior because of that employee's
disability. Four months before he was fired, Hamilton rescued a drowning
woman, after which he experienced various mental disturbances and
extreme fatigue.4" 2 He told his supervisor that his pastor believed these
problems were symptoms of PTSD.4 13 Shortly thereafter, the plaintiff had
a confrontation with a co-worker, which the court described as follows:
Several weeks after the rescue, Hamilton, slamming an
office door, angrily confronted a physically smaller female
manager in front of witnesses after she returned to work from
a shopping trip. In response to her appeal to not speak to her
in such a tone, he slapped her hand down, yelling that she "get
that f ing finger out of my face." Additional profanity

411. 342 F.3d 1117, 1127, 1133-34 (10th Cir. 2003). The Doebele court held that, while the
plaintiff was not actually disabled, she created a jury issue on whether her discharge was motivated
by the fact that her supervisors regarded her as substantially limited in the major life activity of
working. Id. at 1132-33. The court found that, following the plaintiff s disability leave, "[t]he
supervisors' disregard of the assessment and recommendations of Ms. Doebele's treating physician
support the inference that their actions were improperly based on myth, fear, and stereotype, rather
than an individualized evaluation of Ms. Doebele's abilities." Id. at 1134. The court noted,
moreover, that another employee sent a memorandum to one of the plaintiffs supervisors, warning
that the supervisor could be viewed as having "lost all objectivity" with respect to the plaintiff. Id.
at 1133; see also Taylor v. Phoenixville Sch. Dist., 184 F.3d 296, 304-05, 320 (3d Cir. 1999)
(noting, in the context of denying summaryjudgment for the defendant on the plaintiff s reasonable
accommodation claim, that after the plaintiffs supervisors witnessed her becoming manic at work
and requiring hospitalization for bipolar disorder, they decided to increase the plaintiffs job
responsibilities and document every error she made upon her return); Norman v. S. Guar. Ins. Co.,
191 F. Supp. 2d 1321, 1327 n.4, 1333-34 (M.D. Ala. 2002) (finding sufficient evidence of pretext
where, after members ofupper management learned about plaintiffs disability of major depression,
they presented her with a new, stricter attendance policy that effectively revoked accommodations
given to her by her immediate supervisor and shortly thereafter fired the plaintiff for excessive
absenteeism); cf. Raad v. Fairbanks N. Star Borough Sch. Dist., 323 F.3d 1185, 1188-89, 1196 (9th
Cir. 2003) (holding that school district employees' reporting the plaintiff-an unsuccessful
applicant for a teaching position who was of Lebanese descent and Muslim faith and who told them
that she was very angry and did not want to "blow up"-for making a bomb threat may have been
"influenced by stereotypes about her religion or nationality," in violation of Title VII).
412. Hamilton v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 136 F.3d 1047, 1049 (5th Cir. 1998).
413. Id.
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followed. He stormed from the office but then returned to
'
continue his abusive harangue, yelling "You f ing bitch!"414
The court accepted the employer's argument that it discharged Hamilton
not because of his PTSD, but because he violated its policy on workplace
violence.41 Finding no evidence of pretext, the court noted that the
employer "had instituted its policy against workplace violence, with
provisions for suspension and dismissal for 'extremely severe' offenses,
before Hamilton's misconduct." 41 6 It is curious, however, that the
employer's policy was not zero tolerance for workplace violence, but rather
provided for dismissal only for "extremely severe" offenses.41 7 If evidence
showed that conduct similar to yelling at a co-worker and slapping down
that person's hand had not previously been deemed an "extremely severe"
instance of workplace violence, Hamilton could argue that a reasonable
jury could find pretext for disability discrimination.41
An additional means of demonstrating pretext is to show that the
employer did not articulate the reason at the time of the discharge, or that
it changed its reasons over the course of the litigation. 419 In Hamilton, the
employer did not characterize the misconduct as workplace violence until
the hearing before the Texas Employment Commission. 4 0 This failure
arguably suggests that the employer's primary concern with Hamilton's
conduct was not that his slapping down of his co-worker's hand constituted
"violence" but rather that the conduct was committed by an individual with
a mental illness. 42' Following Hamilton's discharge, the employer may
have realized that it had not discharged all employees who had profane
confrontations with their co-workers, so it chose to characterize the hand
slap as workplace violence.

414. Id.at 1052.
415. Id.
416. Id.
417. See id.
418. Important to such an argument is the fact that Hamilton's employer knew that he had (or
might have) PTSD. See id. at 1049, 1052. If Hamilton had not informed his employer of the
possibility that he had PTSD, then he could not establish that the application of the workplace
violence policy was pretext for disability discrimination, unless he had evidence indicating that his
employer suspected that the confrontation reflected mental illness rather than a mere outburst of
temper. For example, perhaps his supervisor opined, following the outburst, that Hamilton had
seemed mentally unstable since his rescue of the drowning woman.
419. Taylor v. Dover Elevator Sys., Inc., 917 F. Supp. 455, 463 (N.D. Miss. 1996).
420. 136 F.3d at 1052.
421. Ann Hubbard has noted that, "in light of popular stereotypes of the dangerous mentally
ill," employers may "magnify the seriousness of the misconduct and conclude that seemingly minor
misconduct warrants severe sanctions." See Hubbard, supra note 236, at 920. Thus the employer
in Hamilton may have viewed the plaintiff's hand slap as workplace violence only because it was
committed by a person with a mental disability.
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Yet another possible means of showing pretext is to demonstrate that,
although the conduct rule in question may appear neutral, the employer
actually adopted the rule because of its effect on persons with a particular
disability.422 The plaintiff in Ray may try to make this argument,
contending that Kroger did not prohibit profanity by its clerks until it
learned that one of them had Tourette's Syndrome. This argument is
unlikely to succeed, however. It seems improbable that Kroger tolerated its
clerks using profanity and racial slurs around co-workers and, especially,
customers 42 3 until it learned of Ray's condition, and then it adopted a rule
prohibiting such conduct to target him surreptitiously.42 4 If prior to its hire
of Ray, Kroger clerks had never used profanity and racial slurs around coworkers and customers, Kroger might not have needed a rule prohibiting
such conduct at that time. Under those circumstances, Kroger's adoption
of an express policy prohibiting such conduct in response to Ray's
behavior would not suggest disparate treatment, unless there was evidence
that Kroger's problem was more with Ray's disability of Tourette's
Syndrome than with his conduct. In contrast, an employer's adoption of a
rule prohibiting bizarre behavior after hiring a brain-damaged employee
might indicate disparate treatment based on disability, particularly if the
employer had previously tolerated wacky pranks or antics by nondisabled
employees.425
2. Defending Against Disparate Treatment Claims: Was the
Plaintiff Qualified?
The key means for an employer to avoid liability for disparate treatment
of an employee who committed disability-related misconduct is to treat

422. Cf Hazen Paper Co. v. Biggins, 507 U.S. 604, 612-13 (1993) (stating that the Court
"doles] not preclude the possibility that an employer who targets employees with a particular
pension status on the assumption that these employees are likely to be older thereby engages in age
discrimination").
423. The opinion mentions three instances in which Kroger received complaints about Ray's
conduct: when he directed a racial slur at a Kroger employee, when he made an outburst in front
of a Kroger customer, and when he blurted out the "N word" in front of an African-American
independent contractor with Kroger. Ray v. Kroger Co., 264 F. Supp. 2d 1221, 1224 (S.D. Ga.
2003), affd, 90 Fed. Appx. 384 (11 th Cir. 2003).
424. Similarly, it seems unlikely that in the Brohm case, the hospital's reason for taking action
against physicians who fell asleep on the job was to target surreptitiously individuals with sleeprelated disabilities.
425. For example, in Gasperv. Perry, one of the plaintiff's co-workers complained that the
plaintiff-who suffered frontal lobe dysfunction after a motorcycle accident, which caused him to
be impulsive, disinhibited, and to have trouble reading social cues-grabbed her duck head
umbrella, pointed the beak of the umbrella within two inches of her eyes, and said "quack, quack,
quack." No. 97-1542, 1998 U.S. App. LEXIS 14933, *1,*6 (4th Cir. July 2, 1998) (arising under
the Rehabilitation Act).
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such employees the same as nondisabled employees who commit the same
misconduct.426 Employers may argue, however, that it is rational for them
to view misconduct by an individual with a disability more seriously than
such conduct by a nondisabled employee, leading them to discharge the
disabled employee. They may reason that a nondisabled employee may
engage in misconduct-for example, yelling at a co-worker, as in
Hamilton-becausethat employee is having an unusually bad day, such
that the employee is unlikely to engage in misconduct in the future. In
contrast, if an employer learns that an employee engaged in misconduct
because of a disability, the employer may reason that the misconduct is due
more to a problem with the employee than to changeable circumstances,
such that the misconduct is more likely to continue.427 Employers may
argue, in short, that anyone can have a bad day, but that employees who are
"crazy" or "sick" are likely to have lots of bad days, so the employer is
justified in treating them differently.
One option for such employers may be reliance on the direct threat
defense. The ADA provides that "[t]he term 'qualification standards' may
include a requirement that an individual shall not pose a direct threat to the
health or safety of other individuals in the workplace,' 28 meaning "a
significant risk . . . that cannot be eliminated by reasonable
' 9 It is important to note, however, that this is not a
accommodation."42
defense to disparate treatment discrimination, but rather to disparate impact
discrimination. 4 0 An employer may adopt a requirement that employees
not pose a direct threat to others in the workplace, even if that requirement
has a disparate impact on individuals with disabilities, but the employer
must apply the requirement to all employees.43 ' In addition, to rely on the

426. See EDWARDS, supra note 408, at 26 (advising employers that "[c]onsistent application
of employer standards is critical").
427. This type of reasoning is consistent with the medical model of disability, which views
disability as inherent in the individual. Ann Hubbard, Meaningful Lives and Major Life Activities,
55 ALA. L. REv. 997, 1038 n.261 (2004). In contrast, the social model of disability recognizes that
the limitations of persons with disabilities vary depending on the environment. See STEFAN, supra
note 100, at 58. Employers may not realize that the reactions of an individual with a disability, lMe
the reactions of nondisabled persons, depend greatly on his or her environment. See id
("Psychiatric disability can be greatly exacerbated or greatly ameliorated by the quality of
interpersonal contact and the nature of the environment.").
428. 42 U.S.C. § 12113(b) (2000).
429. Id. § 12111(3). Relevant factors in determining whether the risk is significant include the
duration of the risk, the nature and severity of the potential harm, the likelihood that the harm will
occur, and the imminence of the harm. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(r) (2004).
430. See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.15(b)(2) (referring to "[d]irect threat as a qualification standard"
as a defense to disparate impact charges related to "selection criteria" and distinguished from
disparate treatment charges).
431. Id.at app. § 1630.2(r) ("Like any other qualification standard, [a standard requiring
individuals not to pose a direct threat to others] must apply to all applicants or employees and not
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direct threat defense, an employer may not assume that all persons with
mental disabilities in general or even a particular mental disability pose a
risk of violence or other danger in the workplace.432 Rather, the employer
must make an individualized assessment of the risk posed by the particular
individual in the particular job, based on current medical knowledge or
other objective evidence.43 3 Accordingly, if the misconduct of a disabled
employee consists of violence or threats of violence to other workers, the
employer may be justified in discharging him or her if an individualized
assessment based on current medical knowledge indicates that the
employee poses a significant risk of harm to co-workers.434
If the employee's misconduct does not involve violence or threats of
violence, however, the direct threat defense is unlikely to apply. Under
those circumstances, an employer can treat an employee differently
because of his or her disability only if the employee is not qualified for the
position.435 Assume that the employer in Hamilton admitted that it
discharged Hamilton because of his disability of PTSD, coupled with his
confrontation with the co-worker. 3 6 The employer may argue that because
Hamilton slapped his co-worker's hand, it concluded that he posed a direct
threat, but this argument is unlikely to succeed given the minor nature of
the contact.437 Accordingly, the employer could justify its intentional

just to individuals with disabilities.").
432. See Hubbard, supranote 236, at 853 ("Under the ADA, an employer may not act based
on generalized fears about the risk of violence by persons with mental disorders.").
433. See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(r) (providing that the direct threat determination "shall be based
on an individualized assessment of the individual's present ability to safely perform the essential
functions of thejob" and that the assessment "shall be based on a reasonable medical judgment that
relies on the most current medical knowledge and/or on the best available objective evidence"); see
also Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624, 649 (1998) (stating that "risk assessment must be based on
medical or other objective evidence").
434. While arguing vigorously that "employer[s] may not act based on generalized fears about
the risk of violence by persons with mental disorders," Ann Hubbard notes that a potentially
effective method "for screening out employees prone to violence is a careful background check for
recent workplace violence or convictions for violent crimes" and that "previous use of aggression
has been documented as a personal characteristic of aggressive employees." Hubbard, supra note
236, at 853, 901-02. This evidence suggests that disabled employees whose misconduct consists
of workplace violence may pose a direct threat of future violence. It also suggests, however, that
employees without disabilities whose misconduct consists of workplace violence may pose a direct
threat of future violence. See id. at 902-03 (stating that in general, "an employer likely has more to
fear from the person who was fired from his last job for assaulting his supervisor than from the
person who is being treated for depression").
435. See 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a) (2000) (prohibiting "discriminat[ion] against a qualified
individual with a disability because of the disability of such individual").
436. See Hamilton v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 136 F.3d 1047, 1049, 1052 (5th Cir. 1998).
437. See id. at 1052. Hamilton's employer did not argue that Hamilton posed a direct threat.
See generally id. After the confrontation with his co-worker, Hamilton saw a social worker who
concluded that he was suffering from agitated depression and some post-traumatic symptoms. Id.

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol57/iss2/2

82

2005]

Timmons:
Acommodating Misconduct Under the Americans with Disabilities Act
269
ACCOMMODATING MISCONDUCT UNDER THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILfITESACT

discrimination against Hamilton because of his PTSD only if Hamilton
were not qualified for his job.43 An individual is qualified for a position
if he or she "satisfies the requisite skill, experience, education and other
job-related requirements of the employment position" and can perform the
essential functions of the position with or without reasonable
accommodation.43 9 In Hamilton, as in other cases involving discharge for
disability-related misconduct, the employer would contend that the plaintiff
could not perform the job's essential functions." 0
Like the direct threat defense, the "qualified" inquiry does not focus on
punishing the plaintiff for his or her past misconduct. Rather, it considers
the plaintiff's probable future conduct, examining whether the plaintiff is
likely to engage in future misconduct, and if so, whether that misconduct
would render the plaintiff unable to perform the essential functions of his
or her job. The fact that the "qualified" inquiry focuses on the future is
evident in the cases following the now-rejected Teahan minority approach
to disability-related misconduct. In Teahan itself, the court remanded the
case for consideration of whether "the likelihood of relapse and future
absenteeism by Teahan" indicated that he was not qualified for his
position." In Husowitz v. Runyon, the court noted that soon after the
Postal Service permitted the plaintiff to return to work after his suspension
for threatening his supervisor with physical violence-and after the
plaintiff had a year of therapy and a psychiatric re-evaluation-the plaintiff
made further threats.1 2 Reasoning that it is a job-related requirement that
an employee be able to get along with co-workers and supervisors, the
court concluded that the plaintiff was not qualified for his job." 3
Like Husowitz, several courts have held that it is an essential function
of every employee's job to refrain from disruptive, contentious, or
insubordinate behavior. 4 Courts do not reach a determination on whether
at 1049. Hamilton also saw a psychiatrist who diagnosed him with PTSD. Id The opinion does not
indicate that either the social worker or the psychiatrist viewed Hamilton as posing a physical threat
to others. See id.
438. See 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a).
439. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(m) (2004).
440. In such cases, unlike cases alleging a discriminatory failure to hire or promote, the
employer generally would not contend that the plaintiff's education or experience rendered him or
her unqualified.
441. Teahan v. Metro-N. Commuter R.R., 951 F.2d 511,520 (2d Cir. 1991); see also Hogarth
v. Thornburgh, 833 F. Supp. 1077, 1087 (S.D.N.Y. 1993) (concluding that "the course of Mr.
Hogarth's illness after his termination from the FBI leaves no doubt that the possibility of further
recurrence renders him unqualified to return to his former position").
442. 942 F. Supp. 822, 834-35 (E.D.N.Y. 1996).
443. Id.at 835.
444. See, e.g., Boldini v. Postmaster Gen. U.S. Postal Serv., 928 F. Supp. 125, 131 (D.N.H.
1995) (stating that "essential to the adequate performance of any job is the ability of an employee
to accept and follow instructions and refrain from contentious arguments and insubordinate conduct
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the plaintiff is qualified simply by examining whether the plaintiff engaged
in such conduct in the past, however. Rather, a plaintiff is not qualified for
the position only if he or she is likely to engage in such conduct in the
future." 5 The fact that courts must examine whether any possible
reasonable accommodation would enable the plaintiff to refrain from
future inappropriate behavior reinforces the forward-looking nature of the
"qualified" inquiry." 6
Assume that following Hamilton's confrontation with his co-worker,
his supervisor met with Hamilton to reprimand him, which was the
employer's typical response to such misconduct. If during the meeting,
Hamilton explained that his PTSD causes him to experience outbursts of
anger, the supervisor could not impose a harsher penalty, like discharge,
merely based on speculation about Hamilton's future conduct. However,
the supervisor could ask Hamilton if he will be able to avoid future
confrontations with co-workers. If Hamilton were to respond negatively,
stating that his PTSD-caused angry outbursts are unpredictable and
uncontrollable, the supervisor might be entitled to discharge him on the
ground that he is unqualified because he cannot perform the essential job
function of refraining from contentious behavior." If Hamilton is

with supervisors, co-employees or customers"); Misek-Falkoffv. IBM Corp., 854 F. Supp. 215,227
(S.D.N.Y. 1994) ("It is certainly a 'job-related requirement' that an employee, handicapped or not,
be able to get along with co-workers and supervisors."); Mancini v. Gen. Elec. Co., 820 F. Supp.
141, 147 (D. Vt. 1993) (stating that "the ability to follow the orders of superiors is an essential
function of any position").
445. See, e.g., Hardy v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., Civ. A. No. 4:95-CV-0215-HLM, 1996 WL
735565, at *7 (N.D. Ga. Aug. 28, 1996) (finding that plaintiffwas not qualified for his job because,
due to his "unreliable history of taking his medication, and his inability to suppress entirely the
potential manifestation of further manic episodes, Plaintiff poses an ongoing risk of combative
exchanges with his co-workers, and even potential physical harm to others").
446. See, e.g., Boldini, 928 F. Supp. at 132 (finding that, because the plaintiff's own counselor
noted that a change in her supervisors' management style would not eliminate plaintiff's emotional
outbursts, "it approaches the lines of certainty that no reasonable accommodation would render
[plaintiff] able or qualified to accomplish the fundamental functions of her job"); Misek-Falkoff,
854 F. Supp. at 228 (finding under the Rehabilitation Act that plaintiff's requested reasonable
accommodation of being permitted to work at home would not enable her to perform the essential
functions of her job because "[w]ork at home does not create total insulation from supervisors or
coworkers," such that "[p]ersonal contact would still be required at critical junctures, triggering
chances of recurrent outbursts"). But see Palmer v. Circuit Court, 117 F.3d 351, 352-53 (7th Cir.
1997) (holding that threatening other employees renders a disabled individual unqualified, and the
duty of reasonable accommodation does not apply to those who commit or threaten to commit acts
of violence). For a discussion of what reasonable accommodations might enable an employee to
avoid disruptive, contentious, or insubordinate conduct, see infra Part V.C.2.
447. In determining whether Hamilton is unqualified, however, the court also should consider
the likelihood that nondisabled employees will have angry outbursts in the workplace and the
consequences of angry outbursts by any employee. As noted by the court in Hogarth v.
Thornburgh,"[a]ll employees, handicapped or not, will fail to perform their job functions properly
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unqualified, he is not in the class the ADA protects, and his employer is
free to treat him differently based on his disability." 8 Note, however, that
if evidence were to show that Hamilton's employer did not discharge
nondisabled employees who indicated that they could not refrain from
contentious conduct in the workplace-in other words, if there were
evidence of disparate treatment-this evidence would cast doubt on the
employer's argument that refraining from such conduct was an essential
function of all of its jobs. 449 Moreover, even if there were no evidence of
disparate treatment, Hamilton could attempt to argue that the conduct rule
prohibiting contentious behavior in the workplace had a disparate impact
on him because of his PTSD.
In contrast, assume that during the meeting Hamilton stated that he
could avoid future contentious conduct if his supervisor permitted him to
leave his work area and take a brief walk to "cool off' when he becomes
angry. The supervisor may still want to discharge Hamilton, reasoning that
nondisabled employees can avoid confrontations with their co-workers
simply by controlling themselves, without any need for special treatment
by the employer. Provided that allowing such a cooling off period is a
reasonable accommodation, however, Hamilton is qualified for hisjob, and
the ADA expressly prohibits employers from denying job opportunities to
qualified individuals with disabilities because ofthe need to accommodate
those employees.45°
Accordingly, the concepts of disparate treatment, qualified, and
reasonable accommodation under the ADA are intertwined. An employer
can treat a disabled individual differently from other employees if the
individual is not qualified, but if the employer does not discharge
nondisabled employees who cannot perform a purported essential function,
this suggests that the function is not essential. Moreover, in determining
whether an individual is qualified, courts must consider whether a
reasonable accommodation would enable the individual to perform
essential job functions.451

at some times." 833 F. Supp. 1077, 1086 (S.D.N.Y. 1993). Accordingly, to determine if a disabled
individual is qualified to perform his or herjob, courts must analyze two factors: "the consequences
of a failure to perform and the likelihood of such a failure being caused by the handicapping
condition." Id.
448. See 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a) (2000) (prohibiting disability discrimination only against "a
qualified individual with a disability").
449. Similarly, if an employer did not discharge nondisabled employees who indicated a
propensity for workplace violence, this would cast doubt on the employer's arguments that a
disabled employee showing such a propensity posed a direct threat and that its direct threat policy
constituted a neutral qualification standard.
450. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a), (b)(5)(B).
451. See Boldini v. Postmaster Gen. U.S. Postal Serv., 928 F. Supp. 125, 132 (D.N.H. 1995)
(finding that no reasonable accomodation would qualify plaintiff to complete her basic job
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The forward-looking nature of the "qualified" inquiry is beneficial for
plaintiffs like Hamilton, Simpkins, and Dr. Brohm because it is not
inevitable that they will continue their misconduct.452 Both Hamilton's and
Simpkins's misconduct were one-time events; there was no evidence that
Hamilton had other confrontations with co-workers nor that Simpkins left
a workplace without her direct supervisor's permission either before or
after the incident that caused her discharge.453 Although Dr. Brohm had
fallen asleep during surgical procedures on numerous occasions, he
contended that if his employer granted him leave to receive treatment for
his sleep apnea, such misconduct would cease.454 The fact that the plaintiffs
in these cases may have been qualified for their positions did not enable
them to win their lawsuits, however, because the court found that they had
not been subject to disparate treatment.455
This scenario is what concerned the court in Teahan-thateven though
disabled individuals may be qualified for theirjobs, they nonetheless could
be discharged because of conduct caused by their disabilities as long as
their employer discharged all employees who engaged in such conduct.4 56
functions).
452. In contrast, Ray did not argue that he could cease his outbursts of vulgar language and
racial slurs in the future. See generally Ray v. Kroger Co., 264 F. Supp. 2d 1224 (S.D. Ga. 2003),
aff'd, 90 Fed. Appx. 384 (11 th Cir. 2003).
453. Unfortunately for plaintiffs, the one-time nature of a plaintiff's misconduct may lead a
court to conclude that the plaintiff's impairment did not substantially limit any major life activities.
See Hamilton v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 136 F.3d 1047, 1050-51 (5th Cir. 1998) (finding that
the limitations Hamilton suffered due to his PTSD-overeating to the point of nausea, thoughts of
suicide, difficulty concentrating, and episodes of fatigue-no longer existed, and that he was not
substantially limited in working because he admitted that his performance level at work remained
above that of his peers); Simpkins v. Specialty Envelopes, Inc., No. 95-3370, 1996 WL 452858,
at *6 (6th Cir. Aug. 9, 1996) (finding that the plaintiff was not substantially limited in working
because her major depression was "only a temporary, non-chronic impairment" and she was able
to return to work one week after the incident).
454. Brohm v. JH Props., Inc., 947 F. Supp. 299, 302 (W.D. Ky. 1996), aff'd, 149 F.3d 517
(6th Cir. 1998). The appellate court in Brohm stated in dicta, however, that "the hospital had direct
evidence that Brohm had been sleeping on the job, conduct which rendered him unqualified to
perform his duties as an anesthesiologist." Brohm v. JH Props., Inc., 149 F.3d 517, 521 (6th Cir.
1998). Given the forward-looking nature of the "qualified" inquiry, arguably the court should have
considered whether Dr. Brohm could have performed the essential functions of his job in the future
if he had received reasonable accommodation. Cf Rascon v. U S W. Communications, Inc., 143
F.3d 1324, 1337 (10th Cir. 1998) (holding that a leave of absence may be a reasonable
accommodation); Mazzarella v. U.S. Postal Serv., 849 F. Supp. 89, 95 (D. Mass. 1994) (finding
the plaintiff who engaged in violent and destructive behavior in the workplace unqualified because
no reasonable accommodation would avoid "the undeniable possibility that such a violent episode
could recur whenever the plaintiff has feelings of stress while he is at work").
455. See Brohm, 149 F.3d at 522-23; Hamilton, 136 F.3d at 1052; Simpkins, 1996 WL
452858, at *7.
456. See Teahan v. Metro-N. Commuter R.R. 951 F.2d 511, 517 (2d Cir. 1991). But see
Barbara A. Lee, Reasonable Accommodation Under the Americans with DisabilitiesAct: The
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Moreover, the absence of disparate treatment would mean that there is no
need to scrutinize whether the conduct was relevant to the employee's
job.457 Raytheon makes clear that the answer to this concern is not to
expand the concept of disparate treatment in disability cases.4 58 Rather, the
answer to this concern is the disparate impact theory of discrimination.
B. DisparateImpact
Just as disparate treatment is intertwined with the concepts of
reasonable accommodation and qualified, so too is disparate impact. An
analysis of Ray v. Kroger Co.'" is instructive on this point. Despite finding
that Ray had not been subject to disparate treatment, the court nonetheless
examined whether he was qualified for hisjob as a night-shift grocery clerk
in the frozen food section.' The court found that Ray's job at Kroger
placed him into contact with customers, co-workers, and independent
contractors.461 Reasoning that the job "involved regular interaction with
customers," the court concluded that "interacting with customers without
offending them was an essential function of Ray's job." 2 Given that his
Tourette's Syndrome caused Ray to blurt out offensive words in front of
customers, the court held that Ray was not qualified for his job. 3
How might Ray contend that his discharge violated the disparate impact
theory of discrimination? First, he must prove that Kroger applied a
conduct rule that had a disparate impact on him because of his disability.
Ray likely would assert that Kroger's rule against using profanity or racial
slurs in front of customers, co-workers, and independent contractors tended
to screen him out because of limitations imposed by his disability. He
could make this showing by testimony from a physician that Ray had
Tourette's Syndrome, that one symptom of his condition was the blurting
out of profanity and racial slurs, and that the condition made it
substantially more difficult for Ray than for most individuals to refrain
from using such language.
Limitations of Rehabilitation Act Precedent, 14 BERKELEY J.EMP. & LAB. L. 201, 230 (1993)
(stating that "employee misconduct does not exempt the employer from determining whether
accommodation is reasonable before deciding to discharge or otherwise discipline the worker").
457. Teahan, 951 F.2d at 517 (2d Cit. 1991) (contending that the problem with a bright-line
distinction between discharge because of disability and discharge because of disability-related
misconduct "is that it would allow an employer to 'rely' on any conduct or circumstance that is a
manifestation or symptomatic of a handicap and, in so doing, avoid the burden of proving that the
handicap is relevant to the job qualifications").
458. See Raytheon Co. v. Hernandez, 540 U.S. 44, 52-53 (2003).
459. 264 F. Supp. 2d 1221 (S.D. Ga. 2003), aft'd, 90 Fed. Appx. 384 (11 th Cir. 2003).
460. Id.at 1227, 1229.
461. Id.at 1227.
462. Id.at 1228.
463. Id.
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Once Ray demonstrated that the rule prohibiting profanity and racial
slurs in front of others had a disparate impact on him, Kroger's application
of the rule to him, which resulted in his discharge, would violate the ADA,
unless Kroger could prove that the rule was job-related and consistent with
business necessity. 4' 4 When is a workplace
conduct rule job-related and
65
consistent with business necessity?
The answer highlights the overlap between the "qualified" inquiry and
the disparate impact theory of discrimination: according to the EEOC, a
qualification standard is job-related and consistent with business necessity
if it concerns an essential function of the individual's job.46 6 No case has
applied this standard to a workplace conduct rule." 7 However, courts

464. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12112(b)(6), 12113(a) (2000).
465. Susan Stefan has used the disparate impact theory in a different way in cases involving
employees with mental disabilities. She contends that abusive and unreasonably stressful work
environments have a disparate impact on such individuals:
Just as an employer's failure to have an elevator or accessible bathroom hinders
a person in a wheelchair from performing a job, an employer's antagonistic,
hostile, or extremely stressful work environment prevents a person with a
psychiatric disability from performing ajob that the person is qualified to perform
and is completely capable of performing.
Stefan, supra note 236, at 836-37. Rather than challenging a workplace conduct rule violated by
a disabled individual as not job-related nor consistent with business necessity, Stefan challenges
abusive and stressful workplace environments as making it more likely that disabled individuals will
violate conduct rules or otherwise fail to perform well. See id. at 843 (noting that prior to the ADA
"an employee's vulnerability to stress or highly unpleasant workplace conditions simply established
that the employee could not work, and he or she was fired or quit," but that the ADA "requires a
reexamination of who should take responsibility for readjustment of the workplace"). Stefan's
argument is particularly relevant to the Simpkins case, where the plaintiff's misconduct of leaving
the workplace without notifying her direct supervisors occurred when she became hysterical after
her supervisors put her on "'final' warning" despite never informing her previously of problems
with herperformance. Simpkins v. Specialty Envelope, Inc., No. 95-3370,1996 WL452858, at *1-2
(6th Cir. Aug. 9, 1996). Moreover, Simpkins claimed that, prior to being placed on final warning,
her employer "was heaping more work on her and bestowing rewards upon others, in an attempt
to force her out of the company." Id. at * 1.
466. 29 C.F.R. app. § 1630.10 (2004) (providing that "selection criteria that are related to an
essential function of the job may be consistent with business necessity"); EQUAL OPPORTUNrrY
EMPLOYMENT COMM'N, supra note 83, § IV-4.3(1) (providing that a "selection criterion [that]
operates to screen out an individual with a disability . . . must be a legitimate measure or
qualification for the specific job it is being used for"); id. § IV-4.3(2) ("A standard may be jobrelated but not justified by business necessity, because it does not concern an essential function of
a job.").
467. Although Den Hartog articulates a disparate impact challenge to conduct rules, it does
so only in dicta. Den Hartog v. Wasatch Acad., 129 F.3d 1076, 1086 (10th Cir. 1997). In its
Enforcement Guidance on Psychiatric Disabilities and the ADA, however, the EEOC provides the
example that an employer must not rigidly apply its dress code and co-worker courtesy rules to a
mentally disabled employee whose job involves no customer contact and only irregular interaction
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frequently have applied the flip side of this definition: in determining
whether the plaintiff is qualified for a job, where he or she is unable to
perform a particular job function that the employer claims is essential,
courts have considered whether requiring the function is job-related and
consistent with business necessity.468 Both the "qualified" inquiry and the
affirmative defense to disparate impact discrimination ask the same
question: despite his or her disability, can the plaintiff do the job? This
overlap between concepts makes the analysis somewhat circular. To be
protected by the ADA from any type of discrimination based on disability,
the plaintiff must be a qualified individual with a disability, meaning that
he or she can perform the essential functions of the job with or without
reasonable accommodation. The plaintiff has the burden of proving
membership in the protected class. However, an employer commits
disparate impact discrimination if it applies a standard to a qualified
individual with a disability that tends to screen out the individual, unless
the employer can prove that its standard is job-related and consistent with
business necessity. A standard is job-related and consistent with business
necessity if it concerns an essential function of the individual's job. Who
bears the burden of proof regarding whether a conduct rule involves an
essential function-the plaintiff, proving that he or she is qualified despite
violating the rule; or the employer, proving that the rule is job-related and
consistent with business necessity despite its disparate impact?
The answer appears to be that, where the parties dispute whether a
particular conduct rule that the plaintiff violated involves an essential
function of the job, and thus whether the plaintiff is qualified, the employer
bears the burden of proving that the rule is job-related and consistent with
business necessity. 9 Accordingly, Kroger must prove that its rule
prohibiting profanity and racial slurs in front of others was job-related and
with other employees. EQUALEMPLOYMENTOPPORTUNITYCOMM'N,supra note 67, at 30 (Question
30, example C). The EEOC explains that for such a position, the rules are not job-related and
consistent with business necessity. Id. In other words, interacting positively with customers and coworkers is not an essential function of the employee's job. Den Hartog cites this EEOC example
in support of its argument for a disparate impact approach to misconduct cases. 129 F.3d at 1086.
468. See, e.g., Davidson v. Am. Online, Inc., 337 F.3d 1179, 1191-92 (10th Cir. 2003)
(holding, in the context of determining whether plaintiff, who was deaf, was qualified for a nonvoicephone position with the employer, despite the employer's requirement of voicephone
experience for placement in a non-voicephone position, that a jury must determine whether the
requirement was "job-related or a business necessity").
469. Hamlin v. Charter Township, 165 F.3d 426,430 (6th Cir. 1999) (holding that "once the
disabled individual contends that a particular job requirement is unessential, the burden shifts to
the employer to prove that the challenged requirement is necessary"); Monette v. Elec. Data Sys.
Corp., 90 F.3d 1173, 1184 (6th Cir. 1996) (holding that "if a disabled individual is challenging a
particular job requirement as unessential, the employer will bear the burden of proving that the
challenged criterion is necessary," by showing that it is "'job-related' and "'consistent with
business necessity') (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(6) (1994)).
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consistent with business necessity, meaning that it concerned an essential
function of Ray's job as a night-shift clerk in the frozen food section of a
grocery store. It may seem that, for any job, prohibiting the use ofprofanity
and racial slurs is job-related and consistent with business necessity, and
that an essential function of any job is to refrain from language that is
offensive to co-workers and customers. This may seem to be a commonsense notion, much like the proposition stated by many courts that
refraining from disruptive, contentious, or insubordinate conduct is an
essential function of every job.47 °
Before upholding a workplace conduct rule that tends to screen out a
disabled individual because of limitations caused by his or her disabilities,
however, courts should examine carefully the specific functions of the
plaintiff's job. Susan Stefan has noted, for example, that the ability "to
refrain from contentious arguments and insubordinate conduct with
supervisors, coworkers, or customers" was regarded as an essential
function of the job of a mail carrier who delivered mail by herself in a rural
area.4 7' The Ray court found that Ray's job "placed him into nightly
contact with customers, co-workers and independent contractors" and that
"interacting with customers without offending them was an essential
function of Ray'sjob." 72 Yet Ray's job did not center on customer service;
he was not a cashier, a grocery bagger, or a greeter.473 The essential
functions of Ray's job focused on "removing frozen food items from
storage freezers in the rear of the store, placing those items on a cart,
pushing the cart to the frozen food freezers on the sales floor and stocking
the frozen food display cases. 474 Although Ray encountered some
customers when he was on the sales floor, he worked the night shift, 11:00
p.m. to 7 a.m., so that there would be fewer people in the store while he
was working. 475 Given that Ray's job required working in the presence
470. See, e.g., Mazzarella v. U.S. Postal Serv., 849 F. Supp. 89, 94 (D. Mass. 1994) ("These
fundamental requirements that an employee not engage in violent or destructive behavior are a
matter of common sense."). But see Karen Dill Danforth, Note, ReadingReasonablenessOut ofthe
ADA: Respondingto Threats by Employees with Mental Illness FollowingPalmer, 85 VA. L. REv.
661,668 (1999) (arguing that "the discussion of the term 'essential functions' in the statute and the
accompanying regulations suggests that Congress intended this term to pertain to actual
fundamental job duties, not to broad policy goals" and that "[tlerming subjective qualities that are
not job-specific"-like "'getting along well with others"--to be essential functions "gives too
much license to employers to discriminate against employees with disabilities").
471. STEFAN, supranote 100, at 123 (citing Boldini v. Postmaster Gen. U.S. Postal Serv., 928
F. Supp. 125, 131 (D.N.H. 1995)).
472. Rayv. Kroger Co., 264 F. Supp. 2d 1221, 1227-28 (S.D. Ga. 2003), aff'd, 90 Fed. Appx.
384 (11 th Cir. 2003).
473. See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(n) (2004) (providing that a job function "may be essential
because the reason the position exists is to perform that function").
474. Ray, 264 F. Supp. 2d at 1224.
475. Id.
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of-but not necessarily interacting with-a relatively small number of
customers, co-workers, and independent contractors ,476 is it correct to
conclude that an essential function of his job was refraining from language
that is offensive to these persons? The small number of complaints Kroger
received about Ray's language 477 arguably suggests otherwise.
The ADA attempts to balance the goal of opening workplaces to
individuals with disabilities with the interest of employers in operating
their businesses efficiently. It may be that, to strike such a balance,
refraining from offending customers may be job-related and consistent
with business necessity for any job performed in the presence of
customers.4 78 Given the considerable burdens the ADA imposes on
employers in furtherance of the goal of equal opportunity for disabled
individuals, however, perhaps the Act also should be viewed as imposing
a burden on customers to tolerate some behavior that they might find
offensive. When Ray had an outburst at work, he showed any customers
in the vicinity a card with information about Tourette's Syndrome. 479 This
educating of customers may help explain the few complaints Kroger
received about Ray's outbursts. Nonetheless, the court dismissed the idea
that the ADA might require Kroger and its customers to attempt to
understand Ray's condition, stating that "the ADA does not require an
employer to maintain indefinitely an employee who subjects the
employer's customers repeatedly to curse words and racial slurs. ' '48°
What if Ray had a job that involved no customer contact, but his coworkers were offended by his outbursts? Is refraining from offending one's
co-workers an essential function of every job that is not completely
solitary? 48' What if Ray's disability caused him to engage in conduct that
did not necessarily offend customers or co-workers, but disturbed them or
made them uncomfortable? Is a workplace conduct rule prohibiting
behavior that disturbs customers or co-workers job-related and consistent

476. The court stated that about one hundred customers, on average, were in the store during
the night shift, and Ray had contact with five to seven co-workers and some contractors hired by
Kroger to clean the floors. Id.
477. After his transfer to the night shift, Kroger received two complaints about Ray's outbursts
during a period of more than six months, one complaint from a customer and one from a pressurewasher who contracted with Kroger. Id.
478. This would mean, of course, that individuals like Ray, with coprolalia as part of their
Tourette's Syndrome, could be barred from a very broad range of jobs, not just jobs like
kindergarten teacher where it seems most apparent that refraining from profane language is an
essential function of the position.
479. Ray, 264 F. Supp. 2d at 1224.
480. Id. at 1229 n.4.
481. By focusing on the fact that the plaintiff's job required him to encounter customers, even
though one of the complaints about his outbursts was by a Kroger contractor, the Ray court suggests
that the answer is no. See id. at 1224.
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with business
necessity for every position involving some interpersonal
48 2
contact?
These are tough questions. It is well-accepted that employment
discrimination based on race is prohibited even if customers or co-workers
have a strong preference for employees of a particular race. Similarly,
courts would not accept an employer's argument that its requirement that
all of its employees be physically attractive was job-related and consistent
with business necessity, despite its disparate impact on an applicant with
a facial deformity, even if the employer could show that the deformity
disturbed customers or other employees.483 Rather, the law expects
customers and co-workers to deal with their discomfort.
Courts are not willing to uphold all job requirements intended to protect
the peace of mind of customers and co-workers but that have a disparate
impact on individuals with disabilities. Accordingly, perhaps courts should
refuse to uphold some such job requirements related to employee conduct,
rather than always assuming that "getting along" with co-workers and
customers is an essential function of every job.4 For example, an
employee who occasionally cries at the office due to her disability of
depression and whose tears make her co-workers uncomfortable may
nonetheless be qualified for her job,485 and discharging her based on her

482. See, e.g., Lewis v. Zilog, Inc., 908 F. Supp. 931,946 (N.D. Ga. 1995) (noting employer's
argument that "maintaining an effective and noncombative atmosphere in the workplace is
fundamental to the performance of Plaintiff's position"). The EEOC provides that identifying
essential job functions "should focus on the purpose of the job and the importance of actual job
functions in achieving this purpose" and that an evaluation of the importance of functions "may
include consideration of the frequency with which a function is performed, the amount of time spent
on the function, and the consequences if the function is not performed." EQUAL EMPLOYMENT
OPPORTUNITY COMM'N, supra note 83, § 1-2.3(b). Where the interaction with others required by
a job is brief and infrequent, refraining from disturbing them arguably is not an essential job
function.
483. Cf Miller v. I11.Dep't of Corr., 107 F.3d 483, 484 (7th Cir. 1997) ("Employment
decisions motivated by the distaste or even distress that severe physical or mental disabilities arouse
in some people violate the ADA.").
484. See Bugg-Barber v. Randstad US, L.P., 271 F. Supp. 2d 120, 128-29 (D.D.C. 2003)
(holding that plaintiff's confrontational and disruptive conduct--'although wholly inappropriate
in her workplace-was not so repetitious or egregious as to deprive her of being qualified for her
job as a matter of law"); Hardy v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., Civ. A. No. 4:95-CV-0215-HLM, 1996
WL 735565, at *6 (N.D. Ga. Aug. 28, 1996) (holding that while "abusive and threatening behavior
directed by an employee towards co-workers and customers may dictate that an employee cannot
perform the essential functions of a given job... the disruption caused by such behavior must be
'substantial"'); Danforth, supra note 470, at 668 (contending that "vague notions of.. . 'getting
along well with others"' should not be deemed essential functions of ajob). But see Misek-Falkoff
v. IBM Corp., 854 F. Supp. 215,227 (S.D.N.Y. 1994) ("It is certainly a 'job-related requirement'
that an employee, handicapped or not, be able to get along with co-workers and supervisors.").
485. Susan Stefan provides this example in asking about "the extent to which workplace norms
should be altered to accommodate people who are 'different' but can do the job":
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crying-even if it is not disparate treatment-may constitute disparate
impact discrimination. A bagger at a grocery store, whose autism impairs
his social interaction skills and causes him to speak too loudly and to ask
personal questions of strangers, may be qualified for his job even if some
customers are uncomfortable around him. 6 Discharging him based on the
fact that his conduct makes some customers uncomfortable may constitute
disparate impact discrimination.
In contrast to Ray, Dr. Brohm cannot argue that his employer's conduct
rule, which led to his discharge, was not job-related and consistent with
business necessity.487 It is beyond dispute that remaining awake and alert
during surgical procedures where one is the anesthesiologist of record is
an essential function of the job of an anesthesiologist.8 Dr. Brohm's

Almost everyone agrees that someone who stutters painfully should not be fired
and that fellow employees should deal with their discomfort related to the
stuttering. Most people feel similarly about someone who weeps at the office or
someone who speaks too loudly because of a disability.
STEFAN, supra note 100, at 157.
486. In finding that an essential function of Ray's job was refraining from language that
offended others, the Ray court relied on Taylor v. Food World, Inc., a case in which the Eleventh
Circuit held that an essential function of the job of a grocery store utility clerk-which involved
bagging groceries and assisting customers in taking groceries to their cars-was "the ability to carry
out the tasks of the job without offending customers." 133 F.3d 1419, 1424 (1 th Cir. 1998). The
grocery store fired the plaintiff after a customer complained about his behavior and two customers
commented that he appeared to be drunk or on drugs. Id. The district court found that the plaintiff's
conduct rendered him unqualified for his job as a matter of law, but the appellate court reversed,
noting that some managers and many employees testified that they had received no complaints
about plaintiffs behavior and that they did not consider the questions plaintiff asked customers to
be inappropriate. Id. at 1424-25. Apparently the appellate court did not believe that the ability to
carry out his tasks without offending or disturbing any customers was an essential function of the
plaintiff's job. Rather, the plaintiff's conduct would disqualify him only ifhe offended a significant
number of customers.
It is interesting to note the differences between the reasoning in Ray and that in Taylor. In Ray,
even though only one customer complained about an outburst by Ray after he transferred to the
night shift, the court found it "beyond dispute that Ray could not perform his work without
offending customers." 264 F. Supp. 2d at 1228. Unfortunately for Ray, this finding was due to the
very definition of the coprolalia manifestation of Tourette's Syndrome, which causes sufferers to
"blurt out offensive words and phrases." Id.
487. Dr. Brohm can argue, however, that the rule had a disparate impact on him because of the
limitations caused by his disability of sleep apnea--that his sleep apnea made it substantially more
difficult for him to comply with the rule.
488. See Brohm v. JH Props., Inc., 149 F.3d 517,521 (6th Cir. 1998) (stating that Dr. Brohm's
conduct of sleeping on the job "rendered him unqualified to perform his duties as an
anesthesiologist"); Brohm v. JH Props., Inc., 947 F. Supp. 299, 301 (W.D. Ky. 1996), aff'd, 149
F.3d 517 (6th Cir. 1998) ("Dr. Brohm's sleeping during surgical procedures placed his patients and
the Hospital in grave danger.").
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objection is not to the substance of the no-sleeping rule but rather to the
fact that the hospital did not allow him another chance to comply with the
rule, after he received treatment for his sleep apnea.489
Is this a permissible disparate impact argument: that an otherwise
reasonable conduct rule is not job-related and consistent with business
necessity if it fails to provide an additional opportunity for compliance
after treatment? The implications are disturbing. A plaintiff who violated
a valid conduct rule could always argue that business necessity - and the
ADA goal of opening workplaces to individuals with disabilities indicates that the employer should not use the rule to screen him or her out,
where the plaintiff could comply with the rule in the future. Under this
interpretation of the ADA's disparate impact theory, a disabled employee
whose disability made it substantially more difficult for him or her to
comply with a conduct rule would have no incentive to seek treatment as
soon as possible. Instead, when the employee finally faced discharge for
violating the rule, he or she could argue that it would be consistent with
business necessity to provide him or her another chance for compliance.
Dr. Brohm apparently felt no urgency to seek treatment for his sleep
apnea, despite his notice that he was having difficulty complying with the
workplace conduct rule prohibiting sleeping during surgical procedures.
Even if he was unaware of his sleeping episodes at the time they occurred,
the hospital CEO first informed Dr. Brohm of reports that he was sleeping
during surgical procedures in late June and did not discharge him until
early September.490 Rather than being alarmed by the danger his behavior
posed to patients, Dr. Brohm offered the weak excuse that "he had a sinus
problem and that clearing his sinuses could be interpreted as snoring."491
Dr. Brohm did not see a physician about his condition until the week after
he was discharged, when he was finally diagnosed with sleep apnea.4 92
Allowing him to use the disparate impact theory to demand another chance
to comply with the no sleeping rule would reward his irresponsible and
dangerous behavior and is inconsistent with the ADA.
Hamilton could attempt to make a similar disparate impact argument
to that made by Ray, but it is unlikely that he would be successful.
Hamilton could assert that he was fired for violating a workplace conduct
rule requiring cordial relationships among co-workers, and that such a rule
was not job-related and consistent with business necessity for his position.
Because Hamilton was a managerial employee, however, interactions with
other employees probably were a frequent and important part of his job.4 93

489.
490.
491.
492.
493.

See Brohm, 947 F. Supp. at 302.
Brohm, 149 F.3d at 519.
Brohm, 947 F. Supp. at 300.
Brohm, 149 F.3d at 520.
See supra note 482.
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Moreover, Hamilton's employer would likely assert that, by slapping his
co-worker's hand down, Hamilton violated the company's conduct rule
prohibiting workplace violence, and that rule seems job-related and
consistent with business necessity for every job.
Hamilton's real problem with either conduct rule is similar to the
problem Dr. Brohm had with the no sleeping rule. Hamilton would not
contend that the rules are unnecessary or that he will never be able to
comply with them. Instead, he likely would be able to refrain from
workplace violence and maintain cordial relationships with his co-workers
in the future, particularly if his employer allowed him to take a break to
"cool off" when he became angry at work. Hamilton's problem with the
rule would be with its zero tolerance nature.
He would argue that, while refraining from workplace violence and
maintaining cordial relationships with his co-workers may be essential
functions of his job, those conduct rules tend to screen him out due to
limitations imposed by his disability-the difficulty controlling his anger
caused by his PTSD-and the zero tolerance nature of the rules is not jobrelated and consistent with business necessity. Regarding the maintainingcordial-relationships rule, Hamilton would argue that giving him another
opportunity to comply with the rule would not present a risk of harm nearly
as serious as that presented by Dr. Brohm and the no-sleeping-duringsurgery rule.494 In addition, Hamilton would argue that allowing him a
second chance to comply with the conduct rules would not reward
irresponsible behavior as it would in the Brohm case. Unlike Dr. Brohm,
Hamilton did not violate the conduct rules numerous times before facing
discharge and seeking to change his behavior.495 While Hamilton suspected
that he had PTSD before his confrontation with his co-worker, he may not
have known that the symptoms of his PTSD would limit his ability to
comply with the conduct rules until he lost his temper during the
confrontation.496
Finally, Simpkins has an even better argument than Hamilton that the
zero tolerance nature of a workplace conduct rule had a disparate impact
upon her and is not job-related nor justified by business necessity.
Simpkins violated her employer's rule requiring employees to obtain the
permission of their direct supervisor before leaving the workplace during

494. This argument would be less strong regarding the no workplace violence rule, which
would present a risk of physical injury although arguably less so than the risk presented in the
Brohm case.
495. Hamilton v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 136 F.3d 1047, 1049 (5th Cir. 1998).
496. It would weaken Hamilton's argument if he had angry outbursts outside the workplace
prior to his confrontation with his co-worker. In that situation, arguably he should have known that
his PTSD would interfere with his ability to comply with conduct rules in the workplace and should
have taken steps to avoid the workplace confrontation before it occurred.
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work hours when she had an emotional breakdown and was hospitalized
for depression.497 Simpkins might challenge the substance of the rule,
contending that the fact that the rule provides for no exceptions even in
emergency situations and even when the employee obtains the permission
of another manager had a disparate impact on her due to her hysterical state
connected to her depression.498 Under those circumstances, she would
argue, the rule is not job-related and consistent with business necessity.4 99
Like Hamilton, however, Simpkins's main objection to this rule would
be its zero tolerance nature, given that it seems unlikely that she would
violate the rule in the future once she received treatment for her depression.
Simpkins would contend that the rule's mandate of discharge for one
violation was not job-related and consistent with business necessity.
Providing Simpkins another opportunity to comply with the rule would not
present a risk of serious harm; unlike the grave risk of serious physical
harm presented by Dr. Brohm's conduct, Simpkins's violation of the rule
may have temporarily interrupted the performance of her customer service
and personnel responsibilities. 00 Moreover, allowing Simpkins a second
chance to comply with the rule would not reward irresponsible behavior.
Not only had Simpkins not engaged in such conduct prior to the incident
in question, she did-not know that she suffered from depression before the
incident.
Dr. Brohm, Hamilton, and Simpkins would argue in the above
scenarios under the rubric of disparate impact for something that courts
have repeatedly rejected under the rubric of reasonable accommodation: a
second chance. Disparate impact analysis suggests that Simpkins would
have the strongest argument for a second chance and that Dr. Brohm's
argument would be the weakest. Given the similarities between the
disparate impact theory of discrimination and the duty of reasonable
accommodation, does the above analysis indicate that courts have
construed the scope of potential reasonable accommodations too narrowly?
Under some circumstances, should a second chance constitute a reasonable
accommodation for a disabled person otherwise facing discharge due to
disability-related misconduct?

497. Simpkins v. Specialty Envelope, Inc., No. 95-3370, 1996 WL 452858, at *2 (6th Cir.
Aug. 9, 1996).
498. See generally id. (noting effect of disability on treatment received).
499. Simpkins's argument would be weakened in this regard if her job involved health or
safety issues such that some serious harm could occur if she left her work station without her direct
supervisor's knowledge. However, Simpkins's job was administrative and involved customer
service and personnel issues. Id. at * 1. Her employer did not argue that it suffered any harm through
Simpkins's actions.
500. But see supranote 499.
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C. ReasonableAccommodation
1. The Timing of Reasonable Accommodation
The general rule is that reasonable accommodation is always
prospective in nature.5"' An employer need not excuse past misconduct as
a reasonable accommodation for an employee with a disability, but if the
employee requests a reasonable accommodation that will help him or her
comply with a workplace conduct rule in the future, the employer must
provide that accommodation, absent undue hardship.0 2 The reasons for the
timing limitation of this rule are obvious, particularly in light of the Brohm
case: encouraging employees to seek diagnosis and treatment of their
disabilities as soon as possible and to discuss with their employers likely
difficulties in following workplace conduct rules before they arise.50 3 In
addition, the fact that reasonable accommodation is always prospective in
nature reduces the incentive of nondisabled individuals to claim only after
their discharge that they had a disability that their employer should have
accommodated. 0"
One consequence of the rule that reasonable accommodation is always
prospective in nature is that it might encourage employers to institute a
policy of no tolerance for violation of any of its workplace conduct rules.
Although an employer must provide a reasonable accommodation to an
employee who requests one before engaging in misconduct, as a practical
matter many employees will not request a reasonable accommodation until
after their disability affects their workplace conduct, attracting their
employer's attention. This is particularly true of employees with mental
disabilities, who--due to the stigma accompanying mental illness-may
be reluctant to disclose their disability and who may not understand or be
able to explain what kind of accommodation they need and why they need

501. Office of the Senate Sergeant at Arms v. Office of Senate Fair Employment Practices, 95
F.3d 1102, 1107 (Fed. Cir. 1996); see also EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMM'N, supra
note 67, at 21 n.51.
502. Burch v. Coca-Cola Co., 119 F.3d 305, 319 n.14 (5th Cir. 1997); Brookins v.
Indianapolis Power & Light Co., 90 F. Supp. 2d 993, 1007 (S.D. Ind. 2000); EQUAL EMPLOYMENT
OPPORTUNITY COMM'N, supra note 67, at 19-23.
503. The policy behind this rule--placing an incentive on plaintiffs to avoid avoidable
harm-is reflected in many areas of law. See, e.g., Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775,
804-06 (1998) (recognizing an affirmative defense to vicarious liability for a sexually hostile work
environment created by a supervisor in order to encourage both employers and aggrieved employees
to take action to prevent or quickly remedy instances of harassment).
504. See STEFAN, supra note 100, at 158 (noting that "the people who misuse the law's
protections against disability discrimination... frequently 'discover' their diagnosis in the wake
of disciplinary action"). Of course, the difficulty of satisfying the definition of "disability" should
bar these claims before courts ever reach the reasonable accommodation issue.
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it."'5 If the employer's policy is to place a lesser sanction than discharge
upon an employee who violated a conduct rule, and the employee requests
a reasonable accommodation in the course of receiving that sanction, the
employer must provide the reasonable accommodation, absent undue
hardship."0 6 If, in contrast, the employer's policy is to discharge
immediately any employee who violates a conduct rule, the reasonable
accommodation issue will not arise."0 7 Assuming that the employer applies
the immediate discharge rule uniformly, it will face ADA liability only if
the conduct rule has a disparate impact and is not job-related or consistent
with business necessity,"0 8 or if the plaintiff can make a disparate impact
challenge to the no-tolerance aspect of the employer's policy.
Another consequence of the timing limitation on the duty of reasonable
accommodation-and of the fact that employees often request an
accommodation only after facing discharge-is that plaintiffs frequently
contend that their employers should have known that they needed an
accommodation prior to the misconduct that led to their discharge. Courts
have held that where a disability interferes with an individual's ability to
ask for a reasonable accommodation, and where the employer knows about
both the disability and the need for accommodation, the employer must not
wait for the individual to ask specifically for a "reasonable
accommodation."' 0 9 The parties must engage in an interactive process to

505. Hubbard, supra note 236, at 906; Danforth, supranote 470, at 678-79; see also Andrews
v. United Way of Southwest Ala., Inc., No. CIV. A-98-1142-P-C, 2000 WL 210694, at *7 (S.D.
Ala. 2000) (involving an employee with depression who was discharged for poor performance and
testified that he did not inform anyone of his emotional problems, stating "'I didn't want to tell
anybody. I didn't even tell my family"').
506. See EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMM'N, supra note 67, at 31 (Question 3 1,
Example A) (providing the example of an employee who violates a conduct rule and receives "a
suspension as the second step in uniform, progressive discipline" and then requests a reasonable
accommodation, concluding that the employer must grant the request, absent undue hardship).
507. See Danforth, supra note 470, at 683 (stating that "where an employee is terminated
consistent with the employer's policy of terminating anyone who engages in like behavior, and the
disabled employee then makes his first request for a reasonable accommodation," "the employer
is not required to rescind the discharge").
508. The Den Hartog court errs on this point. The court provides that as a first step in a
disability-related misconduct case, "an employer should normally consider whether a mentally
disabled employee's purported misconduct could be remedied through a reasonable
accommodation," and if so, "the employer should attempt the accommodation." Den Hartog v.
Wasatch Acad., 129 F.3d 1076, 1088 (10th Cir. 1997). The court ignores the important issue of
whether the employee requested a reasonable accommodation before engaging in the misconduct.
If not, under the general rule regarding the duty of reasonable accommodation, the court is not
required to excuse the past misconduct. See supra note 501 and accompanying text. Accordingly,
this approach differs from the inquiry into whether a plaintiff is qualified for his or her position.
Such an inquiry considers whether the plaintiff will be able to perform the essential functions of the
job in the future if he or she receives a reasonable accommodation.
509. Bultemeyer v. Fort Wayne Cmty. Sch., 100 F.3d 1281, 1285-86 (7th Cir. 1996).
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determine an appropriate accommodation, and when an employee has a
mental illness, "[t]he employer has to meet the employee half-way, and if
it appears that the employee may need an accommodation but doesn't
510
know how to ask for it, the employer should do what it can to help."
Relying on these cases, some plaintiffs have argued that, given their
employers' knowledge of their mental disabilities, the employers should
have been on notice that the disabilities required accommodation.5"'
Taking this reasoning a step further, some plaintiffs have contended that
their misconduct or poor work performance should have put their
employers on notice both that the plaintiffs had mental disabilities and that
they required accommodation. 12 Both arguments pose dangers to the equal
treatment of employees with disabilities. The first argument encourages
employers to assume that employees with disabilities are limited in ways
relevant to the workplace and thus need special treatment. 13 The second
argument encourages employers to associate misconduct and poor
by assuming that employees with
performance with mental disabilities
14
disabled.
be
must
problems
such
510. Id. at 1285; see also Miller v. 11. Dep't of Corr., 107 F.3d 483, 486 (7th Cir. 1997)
(stating that if "the nature of the disability is such as to impair the employee's ability to
communicate his or her needs, as will sometimes be the case with mental disabilities, the employer,
provided of course that he is on notice that the employee has a disability, has to make a reasonable
effort to understand what those needs are even if they are not clearly communicated to him").
511. See, e.g., Taylor v. Principal Fin. Group, Inc., 93 F.3d 155, 163-64 (5th Cir. 1996)
(holding that, although employer knew that plaintiff with performance problems had bipolar
disorder, employer had no duty to accommodate him because plaintiffmentioned no limitations that
he experienced as a result of his disability).
512. See, e.g., Rogers v. CH2M Hill, Inc., 18 F. Supp. 2d 1328, 1336-39 (M.D. Ala. 1998)
(involving plaintiff who claimed that his depressed demeanor along with vague statements that he
made to his supervisors about "'feeling kind of down and depressed,"' meant that his employer
should have known of his disability of depression because it was obvious); Adams v. Rochester
Gen. Hosp., 977 F. Supp. 226, 236 (W.D.N.Y. 1997) (involving plaintiff who claimed that his
employer should have known about and accommodated his disability of depression because he
made three mistakes in his work and behaved "'strangely' at times).
513. See Taylor, 93 F.3d at 164 (noting that "the ADA does not require an employer to assume
that an employee with a disability suffers from a limitation" and that "better public policy dictates
the opposite presumption: that disabled employees are not limited in their abilities to adequately
perform their jobs").
514. See Hedberg v. Ind. Bell Tel. Co., 47 F.3d 928, 934 (7th Cir. 1995) ("The ADA hardly
requires that merely because some perceived tardiness and laziness is rooted in disability, an
employer who has not been informed of the disability, and who has no reason to know of the
disability, is bound to retain all apparently tardy and lazy employees on the chance that they may
have a disability that causes their behavior."); Rogers, 18 F. Supp. 2d at 1342 (reasoning that
"[p]lacing upon the employer the duties to confront a dilatory employee, to question that employee
about whether he or she has a mental illness, and to propose a reasonable accommodation for that
employee" would, in effect, equate mental illness with an inability to perform a job, "the very
opposite of the intent of the ADA"); Lippman v. Sholom Home, Inc., 945 F. Supp. 188, 192 (D.
Minn. 1996) ("An employer is not obligated to observe employees for any behavior which may be
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Under some circumstances, an employee's conduct may be so unusual
for that employee and so symptomatic of a disability that the conduct might
provide an employer with notice of the employee's disability, of the need
for accommodation, and of the employee's disability-related inability to
request an accommodation. 15 Often, however, this argument aims
primarily at avoiding the effect of the rule that a second chance is never a
reasonable accommodation. Accordingly, this line of cases presents the
same issue as the disparate impact analysis in the previous subsection:
should the duty of reasonable accommodation ever require providing a
disabled employee a second chance? Before answering that question, it is
useful to consider what reasonable accommodations other than a second
chance might assist disabled employees in avoiding workplace misconduct.
2. Examples of Reasonable Accommodation Relevant to
Compliance with Conduct Rules
Assuming that a plaintiff satisfies the timing requirement of the duty of
reasonable accommodation, what types of accommodation might enable
him or her to comply with conduct rules in the future? 16 Courts generally
agree that a leave of absence to obtain treatment is a form of reasonable
accommodation."1 Commentators have outlined other possibilities that
"may help an employee with a disability remain calm and in control of
disability-related impulses," such as allowing the employee a brief coolingoff period when he or she becomes angry or stressed, or allowing the

symptomatic of a disability, and then divine that the employee actually suffers from a disability.").
515. See Hedberg,47 F.3d at 934 (stating that "it maybe that some symptoms are so obviously
manifestations of an underlying disability that it would be reasonable to infer that an employer
actually knew of the disability" and providing the example of"an employee who suffers frequent
seizures at work"). One possible example is the case ofLandefeldv. MarionGeneralHospital,Inc.,
involving a physician who engaged in the bizarre behavior of stealing mail from the hospital
mailboxes of other physicians and shortly thereafter was diagnosed with bipolar disorder. 994 F.2d
1178, 1179 (6th Cir. 1993). Cf Byrne v. Avon Prods., Inc., 328 F.3d 379, 381-82 (7th Cir. 2003)
(holding that plaintiffs unusual behavior-sleeping on the job after years of being a model
employee-may have provided his employer with notice that plaintiff had a "serious health
condition" possibly entitling him to leave under the Family and Medical Leave Act, and that the
plaintiff s major depression may have rendered him incapable of telling his employer that he needed
leave). But see Rogers, 18 F. Supp. 2d at 1336-37 ("The court is inclined to believe that symptoms
of depression or anxiety could never clearly be such manifestations of an illness that the employer
would be held to have imputed knowledge of that illness.").
516. Although courts are divided on the issue, plaintiffs should be able to request reasonable
accommodation for any of the limitations caused by their disabilities, not just those connected to
their substantially limited major life activities. See supra notes 365-75 and accompanying text.
517. See, e.g., Rascon v. U S W. Communications, Inc., 143 F.3d 1324, 1333-34 (10th Cir.
1998) (holding that employer should have provided an employee with PTSD, who had problems
with anger and fighting in the workplace, with the four months of leave he requested for treatment).
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employee to call supportive individuals during the workday. 18 In addition,
because mental disabilities are so context-dependent, commentators have
suggested ways of altering the workplace environment to reduce the
likelihood of disability-related misconduct, such as eliminating harassing
conduct in the workplace, reducing the amount of overtime the employee
must work, transferring the employee away from an abusive supervisor, or
training supervisors to approach the employee in a less confrontational
manner and to provide clearer instructions and constructive feedback on
performance.5"9 Educating supervisors and co-workers about mental
likelihood that they will find disabilitydisabilities also may reduce52the
0
disturbing.
behavior
related
Courts have rejected many of these proposed accommodations, holding,
for example, that it is not a required reasonable accommodation to reassign
a disabled employee to a new supervisor.521 Many employers also have
been resistant to behavioral, rather than physical, modifications to the
workplace, despite the inexpensive nature of many such changes.522
Nonetheless, employer surveys have shown that the most common
accommodations for mental disabilities include "adaptations of the
interpersonal environment to protect the worker's privacy and reduce
stress," "extra tolerance for unusual behavior," and "written
instructions. 5 23 Given the context-dependent nature of mental disabilities,

518. Hubbard, supranote 236, at 925.
at 909-10, 924-25; Stefan, supra note 236, at 840-44.
519. See id.
520. See Hubbard, supra note 236, at 912 ("When supervisors and co-workers have more
information about mental disorders, they are likely to become less fearful of employees with those
disorders and less likely to misinterpret or overreact to their behavior.").
521. See, e.g., Kennedy v. Dresser Rand Co., 193 F.3d 120 (2d Cir. 1999) (holding that it was
not a required reasonable accommodation to assign the plaintiff to a different supervisor); Reed v.
Lepage Bakeries, Inc., 102 F. Supp. 2d 33, 38 (D. Me. 2000) (holding that it was not a reasonable
accommodation for the plaintiff, who suffered from bipolar disorder, to walk away from her
supervisor when she thought she was likely to lose control). Interestingly, courts maybe more likely
to find that a behavioral accommodation is reasonable where the employee's misconduct is due to
a physical, rather than mental, disability. See, e.g., Gilday v. Mecosta County, 124 F.3d 760, 761,
766 (6th Cir. 1997) (finding that a paramedic with diabetes, who was discharged for rudeness to
patients and colleagues caused by blood-sugar fluctuations, should have received a transfer to a
less-busy station where he could have better followed his regimen, because "[a]n employer cannot
deny an accommodation that the worker claims will make him able to perform the job and then
argue that the worker's allegedly correctable performance justified termination").
522. Hubbard reasons that such resistance may be because employers "do not understand the
behavioral aspects of mental disorders or believe that issues concerning supervision and workplace
culture are their prerogative." Hubbard, supra note 236, at 906; see also Stefan, supra note 236,
at 800 (noting that employer attitudes toward the impact of abusive or stressful work environments
on employees with mental disabilities "mirror[] past attitudes toward the employment of women
and minorities: as long as such employees fit into the workplace culture and do not demand that it
change, they will be accepted").
523. Caroline L. Kaufmann, ReasonableAccommodations to Mental Health Disabilitiesat
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courts should not assume that behavioral accommodations are
unreasonable or will be ineffective in reducing or eliminating disabilityrelated misconduct.
Dr. Brohm contended that if he received a leave of absence to receive
treatment for his sleep apnea, he would no longer fall asleep during
surgical procedures.524 Hamilton may have been able to avoid angry
outbursts at co-workers if his employer permitted him to leave his work
area and take a brief walk when he began to lose his temper. Simpkins
likely would not have become hysterical, needing to leave the workplace
before she could notify her direct supervisors, if the supervisors had been
less confrontational when they met with her and if they had provided her
with more notice of defects in her performance before placing her on
"final" warning. All of these accommodations could have avoided future
misconduct by the plaintiffs. Because the plaintiffs did not request
accommodation before committing their misconduct, however, they now
must request an additional accommodation: a second chance to comply
with their employer's conduct rules.
3. A Second Chance
The concept of fault pervades most cases involving disability-related
misconduct. Indeed, courts' attempts to discern the meaning of misconduct
have focused on the idea that conduct compelled by a disability is not
misconduct, implicitly suggesting that misconduct involves some element
of fault by a disabled employee. 25 Similarly, the seminal case holding that
a second chance is not a reasonable accommodation under the ADA
involved clear evidence of employee fault. In SieJken v. Village of
Arlington Heights, the court rejected the ADA claim of a police officer
who was discharged after he erratically drove his squad car at high speed
through residential areas while experiencing a diabetic reaction. 26 The
court noted that, although the incident would not have occurred but for the
plaintiff's diabetes, "the more immediate cause of the incident leading to
his termination was his failure to monitor his condition. 5 27 Although
courts have cited SieJken repeatedly for the proposition that a second
chance is never a reasonable accommodation under the ADA,528 the court's
precise holding was that "when an employee knows that he is afflicted with
Work: Legal ConstructsandPracticalApplications,21 J. PSYCHOL. & L. 153, 153-54, 160(1993).
524. Brohm v. JH Props. Inc., 947 F. Supp. 299, 302 (W.D. Ky. 1996), aff'd, 149 F.3d 517
(6th Cir. 1998).
525. See supra notes 226-28 and accompanying text.
526. 65 F.3d 664, 665-67 (7th Cir. 1995).
527. Id. at 666.
528. See, e.g., Burch v. Coca-Cola Co., 119 F.3d 305, 319 n. 14 (5th Cir. 1997); Wooten v.
Acme Steel Co., 986 F. Supp. 524, 528 (N.D. Ill. 1997).
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a disability, needs no accommodation from his employer, and fails to meet
'the employer's legitimate job expectations,' due to his failure to control
a controllable disability, he cannot state a cause of action under the
ADA."5'29 Several of the cases following Sielken have involved evidence
of employee fault in not taking prescribed medication for their disabilities,
which led to their misconduct.530 Other "no second chance" cases feature
evidence of employee fault in failing to seek diagnosis and treatment of
their discharge, despite having notice of problems
their conditions before
531
behavior.
with their
The amount of employee fault leading to workplace misconduct will
vary from case to case. Reviewing the sample cases, Dr. Brohm seems
most at fault, by failing to seek medical attention for his sleeping problems
until after his discharge, two months after receiving reports that he was
sleeping during surgical procedures. Simpkins seems least at fault: there
is no evidence that her behavior manifested symptoms of depression which
should have led her to seek medical attention before the leaving-work
incident that caused her discharge.
In addition, it is also noteworthy that the misconduct at issue in
Siejken-erratic, high-speed driving of a squad car through residential
areas 532-posed a considerable danger of serious physical injury to others.

529. Sielken, 65 F.3d at 667 (citation omitted).
530. For example, the employee who suffered from bipolar disorder in Hardy v. Sears,
Roebuck & Co. was discharged for insubordination and making personal threats against his
supervisors. CIV. A. No. 4:95-CV-0215-HLM, 1996 WL 735565, at *1-2 (N.D. Ga. Aug. 28,
1996). Although the plaintiff had received treatment for his bipolar disorder for several years, id.
at *1, the court noted that "[p]laintiff failed to take his prescribed dose of lithium, voluntarily
reducing his use of the medication on several occasions and forgetting to take his noon dosage on
others." Id. at *8. According to the court, "[p]laintiffs failure to take his medication directly
increases the risk of aggressive behavior, and the ADA's requirement of reasonable accommodation
'in no way requires an employer to place its other employees in jeopardy."' Id. (quoting Palmer v.
Circuit Court, 905 F. Supp. 499, 511 (N.D. Ill. 1995)). The court then cited SieJken v. Village of
Arlington Heights, 65 F.3d 664,666-67 (7th Cir. 1995), for the proposition that "the ADA does not
require that employers give employees a'second chance' to follow a prescribed medication regimen
as an accommodation." Hardy, 1996 WL 735565, at * 1-2; see alsoBrookins v. Indianapolis Power
& Light Co., 90 F. Supp. 2d 993,996, 1006 (S.D. Ind. 2000) (finding that employee diagnosed with
anxiety and depression, who was discharged for absenteeism and failing to call in to report his
absences, failed to control his controllable disabilities by discontinuing to see his psychiatrist, who
had prescribed him medication).
531. In Rogers v. CH2MHill,Inc., for example, despite having received notice ofproblems with
his performance throughout the nine-and-a-half months that he worked for his employer, the plaintiff
did not see a physician for his depression until five days before his employer terminated him, after the
decision to discharge had been made. 18 F. Supp. 2d 1328, 1332 (M.D. Ala. 1998). The court found
that "[p]laintiffs attempts to hold CH2M Hill liable.., are really nothing more than a defensive
mechanism to avoid taking responsibility for his own failure to seek treatment." Id. at 1340.
532. The plaintiff stopped only when he was pulled over by police officers from another
jurisdiction; at that time, he was forty miles outside his jurisdiction. Sielken, 65 F.3d at 665.
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Like the amount of employee fault, the severity of misconduct varies
among cases. For example, Dr. Brohm's falling asleep during surgical
procedures seems more severe than does Hamilton's angry outburst and
slap of his co-worker's hand, which seems more severe than Simpkins's
leaving work without notifying her direct supervisor.
Given that the seminal case for the "no second chance" rule involved
both evidence of employee fault leading to the misconduct and misconduct
that was severe in nature, should a second chance be available as a
reasonable accommodation when there is little evidence of employee fault
and where the misconduct is of low severity? Such a rule would not
conflict with the fundamental policy behind prohibiting second chances as
a reasonable accommodation--encouraging prompt action by employees
in seeking diagnosis and treatment of their disabilities and in discussing
with their employers potential problems in following workplace conduct
rules-because evidence ofunreasonable employee delay would constitute
fault. Moreover, such a rule is also consistent with the reasoning behind a
disparate impact challenge to zero tolerance conduct rules.
Some courts are likely to reject the proposed rule, reasoning that a
second chance is never a reasonable accommodation because it does not
alter working conditions so as to enable the employee to perform the
essential functions of the job. In Wooten v. Acme Steel Co., for example,
the plaintiff verbally resigned from his employment one Friday night
during a severe depressive episode, then asked his foreman to disregard his
resignation the following Monday morning.533 His employer refused to
allow the plaintiff to rescind his resignation or to reinstate him, despite the
plaintiffs explanation that his resignation was the result of a severe
depressive episode.534 The severity of the plaintiffs misconduct-if
resigning from his employment can be deemed "misconduct"--is very low;
there was no evidence that his employer had taken any action in reliance
on the plaintiff's dismissal during the weekend before he asked to rescind
his resignation. Nonetheless, the court held that allowing the plaintiff a
second chance at employment was not a reasonable accommodation
because "the ADA's reasonable accommodation provisions refer to
changes in 'ordinary work rules, facilities, terms, and working conditions,'
'
not altering the employment relationship itself."535
Yet couldn't allowing the Wooten plaintiff a second chance at
employment be viewed as altering the ordinarywork rule of never allowing

533. 986 F. Supp. 524, 526 (N.D. Ill. 1997).
534. Id.at 526-27.
535. Id.at 529; see also Stauffer v. Bayer Corp., No. 3:96-CV-661RP, 1997 WL 588890, at
*4, * 11 (N.D. Ind. July 21, 1997) (holding that the ADA did not require the reinstatement of a
plaintiff with adjustment disorder who resigned while upset at work because the ADA "does not
require an employer to give an employee a 'second chance'").
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employees who resign to rescind their resignations, in order 53to6
accommodate the limitations of an employee with depression?
Moreover, not all reasonable accommodations involve changing the
workplace to enable the plaintiff to perform the essential functions of the
job. Allowing an employee a leave of absence to seek treatment does not
directly enable him or her to perform the essential functions of the job
during the leave period, but most courts agree that it may be a reasonable
accommodation if the employee likely will be able to perform the job's
functions following the leave.537 Similarly, while a second chance does not
directly enable an individual to perform ajob's essential functions, it could
be a reasonable accommodation if the employee likely will be able to
perform the job's functions after receiving the second chance.
The likelihood of the employee being able to perform the job's
functions in the future suggests another limitation on second chance as a
reasonable accommodation: the likelihood that the employee will repeat
the misconduct in the future. While a second chance might be reasonable,
allowing a third or fourth chance is much less likely to deter misconduct
and would be more difficult for an employer to administer. This limitation
suggests that the Wooten court properly denied the plaintiffs request for
in Wooten alleged that he resigned due to his
a second chance. The plaintiff538
"uncontrollable depression," ' probably in order to distinguish his case
from Sielken such that he would seem less at fault. This allegation is
problematic, however, because it suggests that the plaintiff would likely
resign and seek reinstatement in the future, and the court concluded that
"reinstating him whenever he resigns during a depressive episode" would
be unreasonable.539
Courts should recognize that a second chance at employment is a
reasonable accommodation where (1) there is little evidence of employee
fault with respect to both the misconduct and not requesting a reasonable
accommodation prospectively; (2) the misconduct is of low severity; and
(3) there is little likelihood that the misconduct will recur.54 ° The third

536. The Wooten plaintiff also could argue that his employer's policy of never allowing
employees to rescind their resignations had a disparate impact on him because of limitations caused
by his disability-his poor judgment during severe depressive episodes-and was not job-related
nor consistent with business necessity.
537. But see Byrne v. Avon Prods., Inc., 328 F.3d 379, 381 (7th Cir. 2003) (finding that a
leave of absence was not a reasonable accommodation for an employee with depression because
"[t]he sort of accommodation contemplated by the Act is one that will allow the person to 'perform
the essential functions of the employment position,"' and "[n]ot working is not a means to perform
the job's essential functions") (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8) (2000)).
538. 986 F. Supp. at 529.
539. Id.
540. Laura F. Rothstein has suggested that a second chance may be an appropriate reasonable
accommodation depending on whether the job "involves public safety, health care, role modeling,
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factor involves the same inquiry as the requirement that the plaintiff be
qualified to fall within the protected class. If the plaintiff is likely to engage
in the misconduct in the future, he or she may be unable to perform the
essential elements of his or her job and thus may not be qualified.14 1 If the
misconduct does not relate to an essential function of the plaintiff sjob, the
plaintiff can argue that the employer's application of a conduct rule
prohibiting such behavior has a disparate impact on
the plaintiff and is not
5 42
job-related or consistent with business necessity.
The second factor, the severity of the misconduct, involves an
examination of both the objective severity of the plaintiff's behavior and
its impact on the employer's operations. For example, while Simpkins's
leaving work without notifying her immediate supervisor initially appears
of low severity, its severity would increase if her employer could show that
her departure left the company unresponsive to time-sensitive
communications from its customers.543 Similarly, evidence that Hamilton's
angry outburst and slap of his co-worker's hand caused employees to feel
unsafe in the workplace would increase the severity of his misconduct.
The first factor, evidence of employee fault, relates both to the
misconduct and to the employee's failure to request a reasonable
accommodation prospectively. Employees not diagnosed with an
impairment before misconduct occurred may be at fault in failing to seek
diagnosis and treatment within a reasonable time after receiving notice that
they might have an impairment. Relevant to both what constitutes notice
and what is a reasonable time is the nature of the plaintiffs disability, in
light of the fact that denial and unclear thinking are associated with many
mental disabilities. Problems with behavior or performance at home or at
work-especially if family, friends, or work associates brought those
problems to the plaintiff's attention--could constitute notice of a possible
impairment. Employees previously diagnosed with an impairment may be
at fault for failing to take prescribed medication or otherwise to follow
their physician's instructions.
Employees aware of their disability often will be at fault if they failed
to request prospectively a reasonable accommodation that would enable

fiduciary or similar trust, [or] supervisor and consistency issues" and depending on the type of
misconduct. Laura F. Rothstein, The Employer'sDuty to Accommodate PerformanceandConduct
Deficiencies of Individuals with Mental Impairments Under Disability Discrimination Laws, 47
SYRACUSE L. REV. 931, 967, 973 (1997). Rothstein does not mention specifically that employee
fault should be a relevant factor.
541. See supra notes 435-49 and accompanying text.
542. See supra notes 465-86 and accompanying text. Because Ray's profane outbursts are
likely to continue, he cannot satisfy the third requirement for receiving a second chance as a
reasonable accommodation. Unless he can prove disparate treatment, his only argument is that
applying the conduct rule to him constitutes disparate impact discrimination.
543. See supra note 499.
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them to avoid misconduct. However, such employees will not be at fault
if they reasonably failed to realize that the disability was likely to result in
conduct that conflicted with a work rule. For example, even though
Hamilton knew that he might have PTSD before his angry outburst at
work, perhaps it was reasonable for him to be unaware that PTSD often
causes irritability and outbursts of anger. Failure to request reasonable
accommodation prospectively also may be reasonable ifthe employee, due
to his or her disability, did not understand the work rule. In Walsted v.
Woodbury County, for example, the court rejected the employer's
contention that its discharge of the plaintiff-who worked as a custodian
in the Department of Motor Vehicles and whom the employer knew to be
"borderline mentally retarded"--for theft of license plate stickers did not
violate the ADA, where no one informed the plaintiff that the stickers were
valuable so "she practiced wrapping boxes and used the stickers as
decorations to seal packages that she made." 5"
VI. CONCLUSION

Retaining disabled employees who engage in misconduct poses some
dangers for employers. Employers may face liability in tort if the employee
injures another employee, a customer, or a member of the public. An
employer that discharges a disabled employee following violence or threats
of violence may be able to rely on the direct threat defense to ADA
liability, however, if it bases the discharge decision on an individualized
assessment of the risks posed by the employee in light of current medical
knowledge. Moreover, disabled employees who are unlikely to cause
physical injury to others nonetheless may pose other liability risks for
employers. For example, an employee's misconduct, causally connected
to his or her disability, may amount to sexual harassment of another
employee for which the employer could be liable.545 Potential solutions to
this problem include finding workplace conduct rules prohibiting such
544. 113 F. Supp. 2d 1318, 1322-23, 1342 (N.D. Iowa 2000). The court reasoned that special
training or instruction would have constituted a reasonable accommodation for the plaintiff that
would have enabled her to avoid the misconduct. Id.at 1337; see also Fembach v. Dominick's
1996) (stating that employer might have
Finer Foods, 936 F. Supp. 467,486-69,471,473 (N.D. Ill.
violated the ADA by discharging plaintiff-whom the employer knew had "'substantial
neurological impairments"' following a stroke-for theft of merchandise that plaintiff had placed
in his employee locker until he could afford to purchase it, if plaintiff did not understand the store
merchandise policy because of his disability).
545. See, e.g., Gasper v. Perry, No. 97-1542, 1998 U.S. App. LEXIS 14933, at *2-3, *8-10
(4th Cir. July 2, 1998) (involving an employee who suffered a frontal lobe dysfunction after a
motorcycle accident-which caused him to be "impulsive, disinhibited, excessively loquacious, and
to have difficulty reading social cues"-who then asked a female co-worker, who was returning to
the building after a run, if she was wearing a "racer-type" bra and also approached a co-worker at a
business reception and, while kneeling at her feet, "begged her not ever to cut her long, beautiful hair").
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harassment to be job-related and consistent with business necessity, or
concluding that any proposed accommodation that places an employer at
serious risk of sexual harassment liability imposes an undue hardship.
Despite these dangers, courts must reject the common approach where
misconduct means the plaintiff loses. Such an approach severely restricts
the protections provided by the ADA to individuals with disabilities,
particularly mental disabilities which are likely to manifest themselves in
the form of conduct. Courts should not assume that plaintiffs who engaged
in misconduct cannot prove disparate treatment, thereby dismissing claims
based on the inability to establish a prima facie case. Rather, courts should
scrutinize the record for evidence of pretext, keeping in mind that
employers may view misconduct committed by employees with mental
disabilities more severely because ofthe stigma and stereotypes associated
with such disabilities.
While indicating that discharge based on disability-related misconduct
is not necessarily disparate treatment, the Supreme Court in Raytheon Co.
v. Hernandez emphasized the availability of the disparate impact theory of
discrimination in ADA cases.5" Workplace conduct policies prohibiting
behavior that disabled individuals find very difficult to control may operate
as a barrier to equality in the workplace and violate the ADA unless the
employer can demonstrate that such policies relate to essential job
functions. More specifically, avoiding the disturbance of co-workers and
customers is not an essential function of every job, regardless of the nature
and extent of the interaction with those persons that a particular job
requires.
Finally, courts should take a broader view of the duty of reasonable
accommodation, considering ways to alter the workplace environment to
reduce the likelihood of disability-related misconduct. Although ideally
employees with disabilities will request such accommodations
prospectively, before they engage in misconduct, many employees with
mental disabilities will not request a reasonable accommodation until after
their disabilities affect their workplace conduct. Under those
circumstances, courts should hold that a second chance at employment is
a reasonable accommodation where there is little evidence of employee
fault with respect to both the misconduct and not requesting a reasonable
accommodation prospectively; the misconduct is of low severity; and there
is little likelihood that the misconduct will recur. Only by considering
carefully the three forms of discrimination prohibited by the ADA will
courts fulfill the promise of the statute to all disabled employees, even
those whose disabilities manifest themselves in the form of conduct.

546. Raytheon Co. v. Hernandez, 540 U.S. 44, 52-53 (2003).
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